CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE EDGE OF THE MACHINE

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Keywords:

corporate governance, artificial intelligence

Abstract

The increasing incorporation of algorithms, artificial intelligence, and automated decisionmaking
systems into corporate governance marks a structural transformation in the way
corporate authority is exercised. Decision-making processes that were historically grounded in
human judgment, deliberation, and fiduciary responsibility are now increasingly mediated by
algorithmic systems that shape or determine outcomes in areas such as risk management,
compliance, shareholder voting, and capital allocation. While these developments are
frequently justified in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and predictive capacity, their implications
for corporate law remain insufficiently theorized. This article examines the emergence of what
it terms algorithmic corporate actors, i.e. non-human systems that perform governance-relevant
functions with legally and economically significant consequences for corporations and their
stakeholders. It argues that the rise of such systems generates a black box dilemma for corporate
law. On the one hand, algorithmic governance enhances decision-making capacity and
oversight. On the other hand, it obscures responsibility, complicates the application of directors’
fiduciary duties, and weakens traditional mechanisms of accountability and participation. The
article analyses how reliance on opaque algorithmic outputs challenges established doctrines
concerning directors’ duties of care and oversight, reshapes the exercise of shareholder rights
through automated voting and decision-support systems, and strains the capacity of regulators
to monitor compliance regimes governed by proprietary code. Drawing on comparative
perspectives and regulatory developments, including emerging approaches to algorithmic
transparency and auditability, the article evaluates whether existing legal frameworks are
adequate or require adaptation. The central claim advanced is that algorithmic corporate
governance cannot be understood as a purely technical evolution. It represents a shift in the
locus of authority within the firm that compels a reconsideration of core principles of corporate
law, including responsibility, transparency, and meaningful participation. The article concludes
by outlining normative and institutional safeguards aimed at preserving accountability in
corporate governance structures increasingly shaped by code.

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Published

2026-05-27