CONTEMPORARY MIGRATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM

Edita Hasković[8]

Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo

Abstract: The paper considers migrations from the perspective of human security paradigm, with special focus on the Post World War II period. Even though the initial activities in establishing the concept of human security have been taken in mid-40s of the last century under the umbrella of United Nations, its affirmation in scientific and political circles is reached only in the aftermath of the Cold War era, when significant steps forward were made to extend the security agenda to non-military threats and other referent objects of security, outside the previously dominant state-centric approach.

This is a concept that embodies the idea of multidimensional approach to security, which places human being and his daily exposure to different threats and disturbances that represent an existential threat in the center of scientific observations, making it indispensable in considering the contemporary migratory movements, especially multiple factors that affect them.

A special focus of the paper is on determining the migration-related problems through the prism of two fundamental components of human security – freedom from fear (freedom from violence, oppression and persecution) and freedom from want (freedom from poverty, penury and misery), the insufficiency of which is accounted in certain parts of the world as a significant factor in making the decision to emigrate from country of origin.

Keywords: human security, migrations, conflicts, persecution, poverty, Global South

1. Introductory considerations: internationalization of the migration in the 20th century

Migration movements are a pervasive aspect of the modern times. Although migrations are a permanent reality in human history, the dynamics of which were inevitably influenced by the great geographical discoveries in 1492, which favored the large exodus of people towards the newly discovered continents, formation and development of industrial society and economic-market relations were a kind of trigger for the intensification of social movements.

Mass migration waves were recorded at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, when the great exodus of Europeans to other continents followed, especially towards America, and as expected, two world wars, the initiated processes of European integration, decolonization as a significant factor in emigration from former colonies to former colonial powers, as well as bloody conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and Asia, contributed to their intensification. To the aforementioned should be added the problems of an economic and social character

---

[8] Contact address: ehaskovic@fkn.unsa.ba

inherent in this part of the world, which often figure as a significant factor in making the decision to leave the country of origin in search of a better and more promising life.

Starting from the previously mentioned, the conclusion that the 20th century, especially its second half, was marked by mass people movement, is imposed. This is confirmed by the progressive growth of the migrant population in the last fifty years, considering that in 1970 there were 84,460,125 migrants in the world, in 1990 153,111,473, and in 2020 their number reached around 281 milion (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2020: 21; McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021: XII).

These trends led numerous authors, including Castles and Miller, to determine the late 20th century as the 'Age of Migration' (1998: 3). Although, judging on the basis of the first two decades of the 21st century, it is not premature and pretentious to conclude that the mass exodus of people will mark the new millennium more significantly than it was the case with the earlier historical periods. The support for this claim we find in the fact that in 2000 the number of migrants in the world was 173,588,441, and only two decades later the number of migrants in the world increased by over 107 million, which represent an increase of 38% (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2020).

In regard to problemation of the internationalization of migrations, which based on the previously presented parameters is more than evident, we deem important to mention reflection of Philip Martin, who notes that international migrations are motivated by demographic and economic differences in conjunction with communications, transportation and human rights revolutions.[9]

This author illustrates demographic inequalities by relying on the very worrying indicators of the enormous disparity of demographic growth between the rich North and the poor South[10], noting that almost all of the population growth occurs in the world's 170 poorer

---

[9] Philip Martin explains how the mentioned revolutions had a significant contribution to the internationalization of migrations. As this author observes, the rapid flow of information across national borders is a hallmark of the communications revolution. Unlike previous historical periods marked by migrations, such as the 19th century when the literacy rate in rural areas was low and when letters containing information about business opportunities traveled a long time from America to Europe, today mobile phones and the Internet serve to facilitate this exchange. Also, as a significant factor in the internationalization of migrations, this author also mentions the transportation revolution, that is reflected in easier and cheaper opportunities to travel. With today's relatively low transportation costs, traveling anywhere in the world legally typically costs less than $2,500. The human rights revolution that was initiated after the Second World War by the adoption of international conventions on human rights, also gave a significant impetus to international migrations. In the post-war period, most industrialized countries strengthened the constitutional and political rights of citizens within their borders in an effort to prevent the resurgence of fascism. This resulted in the liberalization of asylum provisions that were incorporated into post-war constitutions in order to prevent another situation in which refugees perish because other countries return them to a country that persecuted them (Martin, 2013: 3, 4; Martin & Zurcher, 2008: 6, 7).

[10] The North refers to more developed regions: Europe, North America and Australia, New Zealand and Japan. South refers to less developed regions: Africa, Asia with the exception of Japan, Latin America, the Caribbean and Oceania with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. During the Cold War, the term First World was common for the Global North, while the term Third World was popular for the countries of the Global South. Although after the end of the Cold War, the question of the analytical viability of this term was actualized, authors such as Ayoob, Acharya and others, when problematize

countries, with forecasts that in the near future the population of the 30 wealthier countries in the world will remain relatively unchanged, with approximately 1.2 billion inhabitants.[11] Even the economic indicators presented in the World Bank report from 2012, to which this author refers, do not offer grounds for optimism. Namely, they point out the harsh reality that determines the fate of underdeveloped and developing countries, on the one hand, and the economic supremacy of developed countries, on the other. They indicate that 30 industrialized countries, which have one-sixth of the world's population, own the two-thirds of the world's economic production, an average of $39,000 per person per year, twelve times more than the average of $3,300 per person in 170 poorer countries (Martin, 2013: 3).

There is no doubt that these two types of inequality represent a very significant motivating factor when making the decision to leave the country of origin in the desire for higher incomes and better opportunities for life. This is also confirmed by the data presented in the study "International migration drivers. A quantitative assessment of the structural factors shaping migration", which indicate that the greater part of international migrations during the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century is directed towards high-income countries. In 1965 over two-thirds (68%) of international migrations were directed towards developed countries, while in 2015 this percentage amounted to 74% of total global migration flows, and it should be emphasized that this percentage includes migrants from other developed countries, as well as those from low- and middle-income countries (Migali *et al.*, 2019: 25).

If we look at even more recent indicators dating back to 2020, we will get a more detailed insight into the distribution of the migration population depending on whether it is a question of countries with high, medium or low income. According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, most international migrants reside in countries that offer the greatest opportunities for them and their families. Namely, in 2020, 65% of international migrants or 182 million have lived in high-income countries, 82 million, which is the equivalent of 31%, in middle-income countries, and only 12 million or 4% in low-income countries (UN DESA, 2020: 6).

Migrations from developing countries to developed countries, that is migrations on the South-North route, as expected, occupy a leading position, making up about 45% of the total world migration fund. South-South migrations occupy the second position with 35%, while North-North migrations account for 17% and North-South only 3% of world migration flows (IOM, 2013: 55).

Since the 1950s, there has been an evident trend of continuous growth of migration pressure on developed countries. In the early 1950s, net migration from less developed to developed regions amounted to only 26,000 per year. That number between 2005-2010

---

the specifics of the security reality of the countries of the Global South, refers to them as the Third World countries.

