VITA PRACTICA: ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ AND ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

Abstract

As a continuation of Aristotle's definition of φρόνησις as a virtue by which
the individual is competent in each individual case to find the optimal choice for action
that in the background has the general picture of an eudaimonic life, in a specific
medieval context, φρόνησις is treated also in the philosophy of St. Maximus the
Confessor. According to St. Maximus the Confessor, φρόνησις is an understanding
of practical matters that are related to active life, namely “the deliberative power that
determines the right use of reason for those engaged in practice” (Amb Io. 1109B).
In this text, the concept φρόνησις in the works of St. Maximus the Confessor
through several aspects will be examined: creation as an expression of the Divine
φρόνησις, φρόνησις within the systems of virtues and its function, φρόνησις as
the basis for vita practica and the relation between vita practica and vita contemplativa.
Through these thematic points, the characteristics of φρόνησις in St. Maximus
Confessor’s works will be drawn, which will show his aspirations for reconciliation
of microcosmic antinomies with the macrocosmic paradigm of the eternal Logos.