

## THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE IS FERTILE GROUND FOR TERRORIST RADICALIZATION

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**Abstract:** The article deals with broadening the view of terrorist radicalization, starting from the causes that lead to terrorist radicalization, through social media as a friend of terrorist propaganda distribution, and up to the migration to the dark side of the Internet. The current global landscape is affected by multiple recent crises and largely with high uncertainty, this combined with overall hyper-connectivity is a fertile ground for terrorist radicalization. The impact that terrorists have is due to the spread of their narrative through the media, distributing propaganda material that is easily accessible to all. This material remains available and a potential risk for the spread of new recruits. The online environment is a key medium for terrorist propaganda where law enforcement agencies are forced to take deeper steps to deal with disinformation and propaganda spread by terrorist organizations, which in turn forces terrorists to change their structure and modus operandi. .

**Keywords:** Terrorism, radicalization, social media, anonymous platforms, dark web.

### Introduction

What was once characteristically, or rather, excruciatingly connected to the physical space, today it becomes incompletely connected to it, since more nodes have been released between the physical and online space, in other words, it has acquired a hybrid dimension. The evolution of man was marked by the evolution of technical-technological achievements, so with the advent of the Internet, a digital infrastructure was reached and established that would put man in the center of attention, offering him a series of possibilities for communication, sharing files, images and videos. , up to the establishment of video calls and conversations. But as that digital infrastructure was upgraded, so non-state actors began to use its benefits identically and like the rest, even in certain situations they manage them much more skillfully in contrast to the general audience.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the military response undertaken by the United States and the Middle East alliance, terrorist organizations were forced to find ways to confront a far stronger adversary, both militarily and financially, by moving the fight beyond The Middle East by carrying out terrorist attacks, initially on selected state objects and persons, and then carrying out attacks on non-state objects and persons.

The committed terrorist acts were on every front page in print, television media, and with the advent of social media, they were already available on them. Social media played a key role in spreading terror to a wider audience, and later became directly used for radicalization, recruitment and fundraising by terrorists and extremists.

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With this breaking down of geographic and economic barriers, social media, anonymous platforms and the dark side of the internet have become a medium that connects people who might never meet in physical space. During the emergence of these platforms, terrorists received training and direct guidance from terrorist organizations in their secret places, which posed a great risk of finding their warehouses, camps and even high-ranking people in their chain of command. Now using these platforms they can not only recruit new members, but they manipulate and radicalize their sympathizers by leading them to carry out terrorist attacks that will be accredited by them if successful. All this heralds a new phase in the fight against the global terrorist threat.

Thus, the terrorist groups ceded the space for carrying out terrorist attacks to their followers, who are geographically thousands of kilometers away. Social media has enabled the lone wolf trend, allowing it to reach a very large audience in a very short amount of time while facilitating collaboration between individuals who are at opposite geographic distances. For example, the defendant Sayfulo Saipov committed an attack with a truck in New York in 2017. The attacker was inspired by Islamic State videos that he had seen on social media and also had downloaded to his phone. During the search of the rented truck, two mobile phones were found that contained 90 videos and 3,800 propaganda photos that served as his motivation and were downloaded from IS profiles (Nyst, 2019, pp. 115-121).

A 2016 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies shows that 57% of the content on the dark side of the Internet deals with the sale of weapons, drugs, illegal pornography, hacking and violence (Malik, 2018, pp. 20-22). This points to the fact that the dark side of the Internet not only provides anonymous communication, the purchase of third-party data and travel documents, but it also allows terrorists and extremists to acquire weapons or explosive materials at any time without being discovered by the intelligence services.

## **1. Who becomes a terrorist and/or who becomes a radicalized?**

A large number of people who joined a terrorist organization, but also people who committed a terrorist act without being part of a particular terrorist organization (they were so-called sympathizers), go through several stages of radicalization, consequently, radicalization is a process that consists of several stages, i.e. it consists of four separate but interrelated stages, namely: ideological engagement, radicalization of the individual, catalyst and transition to violent extremism or terrorism (Muro, 2016, p. 2).

Early research into the question of "why do they become terrorists" assumed that becoming a terrorist actually involved a direct choice to change one's status. However, social and operational observations of a number of terrorist and extremist organizations suggest that recruitment and involvement usually do not occur with a conscious decision to join the same organization. As Horgan and Taylor note "what we know about actual terrorists suggests that a conscious decision to become a terrorist is rarely made. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization to extreme behavior." (Borum, 2004, p. 24).