[11] "Developed regions as a whole will experience population decline after 2040. According to the medium variant projection of the United Nations, the world population will grow from 7.6 billion in 2017 to 8.6 billion in 2030. Most of this increase will occur in developing regions, while developed regions for the first time in history will begin to face negative population growth between 2040-2050 (UN DESA, 2017a).

reached a peak of over 3.4 million, after which it dropped to 2.8 million per year in the period from 2015-2020 (UN DESA, 2019: 11).

Looking back on the mentioned period, it can also be concluded that some regions acquired the position of traditional regions of immigration, such as North America and Oceania, as well as Europe, which recorded a positive net value of migration after 1960, and traditional regions of emigration, such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, which in the respective period recorded a negative value of net migration, while North Africa and Western Asia recorded positive net migration since 2000 (*Ibidem*).[12]

Europe leads in the number of the international migrants, whose number in 2020 was 87 million. It is followed by North America, where almost 59 million migrants live, North Africa and Western Asia with a total of 50 million, while in other regions the number of migrants is significantly lower (UN DESA, 2020: 1).

To Philip Martin's reflections should be added forced migration caused by persecution, conflicts, violence and human rights violations, which inexorably mark the security reality of underdeveloped and developing countries. Fragile political structures, absence of socio-political cohesion, slow democratization processes and insufficient economic development, make these countries a suitable environment for violent conflicts. This leads to the conclusion that migration is not always the result of a voluntary decision. Although there are many factors that influence the decision to emigrate, armed conflicts understandably play a crucial role in the generation of refugee exodus.

In the period from 1960-2022 an alarming increase in the number of refugees in the world was observed. According to Migali and others, in 1960 there were 170,000 refugees (2019: 31), while in 2022 around 35.3 million refugees in the world were recorded (The UN Refugee Agency [UNHCR], 2023: 2).[13]

This progressive increase of the number of refugees should be primarily attributed to the unprecedented proliferation of ethnic and civil conflicts, especially in the countries of the Global South. After the end of the World War II, inter-states conflict gave way to intra-state conflicts, which became the dominant form of warfare in modern history. Confirmation for this statement we can also find in the data presented by Kegli and Vitkof, as well as Tatalović, which indicate that out of 225 armed conflicts in the world that were fought in the period from 1945-2001, 178 were of an internal character (Tatalović, 2010: 17; Kegli & Vitkof, 2004: 581, 582).

We also noticed the trend of increasing number of refugees in the first two decades of 21st century, which is glaring evidence that the combination of civil war and ethnic conflicts will be the predominant form of political violence and one of the fundamental preoccupations of this century. The number of refugees in 2000 was 14 million (IOM, 2020), and in 2022, as we previously mentioned, 35.3 million. To the number of refugees in the world, we should add

---

[12] Net migration refers to the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants. If the number of people who immigrate is greater than the number of people who emigrate, we are talking about countries with positive net migration, and *vice versa,* when more people emigrate than immigrate, the country loses population through negative net migration or net emigration (*Ibidem*).

[13] This number includes 29.5 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate and 5.9 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate (UNHCR, 2023: 2).

108.4 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2022 (UNHCR, 2023: 2), which represents the highest recorded number according to the available data.[14]

A large number of conflicts contributed to the progressive growth of the number of refugees and displaced persons in the 21st century, starting with those in certain African countries, such as the Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Burundi, through the conflicts in the Middle East in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, to the conflicts in the Central Asian states of Myanmar, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Latin America, and the Ukrainian conflict in Europe (Ullah, 2016: 61), which was renewed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Even though previous presentation did not exhaust all the armed conflicts that marked the first two decades of 21st century, it also provides us with sufficient grounds to conclude that at the beginning of the new century the world stepped into uncertainty, destroying illusions about the idyllic post-Cold War era, as the creators of the "new world order" triumphantly announced.

This is what made us decide to examine migrations from the perspective of human security paradigm, especially since the second half of the 20th century, as a concept that reached its affirmation after the Cold War. This coincides with the colossal changes that took place on the international arena and which indicated the inadequacy of the state-centric approach in solving the problems that primarily affect human security and determine human existence, such as hunger, poverty, insufficiency of political freedoms and civil rights, and social exclusion.

Problematizing contemporary migrations from the perspective of human security can contribute to the elucidation of multiple factors that influence migration movements, considering that it is a concept that embodies the idea of multidimensional approach to security (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security) and that places human being in the center of scientific observations.

This is the reason why we consider important this security concept in an attempt to identify the causes of large exodus of people. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, pointed out the necessity of a multidimensional approach to migration processes in 2002, when he invited international community to take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of migrations, which include hundreds of millions of people and affect the countries of origin, transit and destination, in order to better understand the causes of international waves of people and their complex interrelation with development (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2002).

2. About human security paradigm

The state-centric approach has been dominant in international relations since the establishment of the modern European system of states by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This approach maintained supremacy until the end of the Cold War, when significant steps

---

[14] After the wars in the Balkans and the genocide in Rwanda, the global numbers of displaced persons were significantly below 40 million. During the first decade of the 21st century, this number ranged between 37 and 42 million (UNHCR, 2020: 11), and almost tripled in the last twelve years (*Ibidem*).

forward were made to extend the security agenda to non-military threats and other referent objects of security, outside the previously dominant state-centric approach.

The political and military crises of the 20th century, as well as the rise of the economic and ecological agenda in the international relations,[15] indicated the inadequacy of the state-security model. To this should be added the growing concern with the issue of identity in the mid-1990s due to an unprecedented eruption of conflicts. As Tatalović notes, almost a quarter of countries in the world were affected by civil war or ethnic conflict (2010: 17).

This has led numerous theorists and politicians to articulate alternative paradigms, including the one that prioritizes safety of human being, which is based on the assumption that individual security is the key to global security – this implies that when the safety of an individual is threatened, security at the international level is also threatened (Hampson, 2008: 232).

The initial step in the decades-long process of establishing human security was made with the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, in which the four key goals of this international organization were addressed: saving future generations from the horrors of war, reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights and the preservation of international peace and security through joint efforts (Charter of the United Nations, 1945).

Despite the primary focus on states and their peaceful coexistence in the international community on the principles of collective security, formation of the United Nations in 1945 brought a glimmer of hope in terms of redirecting the security focus (Simon, 2008: 48). This international organization made an unquestionable contribution to the multidimensional perception of security, recognizing the well-being of the individuals as a necessary assumption in building and restoring an international order based on democracy, peace and security.

That the beginnings of the concept of human security coincide with the founding of the UN is confirmed by the fact that the two basic components of human security – freedom from want and freedom from fear, date from the speech of the US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, in which he summarized the results of the conference from San Francisco in 1945 and on which this international organization was founded. In the speech, he emphasized that the battle for peace should be fought on two fronts: the security front, where victory means freedom from fear, and economic and social front, where victory means freedom from want, recognizing victory on both fronts as a key prerequisite to ensure permanent peace in the world (Tadjbakhsh, 2014: 2).

Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th of December in 1948, further emphasized the determination of this international organization to approach focused on human security. Although the declaration does not explicitly contain the term 'human security', with the articulation and recognition of basic political, economic and civil rights, this declaration had an unquestionable role in the development of human security and its growth into a separate concept a few decades later.

Although the Cold War prolonged the concretization of the efforts that have been taken under the umbrella of the United Nations, the work of the several independent commissions from this era, such as the Brandt Commission and Disarmament and Security Affairs Commission, implied the shifting of the focus of the security analyzes from the security of the state to the security of people (Bajpai according to Acharya, 2001: 444).

---

[15] This refers to the great economic crisis of 1973, caused by the Arab oil embargo, and the Chernobyl disaster of 1986.

The Willy Brandt Commission's report from 1980, with the symbolic name "North South - Survival Program", had a very significant role in the conceptualization of human security. This document expressed the desire to establish the balance in terms of the development policies, as well as the requirements to integrate the countries of the South into the global economic system, with an invitation to the rich industrial countries of the North to share their resources and power with the countries of the South, considering the above as a key prerequisite for improving economic and social conditions in countries with a less favorable position (Menon, 2007: 6). This Report, as can be concluded, was based on the cognition that the world is polarized between the rich industrialized countries of the North and the underdeveloped countries of the Global South. The aforementioned division has been identified as the main cause of insecurity in the world, whereas grave injustice and mass starvation cause additional instability, with the appeal of the members of the Commission to the conscience of the developed world to reduce expenditures for military purposes and to redirect them to development, which would contribute to increasing security at the world level (Independent Commission of International Development Issues, 1980: 124, 125).

The Commission for Disarmament and Security Issues from 1982, chaired by the Swedish politician Olof Palme, took a similar position. This Commission tried to point out the perniciousness of the policies that sought to secure strategic advantage based on military supremacy, appealing to end the arms race and to focus all efforts on survival. Like the previous one, this Commission made a certain departure from the traditional preoccupation with state security, pointing out the security threats faced by Third World countries, such as poverty, hunger and economic inequalities (Menon, 2007: 5).

Unquestionable merits can be attributed to these commissions in terms of indicating the security specificities of the Third World countries, which were in the shadow of the bipolar confrontation. The countries of the Third World, today popularly called the countries of the Global South, become a noticeable international factor immediately after the Second World War when the processes of decolonization entered the phase of culmination with the recognition of independence of India and Pakistan by Great Britain in 1947, which was followed by the emergence of a large number of sovereign states, whose security reality, as observed by Amitav Acharya, was determined from the very beginning by the scarcity of resources, demographic explosion, underdevelopment and environmental degradation (1997: 304).

As previously mentioned, this part of the world was not immune to armed conflicts either. It was the scene of wars, especially of an intrastate character during and after the Cold War competition. So, the combination of military and non-military threats indicated the need to include this part of the world in scientific optics. For supporters of the concept of human security, the countries of the Global South undoubtedly served as a reference point, considering that non-military threats, as well as those deriving from internal conflicts, are far more inherent in developing countries than in developed countries. As Mohammed Ayoob observes: "The dimensions of security problem, and of the concept of security itself, in the Third World are very different from those applied to, and common in the literature of, the developed West" (Ayoob according to Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2014: 51).

All previously elaborated efforts made a significant contribution to the conceptualization of human security, but undoubtedly the greatest influence on the clear and explicit articulation of the human security was provided by the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994, that introduced the term human security and inaugurated its affirmation

in scientific and political circles. The backbone of this Report, and therefore of a new concept of security, is the recognition that development, peace, security and human rights are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, and even mutually conditioning.

The aforementioned is embodied in the next point of view: "The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them – with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms" (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 1994: 1).

This Report states that far too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states, as well as for the most people today a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of cataclysmic world event. Based on the insight into the definition of human security presented in the UNDP Report, by which it is understood: "First, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP, 1994: 23), it can be concluded that this consideration was the main guide in the conceptual definition of this type of security.

The contribution of this Report is reflected in pointing out the inexhaustible need for a deep transition in thinking - from the state-centric and nuclear to the human security, considering that the legitimate concerns of ordinary people were completely peripheral, and for the most of them security symbolized protection from the threats such as disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.

Although the genesis of the two basic components of human security can be traced back to the 1940s, freedom from fear and freedom from want are connected on the international scene with the concept of human security precisely through the UNDP Report from 1994. When we talk about the freedom from fear, we primarily mean freedom from violence, oppression and persecution, while the freedom from want means freedom from poverty, deprivation and misery (*Ibidem*).

The need for security that is more human-oriented arose from simultaneous discussions on the development and more recent trends in international law that give priority to the protection of human rights over the protection of state sovereignty and integrity. As Cristina Muguruza observes: "With the end of the Cold War, as a response to violent conflicts involving gross violations of human rights that threatened to generate wider instability or unacceptable human suffering, the requirements of security have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence (...) This development opened the way to see state sovereignty as a matter of responsibility, not just power" (2007: 18).

At the beginning of the 21st century, the conceptual framework of human security was further elaborated by the Commission for Human Security, chaired by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, and Sadako Ogata, former UN High Representative for Refugees. By devoting chapters to people affected by violent conflicts, migrants, people recovering from violent conflicts and economic insecurity, Sen-Ogata Report from 2003 adequately illustrated the infinite number of cases and causes of human insecurity in the post-Cold War era (Jolly & Ray, 2006: 3).

This Commission offered an even more precise definition of human security, which implies the protection of the vital values of human life in a way which is in the function of improving human freedoms and human fulfillment, whereby the same refers to: protection

of fundamental freedoms; protection of people from serious and ubiquitous threats and situations, exploiting the processes built on the strength and aspirations of people and the creation of political, social, ecological, economic, military and cultural systems, which when combined, provide people with the building blocks for survival, existence and dignity (Commission on Human Security [CHS], 2003).

Considering that the UN was the leader of the processes in establishing the concept of human security, it was expected that the UN's members would accept this form of security and that they will take responsibility fot its protection. This was the epilogue of the World Summit 2005: "The acceptance of the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair and of the responsibility of the state and the international community to protect population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, evidences the centrality of human security on the international agenda" (Muguruza, 2007: 16).

Starting from what was announced in the introductory considerations, as well as what will be discussed on the following pages, the next question arises – *Is the human security condemned to the fate of a mere ideal?*

3. Human (in)security from the perspective of the countries of the Global South

In order to try to understand the reasons that had a decisive role in the positioning certain regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America among the regions of traditional emigration, where certain countries of the old continent will also be analyzed, we consider it necessary to give a brief insight into the colonial past of this part of the world, whose relapses in the form of unstable political structures, as a significant predisposition for frequent intrastate conflicts, and poverty, often of an endemic type, should be considered as the main cause of resorting to migrations, often as a survival strategy, as determined by the Global Commission on International Migration in 2005 (2005: 68).

