MORALI REALIZEM, ITUICIOIZEM I MORALA FEOMEOLOGIJA
Аннотация
The article deals with moral realism, intuitionism and moral phenomenology. It consists of three main sections. In the first section I define moral realism and moral intuitionism. The second section deals with moral phenomenology and introduces the notion of phenomenological argument. The last section deals with phenomenological arguments supporting moral realism and intuitionism (moral cognitivism, internalism about motivation, moral pluralism).
Скачивания
Данные скачивания пока не доступны.
Литература
Audi R. The Good in the Right / R. Audi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Brink D.O. Moral Conflict and Its Structure / D.O. Brink // H. E. Mason (ur.) Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Dancy J. Two Conceptions of Moral Realism / J. Dancy // J. Rachels (ur.) Moral Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Dummett M. Realism / M. Dummett // Synthèse. 1982. № 52, P. 55–112.
Horgan T. in Timmons M. Moorean Moral Phenomenology / T. Horgan in M.Timmons // v
pripravi.
Kirchin S. Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics / S. Kirchin // Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice. 2003. № 6. P. 241–64.
McBaughton D. Moral Vision / D. McNaughton. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.
Putnam H. Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 / H. Putnam. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) / J. Rawls. Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press,
1999.
Sayre-McCord G. The Many Moral Realisms / G. Sayre-McCord // G. Sayre-McCord (ur.)
Essays on Moral Realism. Itacha & London: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Shafer-Landau R. Moral Realism: A Defence / R. Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Strahovnik V. Intuicionizem, moralni konflikt in pluralizem dolžnosti / V. Strahovnik //
Analiza. 2005. № 4. P. 106–29.
Strahovnik V. Moral Dilemmas, Conflict of Duties and Intuitionist Notion of Prima Facie
Duty / V. Strahovnik // J. Juhant in B. Žalec (ur.) Person and Good. Münster: Lit
Verlag, 2006.
Timmons M. Morality without Foundations / M. Timmons. New York – Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
Brink D.O. Moral Conflict and Its Structure / D.O. Brink // H. E. Mason (ur.) Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Dancy J. Two Conceptions of Moral Realism / J. Dancy // J. Rachels (ur.) Moral Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Dummett M. Realism / M. Dummett // Synthèse. 1982. № 52, P. 55–112.
Horgan T. in Timmons M. Moorean Moral Phenomenology / T. Horgan in M.Timmons // v
pripravi.
Kirchin S. Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics / S. Kirchin // Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice. 2003. № 6. P. 241–64.
McBaughton D. Moral Vision / D. McNaughton. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.
Putnam H. Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 / H. Putnam. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) / J. Rawls. Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press,
1999.
Sayre-McCord G. The Many Moral Realisms / G. Sayre-McCord // G. Sayre-McCord (ur.)
Essays on Moral Realism. Itacha & London: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Shafer-Landau R. Moral Realism: A Defence / R. Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Strahovnik V. Intuicionizem, moralni konflikt in pluralizem dolžnosti / V. Strahovnik //
Analiza. 2005. № 4. P. 106–29.
Strahovnik V. Moral Dilemmas, Conflict of Duties and Intuitionist Notion of Prima Facie
Duty / V. Strahovnik // J. Juhant in B. Žalec (ur.) Person and Good. Münster: Lit
Verlag, 2006.
Timmons M. Morality without Foundations / M. Timmons. New York – Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
Опубликован
2019-10-31
Как цитировать
Strahovnik, V. (2019). MORALI REALIZEM, ITUICIOIZEM I MORALA FEOMEOLOGIJA. Филологические заметки, 5(1), 52-58. извлечено от https://journals.ukim.mk/index.php/philologicalstudies/article/view/749
Раздел
Философско-культурологические проблемы
Philological studies © 2019. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License