In studies of terrorism in the late 1960s, it was not uncommon for scholars to consider pathology as a psychological abnormality. In the 1980s, this idea gained a bad reputation, and now scholars almost have a consensus that the roots of terrorism do not lie

in the individual, but on the contrary, the roots and causes lie and should be sought in the wider circumstances in which the individuals who have become live and act terrorists.

Although a certain number of studies focus on determining which types of personality profile are susceptible to radicalization, in this section we will not focus entirely on psychological characteristics because the question of “why” has a large (if not decisive) influence on the social conditions in which the individual lives and acts. In this regard, Albert Bandura points out that “it takes favorable social conditions rather than people who are beasts to commit beastly acts. Given social conditions, decent, ordinary people may be led to commit cruel acts.” (Cottee, 2015).

Although in this direction there are a large number of discussions among scientists about the “social conditions” themselves, about their nature and the influence they have, still few would question the essential point of violence, no matter how overanalyzed it is, above all it is deeply rooted in historical structures and/or social relations, not in the individuals themselves, still less in their “pathological” thinking.

Instead of answering the question “why”? to look for it only in the individual, it is necessary to expand the picture and look around the individual, that is, in the society itself. Thus, the very reasons for the emergence of terrorism in historical frameworks indicate that it was always just a symptom of the disease, which was caused by the inequality and imperfection of certain social systems or the world order itself, in which the injustice and imperfection between people and nations stood on the surface. In this context, violence in the form of terrorism was and still is an expression of powerlessness in the face of power, which in certain historical periods, but to a large extent today, dominates the law. Such an indestructible situation characterized by a division between people, nations and states that is particularly evident today, embodied through the struggle for dominance and a new world order, a struggle that is surrounded by a series of armed conflicts and struggles, now not only against non-state actors, rather, a confrontation between the state and the state began. A global landscape that is shaped by war and a permanent division between people where some lives are more valuable than others and where two identical acts committed by two different perpetrators are treated differently, depending on the power and strength of the one who performs that act. Thus, in such social circumstances, it presses the consciousness of modern man more than ever that nothing can be changed to improve his position. All this causes pain and suffering in man, so he tends more and more to destroy society than to contribute to its construction, as a result of desperation (Трајан Панов, Трајан Гоцевски, Сিনিша Даскаловски, 2003, стр. 120-121)

Hence, joining a terrorist organization is driven by motive. Thus, Martha Crenshaw (Borum, 2004, p. 24) suggests that there are at least four categories of motivation, namely:

- 1) Opportunity to take action;
- 2) The need to satisfy the sense of belonging;
- 3) Desire for social status;
- 4) Acquisition of material benefit.

Motives for joining a terrorist organization can vary, depending on whether it is left-wing or right-wing terrorism. In their study “Why do people join and accept violent groups” Angel Gomez and other authors survey members of two different ideologically oriented terrorist organizations, that is, arrested members of the Tamil Tigers and arrested members of ISIS.

LTTE ex-fighters			Ex-Islamist radicals		
Reasons for joining	n	%	Reasons for joining	n	%
Total	44	100%	Total	60	100%
Compliance	21	47.73%	Compliance	13	21.67%
Internalization	20	45.45%	Internalization	47	78.33%
<b>Compliance</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Compliance</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Total	21	100%	Total	13	100%
Charismatic agent	1	4.76%	Charismatic agent	8	61.54%
Propaganda	3	14.29%	Propaganda	5	38.46%
Coercion	17	80.95%	Coercion	0	0%
<b>Internalization</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Internalization</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Total	20	100	Total	47	100
Personal Identity	6	30%	Personal Identity	16	34.04%
Relational Identity	9	45%	Relational Identity	17	36.17%
Collective Identity	5	25%	Collective Identity	14	29.79%

Figure no. 1 Percentage of reasons for joining

## 2. The Power and Reach of Social Media

Radicalization can be said to be a direct consequence of the propaganda spread by terrorists, that is, radicalization is a product of propaganda. Today in the era of digitization where the modern man is omnipresent in the online discourse, it becomes almost unthinkable for the modern man to function without the digital infrastructure. In this section we will highlight the famous statement made by Osama bin Laden “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio can reach 90% of the total preparation for battles” (Diana Rieger, Lena Frischlich, Gary Bente, 2013, p. 16).