It is common knowledge that the process of spreading European political control over this part of the world dates back to the end of the 15th century, when the leading European powers used their power to conquer foreign territories, primarily in economic interest, but also in order to spread political influence. "Non-European territories and populations came under the control of European governments by conquest or occupation, and were sometimes transferred from one European state to another (...) By the late nineteenth century even isolated and previously inaccessible continents, like the interior of Africa, were under the jurisdiction and manipulation of European powers" (Jackson, 2001: 45).

In the second half of the 19th century, Japan and America joined European imperialism, colonizing new territories. Japan imperialistically occupied Korea and Formosa (Taiwan), while the United States of America was expanding into the Latin American continent. After the USA expanded its colonial power to the west via Hawaii, leased the Panama Canal Zone for an indefinite period from the newly founded state of Panama and established control over several Caribbean islands, all above Cuba (Kegli & Vitkof, 2004: 299, 300).

Although the processes of decolonization, which were initiated at the peace negotiations in Versailles in 1919, inaugurated the liberation of countries from colonial shackles, tracing the path to the processes of their national independence, they did not imply the long-desired and necessary progress and prosperity.

According to many authors, this part of the world is faced with processes of even more pronounced marginalization within the international system in the post-colonial, as well as in the post-Cold War period. One of the authors who advocates this opinion is Barry Buzan, who, in an effort to point out the evidently inferior position of this part of the world in the post-Cold War international order, address it with the term periphery in relation to the center – 'Centre' implies a globally dominant core of capitalist economies, while 'periphery' implies a set of industrially, financially and politically weaker states operating within a set of relationships largely constructed by the centre (1991: 432).

The claim that the countries of the Global South, or more precisely the countries of periphery, will be exposed to processes of even greater marginalization after the Cold War, Buzan explains based on several arguments, which although articulated in the early 1990s, stand the test of time, manifesting their actuality even today. In the forefront, this author is referring to the devaluation of the countries of the Global South after the end of the Cold War, given that capitalism triumphed not only over communism, but also over the ideology of Third World countries. As another reason, he states the fact that the great powers will have little strategic and ideological initiative to fight for the allegiance of this part of the world. Buzan finds the basis for the third argument in the loss of a significant political platform in the form of the Non-Aligned movement, which provided the Third World countries with a political and moral position from which to play in the game of world politics. The fourth argument is based on the Buzan's point of view that the legitimacy of the one-party systems of these countries was discredited after the defeat of communism. This author did not neglect the increasing marginalization of this part of the world in the economic sense, as a last argument (*Ibidem*, p. 439).

Thomas Barnett is of the same opinion. He divides the world up into two regions: the 'functioning core' and the 'nonintegrated gap', that is analogous to the Buzan's division. According to Barnett, the functioning core comprises the so-called first world. Characteristic of the functioning core is its intensive role in global networks and its expressed interdependence. In other words, the functioning core is the modern, globalised world, as expressed by prosperity, security and stability. The non-integrated gap, on the other hand, comprises those countries marked by poverty, insecurity and instability which, because of their lesser global intertwinement, represent an overall security risk (Barnett according to Faath & Mattes, 2014: 159).

Buzan and Barnett are not alone in these considerations. It has become common to find increasingly frequent observations that the East-West conflict has been replaced by the North-South conflict. At one time, the former president of Indonesia Suharto went a step further, defining the permanent division into North and South as "the central unsolved question of our time" (according to Acharya, 1997: 316).

Similar considerations are shared by Katja Aas. She believes that contemporary insecurity should be situated in the context of sharpening social divisions between 'winners' and 'losers' in the new world order, whereby she identifies the slowing global transformations as the main cause of social divisions and inequality, as well as the changed dynamics of social exclusion (2017: 14, 15).

Data from the World Bank from 2018 indicate an inferior economic position of certain parts of the world. Based on an insight into this data, it can be noted that there has been a significant reduction in the number of people living in conditions of extreme poverty, from 1.7

billion in 1990 to 736 million in 2015, but that despite this, extreme poverty is still a reality in many regions of the southern hemisphere. The percentage of people living on less than $1.90 a day in the East Asia, Pacific and South Asia regions is about 13%, which offers little grounds for optimism. The situation is even more drastic in Sub-Saharan Africa, where an enormous increase in the number of people living in conditions of extreme poverty was recorded, from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. This placed the 27 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa among the poorest countries in the world, with a poverty rate of 30% (World Bank Group, 2018: 1, 2).

Certain authors have included in their reflections the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans, created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. One of them is Mohammed Ayoob, who addresses these newly created countries as countries of the new Third World. With this, Ayoob wanted to point out the fact that they cannot be formally recognized as countries that traditionally belong to the Third World, but that they have a high degree of affinity with African, Asian and Latin American countries, considering their recent appearance in terms of legal statehood, the level of their political and economic development, and social characteristics (2007: 96).

It is understandable that the recent history of this part of the world, marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, often accompanied by the emergence and escalation of conflicts and instability in the new states of Europe and Central Asia, as well as the emergence of a meeting place of the poorest countries on the old continent, served as an argument for this Ayoob's qualification.

Following what was said, we consider it expedient to mention the observations of Joseph Stiglitz, former World Bank economist, who notes that especially in the case of former Soviet Union, the new economic system is far from bringing unprecedented prosperity, as the neoliberals announced. Instead, for the majority of the world's population, the transformations have resulted in poverty and social and political chaos (according to Aas, 2017: 15).

Bearing the above in mind, it is not surprising why in the scientific discourse there are increasingly common views that the prominent determinants of insecurity in the former Third World countries represent a significant framework for looking at the main sources of insecurity in the post-Cold War era.

If a holistic approach is taken, it can be concluded that despite their differences, the countries of the Global South share a number of common characteristics in the security and economic arena. The above implies the primacy of internal threats and dependence on external security guarantees, on the one hand, and poverty, underdevelopment and lack of resources as the main characteristics of many countries created by the processes of decolonization, on the other.

In the first part of the paper, we pointed out the prevalence of intrastate conflicts as the dominant form of manifestation of political violence, primarily in the countries of the Global South. Namely, Europe, which during the 19th and the first half of the 20th century was the scene of three fifths of all interstate wars, that coincides with the period of the most energetic arming of the European powers, after the Second World War ceded this leading role to developing countries, in which about 90% of all civil and ethnic, as well as interstate conflicts in the world, take place (Kegli & Vitkof, 2004: 594).

