IS THERE LEGAL READINESS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A THIRD SUBJECT OF LAW?

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer a novelty in any respect, and therefore it should not 
be perceived as a phenomenon whose outcomes we still need to observe before developing a 
common societal strategy in any domain. The question arises whether the European Union’s AI 
Act is sufficient to regulate it, or whether it represents a rather weak mechanism for that purpose. 
By its nature, artificial intelligence is a technical phenomenon, similar to many others before it, 
such as the discovery of electric energy or the internal combustion engine. However, unlike them, 
AI possesses the property of autonomy, which is not inherent in any other creation of the human 
mind. 
That autonomy, reinforced by its enormous expansion through the active use of artificial 
intelligence by every modern individual, the gradual creation of dependence on it in everyday 
activities, and its penetration through self-imposition, cannot be regarded merely as another object 
or service. Consciously or unconsciously, users of AI develop their own notion of its 
personalization, perceiving it in their thoughts as an interlocutor or an active collaborator. This 
tendency arises not only from the possibility of direct communication with AI but also from human 
nature itself and the theory of anthropomorphism, according to which human characteristics are 
attributed to objects or abstract concepts. 
This entire set of fundamental considerations, which are well justified, leads us to reflect 
that AI cannot be integrated within the existing legal concepts of material objects. It certainly 
cannot be classified as a natural person; in some aspects, it encroaches upon the characteristics of 
a legal entity. However, we consider it most appropriate for AI to be assigned the nomenclature of 
a person—but what kind? 
Some authors of similar studies discuss the introduction of the concept of a “digital person” 
as a third type of subject of law, yet all of this remains without legal codification that would 
determine how such a concept could be integrated into the legal system. 
The aim of the following paper is to propose a concrete solution, broadly elaborating on 
how and where this new legal person could be integrated, what legal challenges it may encounter, 
and what legal amendments would be required for this emerging “subjectivism,” which is 
becoming part of everyday life, to be legally recognized.