Figure no. 2 The big picture of digital infrastructure<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Sorce: The Digitalised Terrorism Ecology: A Systems Perspective by Nixon Muganda Ochara available at: <https://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/ajic/v25/01.pdf> last accessed on 27.08.2024.

Figure No. 2 shows the ubiquity of digital technology, from the aspect of structuring the problem, in the human system of living - a discovery that resonates with the emergence of the term sociomateriality, as well as the ability and capacities of technology to exert different types of influence on man. activities and his lifestyle. Seen through this prism, perhaps Daniel, Hartnett, and Meadows are right to argue that the democratizing possibilities of social media are evident in the transformation of top-down power structures to much more bottom-up power. Also, this presentation emphasizes the need to understand the importance of the source of information as an essential meaning that creates the state's understanding of new and diverse forms of terrorism, but also for the development of state policies and strategies to deal with terrorism. However, this is a double-edged sword because with increased online access to information, terrorists can develop counter-strategies for governments' counter-terrorism efforts. Also, the opportunity offered by the Internet and social media to disseminate information in the online space has facilitated terrorists and terrorist organizations in their efforts not only to reach a wide audience for their propaganda, but to promote it and to radicalize and recruit new members. (Ochara, 2020, стр. 9-10).

The greatest advantage that terrorist organizations have, almost identically to all other users, is that "social media and messaging applications allow users to connect with local or global communities, amplify their message and generate momentum. for their causes (FATF, 2023, p. 26), at the same time, they can be used to collect financial resources from their sympathizers who are prevented from participating and joining them on the battlefield, as well as inspiring people who are not members of the terrorist organization itself, but themselves, to carry out terrorist attacks fell under the propaganda influence of "charismatic agents" in the internet space.

Radicalization through social media is only one part of the puzzle. The second part of the handbook refers to the inspiration and motivation of sympathizers through these media to carry out certain terrorist attacks. The first signs of this part of the maid appeared with the attack on La Rambla in Barcelona on August 17, 2017. The change did not concern the manner in which the attack was carried out, but rather how that attack triggered a series of other attacks inspired by ISIS sympathizers. After the London Underground attack (September 15, 2017) and the La Rambla attack, there were three more terrorist attacks that were inspired by the previous attacks, in Finland, Russia and France (Wires, 2017). This was followed by three more raids (two of which were in France) in Chalons-sur-Saône, Paris and Birmingham. At the same time, IS propaganda "explodes", not only celebrating the attack on social media, but also proposing new targets, especially Rome and the Vatican, while easily finding an "ally" in various media that cover these new developments and distribute the message to the general public (Mazzoni, 2019, стр. 140-143).




**Figure 3.** Attacks targeting civilians linked to or inspired by ISIS<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Source: The New York Times - available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/>

In Figure 3 you can see the attacks that were carried out in the period up to 2016, so yes, if we go back to 2015 we can see that the inspiration tactic was applied (or tested) even before the big changes in the functioning of the Islamic state and its Modus operandi in 2017. Thus, after the attacks in Russia (that is, the downing of a Russian plane where 220 passengers died) and two weeks later in Paris where 100 people died. They used these attacks to inspire and call their supporters to carry out attacks, so in December in San Bernardino, California, a woman together with her husband before opening fire in a conference hall that killed 14 people, posted their oath on a Facebook page for loyalty to ISIS (Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins etc., 2016).

And on the other side, that is, right-wing terrorist attacks draw inspiration from their idols, such as the example of Brenton Tarrant who killed 51 people in the terrorist attack on two mosques in New Zealand. Before carrying out the attack, he published a manifesto on the Internet entitled "The Great Mutual". In this manifesto you can find a large number of terrorists who are from the extreme right. He engraved their names and certain slogans on his weapons and the attack was broadcast live on Facebook. In the central part of the manifesto "The Great Replacement", Brenton points out that he had contact with the right-wing terrorist attacker Andreas Breivik, from whom he received the blessing for his mission. In the central part of the manifesto, he points out that he constantly read the statuses of other racist terrorists, including Dylann Roof, but the main motivator was Breivik, with whom he claims to have established communication (Graham Macklin and Tore Bjørgo, 2021, pp. 14-36).

In the period between 2005 - 2016 in the USA, social media played a primary or secondary role in the processes of radicalization and mobilization, i.e. 265 out of a total of 479 or 55.3%. These individuals used social media in a variety of ways, including to find and spread extremist narratives, create shareable content, and/or communicate with like-minded people (Michael Jensen, Patrick James, Gary LaFree etc., 2017, pp. 1-10).