As observed by Singer and Wildavsky: "The proliferation of conflicts in the periphery, when compared with the image of relative tranquillity within and amity among the industrialized

countries of Western Europe and North America, has argumented the impression that there are actually two distinct zones in the international system – the zone of peace in the North and the zone of turmoil in the South, and that the two work according to different logics, a Lockean one *(a state of general freedom and equality)* in the former, and a Hobbesian one (*war of all against all*) in the latter" (according to Ayoob, 2007: 96).

In problematizing the reasons why the countries of the Global South have become a zone of continuous unrest, it is necessary to rely on their colonial past, which, in addition to enormous problems of an economic and social nature, bequeathed to them an inexhaustible potential for conflicts, primarily of a domestic character. In this context, we will mention the reflection of Robert Cooper. He, namely, observes that the European powers bequeathed to their imperial subjects abroad the system of nation states in its original form, and that the act of decolonization itself was an imperial imposition, considering that a system based on a completely European model has been established in Africa and Asia, which was inconsistent with their history. Thus, the nation-state in Africa and the Middle East experienced a complete failure, both in the case of individual states and their citizens, and in the case of the region (Cooper, 2009: 87, 88).

From Cooper's previous reflection, it is evident that the processes of decolonization resulted in the emergence of a large number of new independent states, which are characterized by unstable state structures and the absence of socio-political cohesion, whereby many of them today carry the qualification of the so-called fragile states, which generally speaking do not meet Max Weber's criterion of having a legitimate monopoly over the use of force; they are unable to meet the needs of their citizens and are exposed to frequent internal conflicts.[16]

The above, as Acharya concludes, arose from the relatively short time that was available to the countries of the former Third World, and today's Global South, to create sustainable political structures. To this should be added the conditions of poverty, underdevelopment and lack of resources that limited their ability to achieve development goals in the direction of ensuring domestic stability (1997: 302).

Also, the arbitrary drawing of borders in this part of the world by the colonial powers should also be taken into account, which, guided by particular political interests, did not take in consideration the multi-ethnic composition of many countries, their territorial, historical, linguistic, cultural, religious and other peculiarities. The above resulted in a lack of connection between the territorial dimensions of the state and its ethnic and social composition, and consequently in the inevitable actualization of the significance of ethnicity and ethnic identity on the international scene.

It can be concluded that the unfinished processes of nation building in symbiosis with the multi-ethnic composition of many countries, including insufficient economic capacities as a fundamental prerequisite for ensuring internal stability, make the countries of the southern hemisphere predisposed to intrastate and interstate conflicts.

---

[16] According to Fragile State Index from 2023 the position of the least stable states in the world occupy Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, Congo Democratic Republic, Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Ethiopia, Myanmar, where Somalia as the first positioned has a fragility index of 111.9, while Myanmar, as the twelfth most unstable country in the world, has an index of 100.2 (Statista Research Department, 2023).

4. Contemporary migrations from the perspective of insufficiency of freedom from fear and freedom from want

On the following pages, we will try to look at migration trends since the second half of the last century, relying on two fundamental components of the human security.

"Although international migrations is not an invention of the late 20th century, or even of modernity in its twin guises of capitalism and colonialism, but they have been part of human history from the earliest times, they have grown in volume and significance since 1945, and most particularly since the mid-1980s" (Castles & Miller, 1998: 4), as indicated by the data presented on the previous pages.

Based on the insight into migrations from the World War II to the present day, it can be axiomatically concluded that large global inequalities, primarily of an economic nature, significantly determined the patterns of migration movements. The data presented in the first part of the paper lead us to this conclusion – the data indicate that countries with a market economy, which occupy a dominant position in world production and trade, such as the industrialized countries of the West and other advanced economies in West Asia and North Africa, absorbed a disproportionate share of the world's migration fund of about two-thirds, in which 45% are people originating from underdeveloped and developing countries in Central, East and South Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Most of today's international migration flows date back to the end of World War II, when a number of industrialized countries liberalized their admissions policies with the aim of importing cheap labour. As a result, a large number of labor migrants were recruited from less developed countries to the fast growing industrial areas of Western Europe, the United States of America, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. This inaugurated permanent mass migration movements from the periphery to the center.

In this period immigration was seen as a significant driver of post-war economic development and was primarily economically motivated, both from the perspective of destination countries, as well as from the perspective of migrants originating from less developed countries, which especially after the global economic restructuring in the early 1970s and failed post-colonial development strategies, are marked by rapid population growth, overuse and destruction of natural resources, uncontrolled urbanisation, political instability, falling living standards, poverty and even famine (Castles & Miller, 1998: 78). This was inevitably reflected in the processes of emigration from Africa, Asia and Latin America, which intensified in the following decades. Data that will be presented below confirm the previously said.

In the period after the Second World War, certain areas have maintained the position of traditional regions of immigration such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which, as part of the 'new world', were open to new settlements, while other regions were just beginning to profile themselves as desirable destinations for migrants, like Western Europe.

The first migration processes resulted in the diversification of migrant's origin. As Castles and Miller point out, the population od USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand consisted mainly of European immigrants and their descendants. Since the second half of the 1960s, they have experienced large-scale immigration from new source areas, particularly

from Asia and Latin America in the case of USA (1998: 5, 6). This dynamic of migration movements in the United States of America was influenced by the adoption of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. The amendments created a system of world-wide immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship with US citizens or residents. The result was a dramatic upsurge in migration from Asia and Latin America (Castles & Miller, 1998: 74, 75).

Thus, in the period from 1965 to 1969, migrants from developing countries exceeded the number of migrants originating from developed countries - since the first decade of the 21st century, they make up about 80% of the total migration fund (Martin, 2013: 5).

The same is the case with Canada and Australia, in which, after abandoning the European immigration policy advocated until then, a large increase in the share of immigrants from underdeveloped countries was registered - at the end of the 1970s this share was more than 50%, and by the 1990s it would fluctuate between 70 and 80% (Zlotnik, 2002: 27).

In the following decades, North America was also exposed to a large influx of immigrants, becoming also a desirable destination for migrants from Africa in the 21st century, with an annual average growth rate of 4.9%, which represents an increase of 1.5 million migrants (UN DESA, 2017b: 13).

These trends influenced the increase in the share of the migration component in the total population. The 1990 Census counted 19.8 million foreign-born residents, 7.9 per cent of the total population, while an official survey in 1996 put the foreign-born population at 24.6 million, 9.3 per cent of total population (Castles & Miller, 1998: 84). The first two decades of the 21st century were marked by a continuous increase in the number of immigrants in North America, with an average annual net migration rate of 1.25 million, of which, a growth of 1 million per year was recorded in the United States, and 250,000 in Canada. Thus, this region ranked second in terms of the number of international migrants – approximately 59 milion, and America itself is the destination for 51 million international migrants (UN DESA, 2019: 12).

Europe, also, began to favor immigration processes. At the base of the interest for migration were the internal factors of development of the states that have taken steps toward the creation of European integration, the intra-union mobility of workforce. Also, in the conditions of the Western European countries' economic growth, the necessity for labor-force also increased; this was brought (since the late 1950's) from third countries (Mosneaga *et al.*, 2018: 66).

