

ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ANTHROPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPARISON BETWEEN AND WITHIN CERTAIN POSITIONS IN A VIP CLOSE PROTECTION TEAM

Zlatko Moratić⁷⁴

Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present the necessary anthropological features essential for the performance of general and specific jobs, as well as a comparison within and between certain positions in the team for the close protection of VIPs. The aim of the research is the analysis of specific anthropological characteristics, within certain positions and comparisons between certain positions. For the purposes of this work, an expert analysis was conducted in which twenty-four experts from the field of close protection from the region and Europe have participated, who in their career were members of VIP security services for at least 5 years and worked in all positions in the close protection team. The necessary anthropological characteristics were assessed by an expert analysis and a comparison was made between and within the team for close protection of VIPs working at a medium threat level in accordance with the model most often used in the region and Europe. The mentioned model includes a minimum of two vehicles during the security transport of VIPs by motor vehicles and an average number of agents. The results of this research, after analyzing of specific anthropological characteristics, indicate that there are statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors within certain positions in the team, as well as statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors between certain positions in the team. The results of this research are of crucial importance for the continued improvement of the training and formation of teams that work at an intermediate level of threat, considering the individualities and characteristics of the members of the mentioned team.

Keywords: anthropological analysis, anthropological characteristics, comparisons between and within specific positions, close protection, VIP person

Introduction

Security as an activity and as a function of the state is as old as human society, from the moment when man became aware of the danger from another man or nature. As a rule, the term security means protection from dangers and threats, which led to the grouping and formation of communities for easier defense and protection of goods. The concept of security is of extremely broad importance. It generally implies the degree of protection: people from various forms of threats, the protection of material and cultural assets in personal and public property, the protection of society and its values, the overall protection of the state from all types of threats and, finally, security implies the degree of protection of the human race and life in general from threats on the planetary and the cosmic level (Ahić, 2009). The concept of

⁷⁴ Contact address: moraticz@gmail.com

security, its content and social function could be understood if this phenomenon is observed from an *interdisciplinary point of view*.

As the security threats and the methods of carrying out of terrorist attacks, both in the world and in the region have increased, the need to secure persons and objects of special importance is emerging as one of the basic tasks of the security services. The name **VIP** is used in professional literature. **Very Important Person** (hereinafter referred to as VIP) is an abbreviation that denotes a very important person, head of state or government, or another high-ranking political official, high-ranking military commander, or another person of special importance who is given a special treatment due to some specific reason. Sometimes the abbreviation **WVIP, Very, Very Important Person**, is used to emphasize the importance of a certain person in relation to other VIPs. This abbreviation is used most often when marking places for sitting or when there are many VIP persons at the same place, in order to determine importance of persons at that time, as per standards of world protocols, and in principle it is rarely used (Moratić & Ahić, 2015). There are particular models that determine the size of the protection team, the number of agents, the number of vehicles, logistical support, so as the entire planning of the protection operation, which is further classified according to the level of threat to the VIP person, namely:

- high level of threat - involves enormous number of agents and at least three vehicles in a convoy,
- medium threat level - entails a medium number of agents and at least two vehicles (the most common threat level used in Europe and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is the threat level that is the subject of the aforementioned expert analysis),
- low or small threat level - entails a minimal number of agents and at least one vehicle.

Human resources selection for the needs of the security services, whose primary task is to secure persons and objects of special importance, is a serious and complex process, whose primary task is to find an adequate way in providing of a sufficient number of candidates out of which is possible to choose those who are the best match to the job description and tasks that are necessary for the completion of the daily work in certain security services (Moratić 2023). The elements that are currently used in practice for the needs of the police, but also for the initial sorting (classification) of police officers, are the level of motor and functional abilities, the health status of the individual (determined by the results of the earlier systematic health examination), and the education level. Functional - motor abilities ensure fundamental security in the selection of candidates for certain duties, primarily with regard to the description of the tasks they perform (Hadžikadunić, Šuvalija & Bajraktarević, 2013:109).