**Figure 4.** Social Media Radicalization 2005-2016

Just for comparison, in 2016, 45.4% of supporters and sympathizers of the Islamic State used social media as a primary means of radicalization. On the other hand, right-wing extremists and terrorists used social media 42.76%, but unlike the previous ones, they used it mostly as a complement to the radicalization processes that took place in the offline space. (Ibid.,1-10).

Finally, we'll highlight another recent example that illustrates the power of social media propaganda distribution. On November 23, 2023, a series of videos appeared on the social network Tik Tok showing the manifesto of the notorious terrorist Osama bin Laden entitled "Letter to America" which he wrote in 2002. TikTok has announced that it is "massively removing" video content sharing the manifesto, which was released in the wake of the Palestinian-Israeli war, underscoring Laden's criticism of America and its deep involvement in the Middle East, as well as the support it gives to Israel. Reactions from the White House immediately reached the Chinese-owned Tik Tok company in order to remove this video that supports anti-Semitism. TikTok reported that about 300 videos with the hashtag #lettertoamerica had appeared and had views of about 2 million. However, after this video was shared by the influential Twitter user (now known as X) Yashar Ali, the video gained momentum and crossed 13 million views which forced TikTok to take more serious measures where all videos commenting on the manifesto were removed. (Ally, 2023).

### **3. The use of Anonymous platforms by terrorists**

The digital age has enabled new horizons for terrorists and extremists to operate. Analyzes of terrorism show that in all its aspects (weight, size, operations), today its "structure" has become much more complex than its appearance on the global stage as "Modern Terrorism" in the 1960s and 1970s. This dramatic change in the nature of terrorism can we attribute it to the very emergence of the Internet infrastructure. To a large extent, the basic characteristic of this infrastructure is the openness and availability of access, which in turn increases networking and offers many opportunities for terrorists to operate by exploiting this infrastructure. (Ochara, 2020, p. 11).

Digital infrastructure has started to take a significant place in the daily life of every individual. Thus, online platforms, as part of this infrastructure, have become a powerful tool in the hands of terrorist and extremist groups through which they can spread their ideology, radicalize and recruit new members to their group.

Given the propensity for violence inherent in terrorism, the suggestion that terrorists collect data seems unrealistic. However, larger and more successful terrorist organizations do this, they collect, edit and distribute ideas that have propaganda purposes. ISIS has proven to be very strong in its use of social media to distribute materials, deploying propaganda on these networks as part of waging a war to strengthen and build its state. (Seebeck, 2020, pp. 75-80).

The collection and use of such data, in addition to the easy access that allows communication with people called "end users", disrupts the traditional ways of acting, and also contributes to the erosion of trust between the government and society (citizens), creating an image that the state is not able to satisfy their necessary needs and leaves them on the margins in the socio-social hierarchy. What is of great importance is that online platforms along with anonymous communication platforms called "Anonymous Platforms" or "The Dead Drops platforms", i.e. the availability of these tools and easy access allow new, technologically savvy players, whether it is about individuals, non-state actors or companies, getting involved, observing, exerting some influence, making an impact, as well as potentially undermining and destroying their (un)friend.

Pushed by the increasing surveillance of social media and other online platforms, terrorists have started to use other, smaller platforms that will allow them a number of functions and activities without the need to create an account or leave other personal data. The most popular such platform is JustPast.it. It is a Polish site that does not require registration and is not open for search by the users who will access it, while the content that is attached to it is only available by sharing the link with another person by the creator of the content.

This content offers formatting and exporting PDF documents, pasting text directly from another document or web page, uploading and downloading images, the content is secure and password protected by the content creator. More importantly from a terrorist point of view, this platform allows them to protect content from automated searches by web robots and algorithms when it is posted on social media or another online platform by providing them with encrypted tags. This platform attracted international attention when it became clear that ISIS supporters and operatives were using it to share and disseminate images, videos containing propaganda content and executions of persons held hostage by ISIS, as well as textual content promoting and spreading their ideology (Silverman, 2014). Significantly, due to the deletion of content by social media, i.e. by its automated algorithms, terrorists began to use this platform to distribute their magazines, as with the example of ISIS publishing its magazine Dabiq and its later editions. (Ahmad Shehabat, Teodor Mitew, pp. 81-99)



**Figure 5.** *Dabiq Magazine issue hosted by justpast.it (full url is obfuscated<sup>22</sup>)*

The move to such platforms is the result of a crackdown Twitter took in 2015 that deleted nearly 20,000 accounts suspected of being directly or indirectly linked to ISIS.