In order to trace the path of their own economic progress, the members of European Community reached out to labor migrants from countries that were under their colonial administration, primarily from North Africa, where the largest share of the migration flow from underdeveloped countries to Western Europe was from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, as well as from former British colonies from the New Commonwealth. Also, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece have become significant exporters of labor force for European Community's members, as well as less developed countries of the old continent such as Italy, Spain and Portugal (IOM, 2000: 9; Stalker, 2002: 153; King & Lulle, 2016: 26, 27).

As a result, Europe, a traditional region of emigration for centuries, has become an attractive area for international migrants. Although the arrival of migrants was affected by the great economic crisis caused by the Arab embargo on oil from 1973, when immigration programs were temporarily suspended, members of the European Community begin to

record positive net migration immediately after the initiated integration processes, as well as a progressive increase in the number of immigrants in the decades that followed.

As Strozza observes, based on Eurostat data: „As early as the 1960s, the EU15 countries recorded a positive net migration (about 800 thousand net arrivals) which grew to 2.3 million in the 1970s and remained more or less stable in the 1980s. It is in the last twenty years, however, that this geopolitical area has become increasingly attractive: positive net migration was close to 8 million in the 1990s and almost doubled in the first decade of the 21st century" (2010: 13).

This progressive growth of the immigrant population in the countries of the European Union was conditioned by its expansion towards the less developed countries in the south in the 1980s, great political turmoil in the former Soviet Union and its collapse, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, as well as admission to the European Union in the 21st century members with a significantly lower standard of living. Accession of Greece 1981 and Spain and Portugal 1986 to the European Community, along with Italy as one of the leaders of European integration, combined with the growing prosperity of these countries and their relative 'openness' to migration from all sides of the Mediterranean, resulted in a rapid influx of immigrants to these countries. During the 1990s and 2000s, Southern Europe became an attractive destination, primarily for migrants originating from Asia, Latin America and North Africa, but also from certain new members of the European Union. Thus, in 2012 the number of foreign citizens in Spain reached 6.6 million, in Italy 5.7 million, while in Portugal and Greece the share of the migrant population was significantly lower - 872,000 and 730,000, respectively (The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2014: 362, 363).

In the second half of the 1980s, there was a revival of migrations towards Western Europe. The main drivers of these migration movements were problems of an economic and political nature in the countries of origin. Many migrants came to Western European countries primarily for economic reasons, but at the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, large population movements originated from Central and Eastern Europe, caused by ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, the collapse of socialist regimes and the transition to a market economy, which had a significant impact on the migration processes of this era, with an increase in the participation of non-economic migrants in the form of refugees and an increasing number of asylum seekers.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by increasing economic chaos, high unemployment and political conflicts. The aforementioned problems of an economic and political nature were a kind of trigger for large migration movements from the east to the west, that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, as a decades-long barrier to human mobility. This, as well as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which caused the exodus of millions of people, were reflected in the enormous increase in the number of asylum seekers in the European Union, which in the period from 1989-1998 amounted to more than 4 million - 43% of asylum seekers came from other parts of Europe, 35% from Asia and 19% from Africa (Salt according to Stalker, 2002: 153).[17]

---

[17] To illustrate the progressive number of asylum requests, we will refer to the following data: in 1983 there were 66,900 asylum requests, and in 1992 the number of submitted requests reached a peak of 649,000. This rapid increase in the number of requests was conditioned by political instability in Romania and Poland, as well as the eruption of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. So asylum applicants

Although the predictions that after the Cold War the West would face an exodus of people from the countries of the Eastern Bloc of epic proportions did not come true, there is no doubt that this historical event had a significant impact on the intensification of international migrations. This is supported by the fact that in the period from 1988 to 1996, Germany, as one of the leading recipients of immigrants from the former Eastern bloc, received 2.3 million ethnic Germans (Zlotnik, 2002: 26). Hundreds of thousands of people from the former Soviet Union found a new home in Greece, Israel and the United States of America (*Ibidem*, p. 31).

The further dynamics of migration within the European Union was influenced by its expansion to countries with a significantly lower standard of living, which made migrations on the East-West route even more certain. Therefore, the movements of people in the first decade of the 21st century were dominantly determined by economic factors, unlike those that preceded them, whose causes should also be sought in political reasons, ethno-religious conflicts and wars.

Although the expansion of the European Union in the first decade of the 21st century also resulted in migration movements from the east to the south, considering the significant presence of Romanians, Poles and Bulgarians in the EU southern states, as well as immigrants from non-member countries, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Albania, the main effect of its double expansion were the movements of people towards the west. The movement of around 600,000 Poles to Great Britain after 2004 represented the single largest migration event of the new era of enlargement (King & Lulle, 2016: 28).

The number of immigrants from the new members of the European Union increased by about 3.3 million in the period from 2000-2009, with the highest recorded inflows in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden, countries that have not established restrictive measures regarding access to the labor market for people originating from the new member states, as well as in Germany, Italy and Spain (Strozza, 2010: 32).

The EU enlargement processes also implied that some new members, especially those with greater economic opportunities, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, became desirable destinations for migrants from countries with a lower standard of living (Black & Glorius according to King & Lulle, 2016: 28).

In the second decade of the 21st century, Europe faced one of the biggest refugee and migrant crises in its history, which was caused by revolutionary turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East. This revolutionary tide was favored by the synergistic action of unfavorable political and economic factors that determined the social reality of this region for many years. The political reasons for the rebellion arose from the fact that this region has the largest concentration of dictatorships in the world, which due to the missing mechanisms of consensus in authoritarian regimes tend to promote violent solutions to political problems (Faath & Mattes, 2014: 159). To this should be added the desperate situation regarding the realization of fundamental human and political rights, which are not even characteristic of such systems.

Economic factors, on the other hand, are reflected in the high rate of poverty and unemployment, which is conditioned by failed economic reforms, stagnation of gross national product per capita, external debt, corruption. As noted by Faath and Mattes, the study entitled *Rich and poor states in the Middle East* has lost none of its relevance and significance

---

were predominantly from these countries, but also from Turkey, Sri Lanka and Iran (Zlotnik, 2002: 28).

since it was first published in 1982. Today, as 30 years ago, the MENA states are influenced by the disparity of the extreme income differences both between the individual countries and among the individuals of a particular country, the differing productivity of the respective national economies, and the wide gap between the energy and non-energy sectors in the resource-rich countries (2014: 160, 161).

It is undeniable that the factors that ignited the revolutionary mood correspond to those that produced decades of exodus from this part of the world. This made this region the source of 8 million emigrants of the first generation, of which 62% live in the countries of the European Union, 27% in other Arab countries (20% in the Gulf) and 11% in another part of the world (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012: 1, 2).