Training for police officers in the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, takes place at the police academies as per the high school education program, for the title of police officer based on the Law on the Police of the mentioned countries⁷⁵. During the education at these academies through specialist courses, participants will get familiar with the basics of personal security and objects of special importance jobs, which implies the importance and

⁷⁵ Law on the Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia from 2016, Law on the Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, NN34/11, NN130/12, NN33/15

need to continue adopting new tactics and techniques after arriving in the parent units that deal with this type of work.

In accordance with the Law on the Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies and on Police Support Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main role in research and education in the field of police and security education in Bosnia and Herzegovina was given to the Agency for Education and Professional Training, where as a part of the regular cadet training program, the basic VIP protection training is also being conducted.

After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, we have witnessed the attacks with devastating consequences on civilian and military targets, as well as on the symbol of the United States of America, the White House, which completely changed the approach to tactical and technical planning and performing tasks in the domain of personal security and objects of special importance. The latest terrorist attacks on the symbols of democracy and freedom in France, Great Britain and the heart of Europe, Brussels, showed the lack of information sharing by the security services, and the level of fear and panic that can be caused by simultaneous attacks with a large number of civilian victims (Abazović, 2002). The Republic of Turkey has recently become the target of terrorist attacks, with a special method of attack known as a Lone Wolf⁷⁶, which causes huge problems to the world's security services, especially the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany, where such attacks also have been recorded. A small number of attackers and targeted groups of civilians in public and highly trafficked places, cause considerable number of victims and a large dose of fear with a weak preparation and minimal use of logistical support, which was the case in some of the attacks in the past, in Europe. Terrorist organizations have begun to use digital media and the Internet to broadcast events related to their organization's activities and activities of the individual groups around the world. In this way, whether intentionally or not, unnecessary media space is given to the terrorist organizations that spread their ideas and goals in this manner (Abazovic, 2002). Like this, we have the opportunity to see a new type and way of conducting the terrorist attacks through sympathizers or sleepers, who act independently and by inertia. This type of attack is impossible to prevent as the attack is conducted by persons who are not previously known to the security services or were under minimal surveillance. Attackers in this way, after identifying with terrorist groups and following the media, conduct the attacks that are difficult to predict and prevent. There are situations where some attackers were detained, interrogated, and finally released, because there was not enough evidence or information that they were the ones who have committed these attacks with devastating consequences for society. A special problem is the concept of uncontrolled migration and insufficient cooperation of the intelligence services of the countries where such migration took the place (Buzar, 2023). While this paper is being written, we are witnessing terrorist attacks by vehicles on pedestrians all over the Europe. This shows us that terrorists have no limitations when it comes to:

- funds from which they have been financed,
- moral, social, and legal barriers,

⁷⁶ Lone wolf is a person who prepares and conducts attacks alone, outside of a specific organization, without a command structure, financial and logistical support of the organizations, sowing fear, and with the aim of supporting one of the organizations, movements, and events.

- legal restrictions when it comes to the use of force, as the members of security agencies have,
- travel, unhindered movement, and activities across the European countries and around the world,
- access and exchange of information between various extreme organizations via the Internet and unnecessary media attention.

An invisible enemy is a special challenge, as we had the opportunity to see during the COVID-19 crisis, which have changed the view of security aspects in every respect. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, has proven to be a multidimensional and goes beyond exclusively health, humanitarian, social and economic aspects. Turkcan (2020) warns that the COVID-19 pandemic represents an existential threat to human security and that pandemics not only cause an increased level of mortality, but also have the negative affect to the economic, social, and political structure of the country. It has been shown that state security systems are still primarily structured for the defense of the state against an armed aggression, which is why they are mainly based on hard power elements, such as the defense, police and security-intelligence segment (Tatalović & Malnar, 2021), and it is clearly visible that formalization of the COVID-19 pandemic as a security threat in security strategies, has not been adequately followed by operationalization in the state security system that would guarantee an effective response, as is the case with some other threats, such as the aggression and terrorism.