The owner of the justpast.it platform, Mariusz Żurawek, in cooperation with the security and intelligence services, removed certain ISIS content that had a propaganda purpose in 2014, as a result of this discovery and removal of the content, new such platforms appeared, including Manbar.me in 2014, nasher.me in 2015 and Alors.ninja June 2015.

Manbar.me became a replacement for justpast.it that was actively used not only by ISIS operatives but also by its sympathizers who retweeted posts from official ISIS pages. ISIS provincial media offices have begun using this anonymous platform, including those located in Tripoli and Barqa in Libya. (Steven Stalinsk, R. Sosnow, 2016). Their goal was to distribute propaganda that included collections of photos and videos of events, executions, attacks and

<sup>22</sup> Извор: Ahmad Shehabat, Teodor Mitew - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26343748>



raids carried out by the terrorist organization. In addition, we will present several examples of posts that were used by the media offices of ISIS.



Слика бр.6 Profile page: “The official account for the Media Office - The Province of Sinai - The Islamic State - This page is for publication and not for communication”



Слика бр. 7 “#Syrian\_Rasd ||New|| The Media Office of the Province of Diyala presents: Visual Report: lava (5)”; Manbar.me page linked to in the tweet: “Shelling the barracks of the Safavid army with 60 mm mortar rounds<sup>23</sup>.”

Using these platforms allows terrorists to duplicate the content creator, disseminators and end consumer of the propaganda material itself. This contributes to solidifying and strengthening the network for spreading propaganda, also ensuring effective avoidance of algorithms and automatic propaganda detectors established by social media, thus ensuring that even if a piece of content is removed from a site (link ), there is another reliable site where the same propaganda material can be found. Thus, these platforms are

<sup>23</sup> Sorce: MEMRI TV available at <https://www.memri.org/reports/jihadi-cycle-content-sharing-web-services-2009-2016-and-case-justpasteit-favored-isis-al> last accessed on 25.08.2024

used as “communication black boxes” in order to enable “quick redistribution of content even in the face of heavy intelligence monitoring and filtering.” All this results in a “fragmentation of propaganda that makes these materials “less monitored by the social media themselves or security-intelligence services” but allows for a “relatively closed and stable digital propaganda ecosystem” (Mazzoni, 2019, pp. 140-141).

The evolving landscape of online recruitment and radicalization requires intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies to be flexible, adaptable and proactive. By constantly reviewing their strategies, using new technologies and information on the latest trends, these agencies can be effective in reducing the threat of online radicalization.

#### **4. The dark side of the Internet as an enabler of terrorist activities**

The EU adopted a regulation by which, from June 7, 2022, each member state through its authorized body will be able to issue an order for the removal of terrorist content from social media, whereby social media are obliged to remove the same post within one hour at the latest terrorist or extremist content. From 2022 until now, more than 23 member states have established such bodies and used this option, and approximately 350 orders have been issued to remove radical content (Affairs, 2024).

This decision of the EU is a step forward in the fight against radicalization in the online space, but on the other hand, terrorists and extremists were forced to make a change in taking their actions in the distribution of propaganda, so they started using anonymous platforms that together with the so-called computer clouds, that is, platforms that allow online content to be stored, have allowed them to escape from algorithms (as we elaborated in the previous point) and automatic detectors built into social media. Some of them started to migrate to other social media that offer them greater privacy, anonymity and a high degree of encryption in their communication.

On the other hand, such a decision of the EU together with the latest event in which the owner of the Telegram social network Pavel Durov was arrested, which is considered one of the most trusted social media in terms of privacy protection and high level of communication encryption, will force terrorist organizations to search, that is, to migrate now more massively almost to the safest place in the internet space, that is the dark side of the internet. During 2023 Telegram, Signal and Discord were named as the platforms most dominantly used by cybercriminals (CCT, 2024, pp. 11-13)

In short, in order to understand the essence of the dark side of the Internet, we will give the example, as a metaphor, of the existence of cities. The bustling city center and its highly visible and busy streets, shopping malls and tall light towers represent that publicly accessible and visible space on the internet, where anyone can have access, that is mainstream websites and social media. Inside the buildings are private things where people live their personal and private lives, representing the private networks and databases that make up the deep web. The hidden corners and dark alleys of the city, which many residents may not even know exist, reflect the discreet and sometimes dangerous corners of the dark web (Ibid.,14).