The revolutionary changes that took place in certain North African countries at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, were accompanied by the aggravation of inter-ethnic conflicts, civil war and an acute decline in the standard of living. These are the key reasons why this region has become the epicenter of mass refugee exodus and internally displaced persons. The aforementioned processes had an immediate impact on the migrant situation in Europe, given that after the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Libya, Egypt and other countries in this part of the world, borders have become porous and this was inevitably reflected in the increase in migration from northern and equatorial Africa to Europe.

The scale of the migration flow is best illustrated by the data of the UN Refugee Agency, which indicates that during 2015, when the migrant crisis reached its peak, over a million people arrived in Europe. This represented a fourfold increase compared to the previous year, when the number was 216,000 (UNHCR, 2016: 7).

Although we cannot ignore economic factors when looking at the etiology of these migration movements, the wave that swept Europe in the spring of 2015 was primarily determined by political motives. According to the data of the UN Refugee Agency from the end of 2015, 84% of those who arrived in Europe came from one of the countries affected by the war (Clayton & Holland, 2015).

Eurostat data indicate that over 1.2 million people applied for the international protection in one of the EU member states in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016). This is an unprecedented number of asylum requests, which almost doubled compared to the previous year, when 626,000 persons applied for asylum in the EU and, it is important to emphasize, that the 2014 total was the highest since the previous peak of 672,000 in 1992, when the EU had 15 Member States (King & Lulle, 2016: 43).

This peak from 2014 was significantly influenced by the conflict in Ukraine, which forced hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to seek protection in certain European countries (UNHCR, 2015: 9).[18]

Over 50% of asylum seekers in 2015 were from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Syria took the leading position in terms of the number of applications submitted, which compared to the previous year was twice as large and it numbered 362,800, while the number of applicants from Afghanistan was 178,200 and Iraq 121,500 (Eurostat, 2016).

---

[18] Full-scale war in Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022 resulted in the re-actualization of the refugee crisis – almost 2.6 million refugees from Ukraine were hosted in neighbouring countries, with a further 3 million in other European countries and beyond (UNHCR, 2023: 19).

Events in these countries undoubtedly pointed to a direct link between conflict and migration. Afghanistan, for almost four decades, is a glaring example of that correlation, considering that the war destruction in this country during the indicated period, and especially during the rigid Taliban rule from the second half of the 1990s until the end of 2001, caused a one-way multi-million migration flow from this country, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, and recently also to the countries of the European Union, where hundreds of thousands of people from Afghanistan and refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran try to find perspective (Mikac & Dragović, 2017: 137).

Since the 1980s, Afghanistan has continuously been the largest source of the refugee population in the world, which often exceeded 6 million during the mentioned period (UNHCR, 2020: 20). Although the number of refugees from this country has decreased significantly during the last decade, thanks to the repatriation processes of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran, which in 2020 counted 2,6 milion (UNHCR, 2021a), at the end of 2022 the total population of Afghan refugees increased to 5.7 milion.[19] Thus, Afghanistan took the third place in terms of the number of refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2023: 19).

In 2014, Afghanistan has ceded its long-standing position as the leading source of the world's refugee population to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian conflict that dates back to 2011 and had strong repercussions on the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, produced one of the largest refugee populations in history, which amounted to more than 6.5 million at the end of 2022 (*Ibidem*), while the number of internally displaced persons is 6.8 million (*Ibidem*, p. 27). This indicates the level of the humanitarian disaster that this country is facing during the last decade, as well as countries in the region, especially Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, in which about 77% of Syrian refugees have found shelter, which additionally emphasizes the human-security dimension of this conflict.

Looking at the recent and less recent history of the countries of the MENA region (North Africa and the Middle East), it can be concluded that this part of the world has been profiled as a very prominent stage for international and domestic conflicts, thereby assuming a very active role in the production of refugee exodus over a long series of years. In the following, we will present some of the biggest conflicts that marked the modern history of this part of the world, and that pointed out the link between conflict and migration, generating a humanitarian disaster of unfathomable proportions.

Indispensable to mention is the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which caused large-scale forced displacement of Palestinians, mostly to camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. It is a conflict that generated one of the largest refugee populations in the world of 5.9 million Palestinians, which are under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East - UNRWA (*Ibidem*, p. 2).

Iraq is a country that, together with Afghanistan, has continuously been among the leading countries in terms of the number of refugees since the 1980s (UNHCR, 2015: 16). This should be attributed to the three Gulf Wars, where only the last one (2003-2009), caused 2.7 million internally displaced persons and more than 2 million refugees abroad (Faath & Mattes, 2014: 171).

---

[19] This was largely due to the upwards revision of population estimates in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2022 which led to the recording of 2.6 million more Afghans. Of these, it is estimated that 1.6 million arrived prior to the Taliban takeover in August 2021, with a further 610,000 arriving later in 2021 and another 390,000 in 2022 (UNHCR, 2023: 19).

Yemen is also the epicenter of one of the biggest humanitarian disasters in the MENA region. Six years of war destruction in this, otherwise the poorest country in the Middle East, forced 4 million Yemenis to leave their homes, while 20 million people are in dire need of humanitarian aid (UNHCR, 2021b).

The multi-decade civil war between the northern and southern parts of Sudan devastated this country, causing between 1.5 and 2 million casualties and a large number of displaced persons (Daly & Sikainga; Kok according to Faath & Mattes, 2014: 173). Although the Sudanese conflict formally ended in 2005, at the end of 2013, only two years after gaining independence, South Sudan was affected by a new civil war, which caused one of the fastest growing refugee crises in the world. The war ended in 2018, leaving behind a refugee population of almost 2.3 million people at the end of 2022 (UNHCR, 2023: 19).

The exclusivity of the permanent production of human tragedy does not belong only to certain countries of the MENA region. By looking at the historical review presented by UN Refugee Agency, twelve countries have featured among the top 20 source countries of refugees in the period from 1980-2014. In addition to the already nominated Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq, six Sub-Saharan African countries are on this list, including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, Eritrea and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2015: 16). The situation in this region is no more optimistic even in the second decade of the 21st century, when an almost three-fold increase in the number of refugees was recorded, from 2.2 to 6.3 million. This progressive increase was primarily caused by conflict and violence in the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Burundi (UNHCR, 2020: 18).

In recent times, some other countries of the southern hemisphere have profiled themselves as very significant generators of refugee and displaced populations. In this context, it is important to mention the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in which, due to the deterioration of political, socio-economic and human rights conditions in the last decade, a sudden increase in the number of displaced Venezuelans in Latin American countries and the Caribbean has been recorded. This is the largest exodus in the recent history of the Latin American continent and one of the largest displacement crises in the world. This is confirmed by the fact that Venezuela had more than 5.4 million refugees at the end of 2022 (UNHCR, 2023: 19).

At the end of 2022, over 16% of the world's refugees were Ukrainian. This number increased from 27,300 at the end of 2021 to 5.7 million at the end of 2022. This was the fastest outflow of refugees since the Second World War, triggered by the eruption of full-scale war in Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022 (*Ibidem*).

