Aristotle’s Concept Φρονησις and Moral Education

Abstract

In the systematization of intellectual virtues, amongst which are knowledge (ἐπι-
στήμη), wisdom (σοφία), understanding (νοῦς) and craft (τέχνη), Aristotle enumerates
the practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and defines it as: “to be able to deliberate correctly about
what is good and advantageous …, not partially… but about what sorts of things further
living well as a whole (Arist. NE 1140a25-27, trans. Reeve). Aristotle distinguishes φρόνη-
σις from the knowledge and from the crafts because under this notion he presupposes the
ability not only to decide how to achieve a certain goal, but also the ability to deliberate
and to determine good ends according to the aim of the individual in achieving its own happiness
(εὐδαιμονία). In educational context, this presupposition entails the standpoint that
education should not be understood only as a process of attaining knowledge and crafts, but
also as a process of becoming a virtuous person through thinking embedded in context.
Without the pretension to give a consistent system of the principles of virtue ethics,
concerning education, this article will inspect the possibility of laying out a different
perspective concerning educational practices that are deduced from an ancient ethical theory,
especially the specific notion that this theory introduces, the notion of φρόνησις.