The use of the dark web by terrorists and extremists complicates detection processes by state security and intelligence agencies. It is assumed that they have been using this part of the internet for a long time, but the real official data dates back to 2013 when the US

National Security Agency published this data. Also they store propaganda data (the dark web serves as a propaganda repository), far better protection against possible attacks and detections by government services. Moreover, they have started using cryptocurrencies to raise funds and to make transactions/transfers for illegal trade, extortion and/or money laundering by making the most of their anonymity feature.

In addition to the dissemination and storage of propaganda material, communication and coordination of terrorist attacks, terrorists have begun to use the dark side as a source for raising funds, but also for acquiring weapons (or bomb-making materials) to carry out terrorist attacks. An example of a fundraiser is "Fund the Islamic Struggle without Leaving a Trace" a link is posted to collect donations from supporters at a specific bitcoin address. The public prosecutor's office in Stuttgart revealed that the weapons used in the terrorist attacks in Paris were obtained through the dark side of the Internet, that is, by a seller on this network called DW Guns. Furthermore, certain data indicate that terrorist organizations also use this network for the sale of human organs, the sale of stolen oil, or the sale of contraband artifacts stolen from cities with ancient treasures. (Weimann, 2016, pp. 40-44).

## **Conclusion**

Terrorists once again proved that they will constantly find new alternatives to spread their cause, no matter how many barriers are placed in their actions. They have also proven that they are constantly up to date with the development of the digital industry. Terrorism in all its aspects (gravity, size, operations), or rather its "structure" has become much more complex since its appearance on the global stage as "Modern Terrorism" in the 1960s and 1970s. This dramatic change in the nature of terrorism can be attributed precisely to the very emergence of digital infrastructure.

Becoming a part of everyday life, the digital infrastructure has created a fertile ground where terrorists can spread their propaganda, radicalize and recruit new leaders, but also get financial resources by manipulating their sympathizers that even from home they can participate in abandoning their cause.

The role played by social media in the process of radicalization is getting bigger, namely in the USA for the period 2005-2016, over 55% of social media played a primary role not only in radicalization, but also in the mobilization and recruitment of new adherents. The number tends to go up taking into account the emergence of social media that offer anonymity and a high level of encryption known as "end-to-end" where messages are protected from possible tracking and reading by others because existing letters are replaced by characters that are almost impossible to trace except for the company that established the encryption itself.

In addition, anonymous platforms (Justpast.it and similar) are the simplest to use, do not require large maintenance funds and allow to avoid automatic detection of propaganda or radical content. As counter-terrorism measures are taken, it becomes clear that they will be forced to migrate to safer platforms, such as the dark side of the internet. Which means, social media allows them a wide audience, anonymous platforms protection of propaganda content (together they serve as a roadmap to the dark side), while the dark side allows coordination, communication, storage of their propaganda content, access to finance as well as the necessary material and technical means of carrying out a terrorist attack.

The exploitation of digital infrastructure, be it by terrorists or extremists, even by other non-state actors, will continue in the future, probably finding new opportunities and solutions to conceal their activities while reaching the general public. . This conclusion stems from the fact that man is building a greater relationship with technology, that is, it becomes unthinkable for modern man to carry out daily activities in the absence of technology. Thus, an unbreakable connection is created, which the theory of sociomateriality is gaining more and more relevance in recent times.

Considering that the EU is trying to establish a regulation for the removal of radical content within an hour, the rest of the countries that are not part of the EU will have to find mechanisms in the fight against radical content on social media. Otherwise, a large space is left for terrorists and extremists to operate.

In the coming period, all agencies, states and international organizations that fight against terrorism and violent extremism will have to focus on the following points:

- Removal of radical content on social media that is shared using anonymous platforms to hide from algorithms and automatic detection of radical content (as we mentioned Justpast.it, Manbar.me);
- Platforms for storing content (be it video, image, PDF documents) such as cloud, drive, dropbox and similar, also called "cloud" platforms, represent a challenge to which countries will have to find an answer to it. . Otherwise, the measures taken to remove radical content or propaganda will not have a great effect, that is, it will have an insignificant effect, taking into account the fact that the same content is stored in cloud platforms and can be distributed again and again throughout the Internet space.

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