All of the above tells us how important it is to have a professionally trained member of the security services in private and public security sector and how important it is that training and professional development are conducted daily using new tactics and techniques in the fight against terrorism, studying how the latest attacks were conducted. It is important to highlight that 100% protection does not exist (Rađenović, 2003). In the security structures whose basic task is the VIP protection, there is a rule that the one who tries to protect everything and everyone, will not protect anything and nobody. A carefully selected and trained team for close protection is able to do only two things when it comes to protection of persons and objects of special importance, namely:

- To act preventively and discourage attackers with their appearance and the impression they leave every day in public (Korajlić & Dautbegović, 2012),
- With their timely reaction to force the attackers to miss their target during the first attack, thanks to the proper selection and training of the team for close protection (Moratić & Ahić, 2015).

It is known fact that mistakes of the improper selection of candidates who works in agencies for the protection of persons and objects of special importance, endanger the safety of those persons and facilities. On the other hand, the mentioned mistakes may have various harmful consequences for the member of the security service, such as increasing the possibility of injuries at work with the possibility of a long-term disability (Anderson, Plecas & Segger, 2001). According to Cochrane and others (2003), there are several factors that influence the potential success or failure of the candidate, so when recruiting the candidate for the jobs for protection of persons and objects, there is a great concern in the agencies about their emotional or psychological adequacy. Considering the fact that throughout the

history of humankind, assassination was one of the main methods used for the purpose of overthrowing the state and its systems, it is logical that in this context protective mechanisms were also developed in order to prevent them.

Organization of a team for the Close protection of VIPs

Depending on the needs and the activities of the VIP, the following three types of protection on the move area applied:

1. On foot (without vehicles),
2. By vehicle – armored, if possible,
3. A combination of the above.

Members of the Close Protection Team according to the medium threat level are:

- AIC – Agent in Charge,
- SL – Shift Leader,
- LR - Left Rear Agent,
- RR - Left Rear Agent,
- LD - Limo Driver,
- FD - Follow Driver,
- AD - Advance Agent.

Moratić & Ahić (2015) state that the close protection team has two basic tasks. **The primary task** is to protect the VIP from injuries and situations in which the VIP's integrity or freedom may be at risk (e.g., murder, death in an accident, murder threats, extortion, kidnapping, and other types of physical assault). **The secondary task** is protection against psychological harassment and compromising. This implies the prevention of intentional verbal insults, compromising of VIP in public in the course of performing private or official business.

Agent in charge - AIC

Agent in charge must be an expert in the field of protection and security. Agent is responsible for planning, leadership, and general management of the Close Protection Team. Agent in charge maintains communication with persons assigned to the VIP protection to ensure the timely exchange of information pertaining to the schedule of activities, potential threats, and unplanned movements. Agent in charge is also known as **the quiet agent**, since he rarely uses communication devices, except when receiving information from the Shift Leader or when disseminating information to the rest of the team. Prior to commencing the work of the Close Protection Team, the Agent in Charge assigns agents to their positions and shifts, and issues specific work assignments for specific work positions. Agent is polite but firm with the media. Agent's relationship with the VIP is as follows:

- Explanation of the protection role to the VIP,
- Formal behavior,

- Security information receipt and dissemination,
- Provision of immediate protection in accordance with the VIP's style.

Ultimately, agent is responsible for all equipment (radio communication, vehicles, manual weapons and ammunition, protective masks, bullet-proof vests, medical equipment, flashlights, raincoats, maps, metal levers used to open doors – crowbars, vehicle equipment, etc.). Agent is always in the limousine with the VIP, sitting in the front right side, and is usually a veteran with an extensive experience in all protection fields.

Shift Leader - SL

Shift Leader is an immediate supervisor or a tactical leader of the Close Protection Team. There is usually one Shift Leader for every eight hours shift. Leader represents a tactical coordinator of the Close Protection Team. Shift Leader must possess an experience in each and every aspect of the protection and security activities. This position is also the main radio connection between the base (the Command Center) and other agents. Shift Leader is sitting on the front right side of the vehicle following the limousine.

Based on recommendations received from the Advance Agent, the Shift Leader assigns agents to their positions and, when necessary, makes corrections of protection tactics. Leader keeps an eye on all members of the Close Protection Team and updates the Agent in Charge in relation to activities and tactical situations. Administrative duties of the Shift Leader are as follows:

- Submission of reports to the Agent in Charge or to their deputy,
- Keeping track of tasks assigned to agents,
- Preparation of daily schedules for agents and resolving of disciplinary issues during the shift.

Agents in follow vehicle – Left Rear and Right Rear

When on the move, their duty is to visually cover their sectors – from all sides of the vehicle and the back. They possess several types of small weapons for use in their line of duty. They take care of appropriate fire perimeters, while equipment and weapons must be in working order and must be hidden, except when it is necessary to expose them.

Limo driver - LD

The limo driver must always be ready to move. The driver must ensure the safe and comfortable transportation and must be well familiar with primary and secondary routes, with the vehicle as well as evacuation routes (e.g., hospitals or shelters). The driver may provide certain suggestions in relation to instructions pertaining to transportation or selection of routes. The driver makes sure that the vehicle is clean inside and outside, checks its mechanical condition (oils, brake fluids, steering hydraulics, seat belts, air conditioner, wipers, lights, blinkers, sirens, doors, etc.). The driver takes care of the emergency equipment and makes sure that it is usable. The driver must prepare the vehicle for movement 30 minutes prior to the planned movement and should be in the vehicle with the engine running 15

minutes prior to the planned movement. Whenever possible, according to Moratić and Ahić (2015), the limo driver should inspect the vehicle for potential explosive devices, and/or use the assistance of the EOD team for this purpose.

Follow vehicle driver - FD

This driver has the same responsibilities for the vehicle as the limousine driver. During a drive, the driver covers the VIP's vehicle when changing lanes, and in case of evacuation, moves to the previously planned position. This driver is in charge of the amount and functionality of special equipment located in the trunk of the follow vehicle.

Advance Agent - AD

Advance Agent has enormous and various duties in terms of planning and establishing security measures at the location to be visited by the VIP. This is the most difficult and the most responsible position in the close protection team. The Advance Team is composed of one or more agents and has preliminary protection functions at the location to be visited by the VIP and stay for a certain time. The Advance Agent works independently from the rest of the Close Protection team. The agent represents the team at the preparatory meetings on forthcoming VIP's visit. This agent is the "eyes and ears" of the team in the field. The Advance Team conducts the analysis (check) of the specific location prior to the VIP's visit. The Advance Agent determines elements that require additional protection, so the VIP's visit is completely safe and goes according to the plan. The Advance Agent should visit the place of the visit at least one month, one week or one to three days before the visit of the VIP. The Advance Agents who are in charge of situations of serious threat or the visits with high publicity, must begin their work several weeks, if not months, before the actual visit. Agents must collect any information about any inconveniences or threats and take appropriate actions (Moratić & Ahić, 2015).

Advance Team must leave the location soon after the arrival of the Close Protection Team, in order to reach the next location to be visited by the VIP⁷⁷. In this case it is necessary for the Advance Agent to inform the Close Protection Team members on all the details before he leaves the location. Given that, the Advance Agent has enough time to conduct a detailed surveillance of the location, so as to be able to reply to few basic questions and to take care of many details in order to plan all protection measures. Responsibility of the Advance Agent for a specific location starts at the moment when the VIP leaves the previous location to move in the direction of the place where the agent is located, and agent's assignment is not completed until the VIP leaves the location. Also, this agent must meet with the local protection units and ensure their assistance too. Priority tasks of the Advance Agent, which create a whole subset of questions and tasks to be resolved by the Advance Team, include the analysis of the access to the location (space, time and security), outer zone requirements (motorcade arrival and departure location, barricades, check points), inner zone requirements (exact spot where the VIP will be located, meeting, greeting, toilets, etc.), planning of the formation

⁷⁷ The Counter-Terrorism Assistance Program integrated in the ICITAP Program for the Western Balkans was originally approved by the U.S. Congress on November 13, 1983., last minute request by the Advance Team, pgs. 9-14.

of concentric protection circles (EOD sweep, identification system, badges, identification documents, guest lists, etc.), establishment of emergency response plans (hospitals, detailed overview of hospitals in terms of equipment and safety, delivery of the blood type identical to the VIP's blood type that could be used in case of attack, in case of fire, etc.), and some additional needs at the spot. As mentioned above, the Advance Agent must arrive to the spot prior to the planned visit, in order to make the protection arrangements. Nevertheless, in spite of all the preparations mentioned above, certain unpredictable changes in the schedule may make it impossible for the agent to perform tasks in the initially planned manner.

Therefore, the Advance Agent must maintain continuous communication with the Close Protection Team for the purpose of immediate change of plan of the VIP's visit. The agent should never presume anything; must be certain of the situation and the location must be completely "clear" before the Advance Agent allows access to the Close Protection Team.

Visiting the meeting site:

Start visiting and collecting information immediately upon the arrival at the location. During the visit, the Advance Agent must:

1. Meet with the manager or the contact person at the location (someone who knows everything about the meeting and the location).
2. Determine both the main and the alternative routes.
3. Provide parking for the vehicles, including the support vehicle.
4. Identify the exact number of media representatives at the location.
5. Agree upon the exact number of agents authorized to access the location.
6. Determine the exact route to the main entrance.
7. Determine the exact route to the exit in case of emergency.
8. Determine the exact number of persons authorized to use elevators in an undisturbed manner.
9. Determine the exact number of persons present in the room, restaurant, or other location visited by the VIP.
10. Determine the exact location of the restroom and the closest shelter.
11. Determine the exact location of the room the VIP may use for a short break and private conversations.
12. Determine the exact location of the fire extinguisher.
13. Determine the exact location of the fire station – collect information on the number of fire trucks, their condition and the highest floor that can be reached by the fire ladder.
14. Determine the exact location of the closest police station and medical institution.
15. Determine the exact location and explain the route used in case of emergency.

16. Establish the POINT OF NO RETURN⁷⁸ and inform all team members of the exact location of this spot.
17. Identify other Close Protection Teams and their VIP's and disseminate such information to all members of your team.

The research objective

The main objective of this research is to analyze special anthropological characteristics.

Second goal, or the first partial goal, is the comparison of special anthropological characteristics within certain positions.

The third goal, that is, the second partial goal, is the comparison of special anthropological characteristics between certain positions.

Research methodology

Sample

The sample of respondents for the purposes of this research, were twenty-four experts in the field of close protection from the region and Europe, who voluntarily participated in this research. All experts have at least five years of experience in VIP close protection and have worked at all positions in VIP close protection team.

Questionnaire

The expert analysis was done on the basis of a questionnaire that had pre-defined questions with a scale of 5 degrees (Likert scale), which served to assess the importance of anthropological characteristics, for the purpose of comparison within and between certain positions in the close protection team, defined as:

1. Morphological characteristics **MORP** (height, weight, body girth, arm span, age, and gender)
2. Functional and motor skills **FMOT** (movement coordination, speed, strength, endurance, precision)
3. Cognitive characteristics **COGN** (memory, perception, mental representation, thinking, attention)
4. Conative qualities **CONAT** (emotions, motivation, ability to adapt to the environment, ability to resolve conflict situations, commitment/trust)

⁷⁸ Point of no return is an imaginary line set by the Advance Agent who informs every team member about it. Usually, this is the line imagined between the two safe spots at the location where the VIP happens to be at the time Moratic & Ahic (2015)

5. General education **GENEDU** (primary school, secondary vocational education, higher vocational education, university degree, master's/PHD)
6. Professional qualification **PQUA** (secondary police school, faculty of security, faculty of criminology, criminology and security studies, specialist courses for close protection, military school).

Data processing methods

For all variables, the central (AS) was calculated and the normality of the distribution was assessed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. The sum of individual scores was calculated for all variables and all positions. The statistical significance of the differences between the variables was established by the Friedman test. The level of statistical significance was set at $p < 0.05$. All analyzes were performed using the SPSS program package for the Windows operating system.

The results

In accordance with the set goals, the results of this study indicate the following:

1. In accordance with the objective one in the subsection results, tables 1 and 2 are presenting the results of the Friedman test.
2. In accordance with the second research objective, it is noticeable that there are statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors **within** certain positions in the team, where:
 - **FMOT** has the highest value at **RR/LR, LD** and **FD**,
 - **COGN** has the highest value at **AD, LD** and **SL**

	AIC	SL	RR/LR	LD	FD	AD
MORP	2.44	2.33	2.40	2.10	2.40	2.30
FMOT	4.44	4.04	4.63	4.58	4.60	4.00
COGN	4.31	4.69	4.35	4.77	4.42	4.80
CONAT	3.73	3.77	3.69	4.15	4.06	3.57
GENEDU	3.44	3.25	3.15	2.92	2.83	3.33
PQUA	2.65	2.92	2.79	2.48	2.69	3.00
X2	31.281	31.571	35.165	57.834	43.105	33.145
Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Table 1. Results of the Friedman test of individual factors within specific positions

3. In accordance with the third objective of the research, there are statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors **between** certain positions in the team where:
- **MORP** is the most important for the **RR/LR** position (**AIC** has an extremely high score compared to other positions),
 - **FMOT** is the most important for the **AIC** position,
 - **COGN** is the most important for the **AD** position,
 - **CONAT** is equally, and at the same time, the most important for the positions of **SL** and **AD**,
 - **GENEDU** is the most important for the **AD** position,
 - **PQUA** is the most important for the **AD** position.

	MORP	FMOT	COGN	CONAT	GENEDU	PQUA
AIC	3.94	3.79	3.27	3.46	3.89	3.44
SL	3.88	3.50	3.85	3.88	3.87	3.98
RR/LR	3.96	3.63	3.33	3.31	3.22	3.29
LD	2.50	3.08	3.38	3.25	2.70	2.73
FD	3.00	3.38	2.83	3.23	2.61	2.98
AD	3.73	3.63	4.33	3.88	4.72	4.58
X ²	22.135	4.161	19.156	7.602	30.615	24.704
Sig.	0.000	0.527	0.002	0.180	0.000	0.000

Table 2. Results of the Friedman test of individual factors within specific positions

Discussion

The selection of candidates for the protection of persons and facilities of special importance in a private and public security has an especially significant role, both for the home unit and for society as a whole, when it comes to safety. (Anderson and other 2001). That is why, only candidates who demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge and meet the general requirements for admission to education, are being sent for further training. After admission, the training of private and public security officers may be classified according to different criteria, considering the scope and description of specific jobs in the home unit. The skills that the most often are being improved in the jobs of the protection of persons and facilities of special importance are physical training, handling of official firearms, tactical training, specialist training, general and special knowledge. Bearing in mind that in the basic courses for police officers, training for the protection of persons and facilities of special importance is conducted solely through specialist courses (basic training), it is of crucial importance to continue training and acquire knowledge after arriving in the home unit. The elements that are currently used in practice for the needs of the police, but also for the initial

sorting (classification) of police officers, are the level of motor and functional abilities, the health status of the individual (determined by the results of the earlier systematic health examination), and the education level. Functional - motor abilities ensure fundamental security in the selection of candidates for certain duties, primarily with regard to the description of the tasks they perform (Hadžikadunić, Šuvalija & Bajraktarević, 2013:109). In the conducted research, through the results presented by the Friedman test, it is noticeable that there are statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors within certain positions in the team where **FMOT** has the highest value in **AIC**, **RR/LR** and **FD** positions, while **COGN** has the highest value in **SL**, **LD** and **AD** positions. Also, there are statistically significant differences in the value of certain factors between certain positions in the team, where **MORP** is the most important for the **RR/LR** positions (**AIC** has an extremely high score compared to other positions), **COGN** is the most important for the **AD** position, **CONAT** is equally, and at the same time and the most important for the **SL** and **AD** positions, **GENEDU** is the most important for the **AD** position, so as **PQUA** that is also the most important for the **AD** position.

Conclusion

Proper selection of candidates in private and public security, through legal norms, has become one of the crucial processes for the security agencies around the world, and special attention should be paid regarding the anthropological characteristics of members of security agencies, during recruitment. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully plan and conduct the recruitment assessment and selection of human resources in the services for the protection of persons and facilities. The results of this research are of crucial importance for planning of the recruitment methods of new personnel, continuation of training and establishing teams that work at a medium threat level. It is necessary to pay special attention to the anthropological features and characteristics of the members of the aforementioned team. The results of this research have the potential to improve and create new models when analyzing special anthropological features and their detailed measurement and improvement during basic selection, as well as setting of a new standards in accordance with EU standards for private and public security. The results of the expert analysis provide us with enough material for more serious and detailed planning of the development of anthropological characteristics, which are necessary for the successful performance of everyday tasks. After the comparison and interpretation of the obtained results between and within certain positions in the security agencies responsible for protection of persons and objects of special importance in private and public security, the sufficient number of information and data have become available, that provide the possibility of advancement and selection of the best members for certain tasks.

Literature

- Abazović, M. (2002). *Nacionalna sigurnost*. Sarajevo: Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo
- Ahić, J. (2009). *Sistemi privatne sigurnosti*. Sarajevo: Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo

- Anderson, G. S., Plecas, D., & Segger, T. (2001). Police officer physical ability testing—Re-validating a selection criterion. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 24(1), 8-31.
- Buzar, M. (2023). Irregular migrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Detention, readmission, and return. *Kriminalističke teme - Godina XXIII*, Br. 3-4, 2023.
- Cochrane, R. E., Tett, R. P., & Vandecreek, L. (2003). Psychological Testing and the Selection of Police Officers a National Survey. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 30(5), 511-537.
- Dale, L. June. (2008). *Introduction to executive protection*, 2nd ed. CRC Press. Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton Florida
- Hadžikadunić, A. & Turković, S. (2013). *Selekcija ljudskih resursa za potrebe policije primjenom bazično motoričkih testova*. Third international conference "Sports sciences and health." Pan-European University 15.03.2013. Banja Luka.
- Hadžikadunić, A., Šuvalija, M., & Bajraktarević, J. (2015). *Selekcija ljudskih resursa i potencijala za potrebe policije primjenom psiho-motoričkih testova*. *Kriminalističke teme*, (3-4), 107-124.
- Korajlić, N. & Dautbegović, A. (2012). *Osnovi kriminalistike*. Travnik, University in Travnik.
- Krstić, S. (2012). *Bezbedonosna procena ugroženosti određenih ličnosti*. Beograd, Kompanija „Milenium group“
- Moratić, Z. (2024): Analiza komponenti uspješnosti pripadnika timova za blisku zaštitu u javnoj i privatnoj sigurnosti, *Kriminalističke teme - Godina XXIII*, Br. 3-4, 2023.
- Moratić, Z. & Ahić, J. (2015). *Bliska zaštita VIP ličnosti*. Sarajevo: Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo
- Moratić, Z. (2015). *Predvidivi model selekcije i obuke profesionalaca za blisku zaštitu VIP ličnosti u BiH/Foreseeable Selection Model and Training of Professionals for VIP Close Protection in BiH*. *Zbornik sažetaka*, 1(1), 27-28.
- Obradović, S. K. (2011). *Planiranje, regrutovanje i selekcija kadra u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova RS*. *Nauka, bezbednost, policija*, 16(1), 135-156.
- Rađenović, R., (2003), *Bezbednost određenih ličnosti i objekata*, MUP RS, Beograd
- Tatalović, S. & Malnar, D. (2021) *Pandemija COVID-19 i novo razumijevanje sigurnosti, Politička misao 3*. Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb.
- Turkcan, M. L. (2020). Pandemics blind spots in national security paradigms, AA 23.5. 2020., Istanbul.

- White, M. D., & Escobar, G. (2008). Making good cops in the twenty-first century: Emerging issues for the effective recruitment, selection, and training of police in the United States and abroad 1. *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, 22(1-2), 119-134.
- The Counter-Terrorism Assistance Program (1983) integrated in the ICITAP Program US Department of Justice for the Western Balkans, U.S. Congress., the request by the Advance Team, pgs. 9-14

The legal framework

- Law on Police Officers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27-04 with amendments 63-04, 05-06, 33-06, 58-06, 15-08, 63-08, 35-09 and 07-12 from 02.08.2016
- Law on the Police of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Official Gazette of the Brčko District of BiH", No. 31/09),
- Law on Internal Affairs of the Federation of BiH ("Official Gazette of FBiH", no. 49/05),
- Law on Police and Internal Affairs, Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, no. 57/1,
- Law on the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina from February 15, 2012,
- Law on Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia from 2016,
- Law on the Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, NN34/11, NN130/12, NN33/15.