We will finish our reflections on this topic with a brief review of the tragic fate of the Rohingya minority group in the Southeast Asian country of Myanmar, which was the target of ethnic violence by the power structures in this country. This is a Muslim minority without a homeland that, after many years of continuous exposure to discrimination, persecution and physical oppression, was forced to seek salvation in Bangladesh. Persistent terrorizing of the Rohingya, resulted in this minority group becoming one of the dominant refugee populations in the world with more than 1,2 million (*Ibidem*).

The previous review of the conflicts in the world understandably is not final. Aware that it is impossible to present each one individually, we opted for those that both during a long period of time and in recent times, generated multi-million refugee flows. If we only

look at the case of Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Venezuela, Ukraine and Myanmar, we will see that these are countries that, in the total world refugee fund of 29.4 million (not including Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate), participate with 26.8 milion, which is approximately 91%. The situation is no better in certain countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, bearing in mind their tendency to revitalize conflicts since the 1980s, which made this region one of the largest meeting place of refugees and displaced persons in the world.

This exposes the tragic fate of these countries, as well as the agony faced by their people, who are deprived even of the hope for a better tomorrow and a life worthy of a human being. The above feeds our previously expressed skepticism that human security in certain parts of the world is just an unattainable dream - primarily in those that evidently fit into Barnett's notion of an 'nonintegrated' gap, destined to play the role of an unquestionable generator of continuous human tragedy.

Conclusion

The concept of human security was created as a result of the desire to conceptualize the understanding of security as a kind of alternative to a realistic approach. Based on what has been presented in the paper so far, it is evident that the search for this type of security stemmed, among other things, from the perception of the state as incapable of providing security and satisfaction of basic human needs, on the one hand, and often as a source of threats to human security, on the other.

The aforementioned has made us decide to look at the migrations from the perspective of human security, with a special focus on those countries that in the post-colonial, and especially in the post-Cold War period, found themselves on the margins of world politics, bound by numerous political, economic and social problems that gave a strong impetus to the migration movements, primarily towards developed countries. This contributed to a clear differentiation into regions of the traditional emigration, which are located in the Global South, and regions of the traditional immigration, which are dominantly located in the Global North. Although the migration corridor on the South-North route was actualized immediately after the Second World War, in the following decades it gained more and more affirmation. These trends made it the most frequent migration corridor in the 21st century, with 45% of the world's migration fund.

The patterns of contemporary migrations very clearly reflect the polarization of the world into the rich North and the poor South, making migration one of the more prominent aspects of the relationship between the center and the periphery. The aforementioned results from the fact that countries with advanced economies, such as North America and Europe, are characterized by a high standard of living and a low birth rate, unlike their kind of antipode - a large part of the countries of the southern hemisphere emerged after the processes of decolonization, whose independence did not bring prosperity and progress, and which are determined by a low standard of living and a high birth rate. This made inevitable migrations from underdeveloped and developing countries to developed Western countries, and it is quite certain that the migration corridor from the periphery to the center will not lose its importance even in the following years. We find the basis for this claim in two key facts - first, the rich West is facing a demographic implosion, which in the coming decades will significantly affect the reduction of the working age population

as a guarantor of economic progress, which will force developed Western democracies to compensate for this by favoring emigration; and second, the aspirations of people to try to find their perspective in countries that offer higher incomes and better opportunities for life will not disappear, in an effort to free themselves from the shackles of poverty and misery.

The polarization between North and South is not only evident from the perspective of economic factors, but also from a security angle, given that the countries of Western democracies have been committed to pacifism for decades. This is not the case with the underdeveloped and developing countries of the southern hemisphere, which especially after the Second World War became a prominent stage for conflicts, primarily of an intrastate character. This contributed to the consolidation of the belief that the world is divided into two diametrically opposed zones - the zone of peace in the North and the zone of turmoil in the South, whereby the latter, with a manifested tendency to frequent conflicts, was profiled as a significant generator of the refugee and displaced population in the world, which indicates the insufficiency of freedom from fear in this part of the world.

The lack of freedom from fear is particularly characteristic of certain countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region, which during the last decades have continuously generated multi-million refugee waves. Understandably, countries in other parts of the world are not immune to conflicts either. Afghanistan, a South Asian country that has been the leading source of the world refugee population since the 1980s, while today it occupies the third position in terms of the number of refugees in the world, is definitely worth mentioning. Also, in the 21st century, we have witnessed the outbreak of new conflicts, such as those in Ukraine, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Arab Republic of Syria and Myanmar, which have forced million of people to flee their homes. All previously nominated conflicts contributed to an alarming increase in the number of refugees (the number increased by 2.5 times) and displaced persons (the number almost tripled) during the first two decades of the 21st century. This indicates the degree of violence that these conflicts are characterized by, which condemned the people originating from these countries to a life on the run, as well as mercy, primarily of neighboring countries, that most often provide them with refuge from the atrocities they are exposed to in the countries they come from. And exactly, in contrast to economically motivated migrations, which are expected to be dominantly directed towards developed countries, according to the estimates of the UN Refugee Agency, low- and middle income (neighboring) countries hosted 76% of the world's refugees and other people in need of international protection. This represents an additional source of threats to the human security of the receiving countries, which are already facing numerous economic, political and social problems.

The countries that are on the list of the most unstable countries in the world according to the Fragile State Index 2023, were profiled as the biggest generators of refugees and displaced persons. This undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that countries characterized by fragile political structures, the absence of socio-political cohesion, slow democratization processes and insufficient economic development, are one of the leading problems of world politics and a significant source of threats to peace. Therefore, it is certain that in the following years, these countries will significantly determine the dynamics of forced migration movements, leaving no other alternative to its citizens, except escape.

References

- Aas, K. F. (2017). Globalization & Crime. Second Edition. SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC.

- Acharya, A. (1997). The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies in Critical Security Studies - Concepts and Cases. UCL Press.

- Acharya, A. (2001). Human Security: East versus West. International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, Sage Publication, p. 442-460.

- Ayoob, M. (2007). State Making, State Breaking and State Failure In Leashing the Dogs of War. Conflict Management In A Divided World. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.

- Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing, New Jersey, p. 431-451.

- Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (1998). The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Second edition. Macmillan Press, London.

- Clayton, J., Holland, H. (2015). Over one million sea arrivals in 2015. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html;

- Commission on Human Security. (2003). Human Security Now: Protecting and empowering people. Report of the Commission on Human Security. United Nations, New York.

- Cooper, R. (2009). Slom država. Poredak i kaos u 21. stoljeću. Profil, Zagreb.

- Eurostat. (2016). Asylum in the EU Member States. Record number of over 1,2 milion first time asylum seekers registered in 2015. Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis: top citizenship. Eurostat Press Office, Luxembourg.

- Faath, S., Mattes, H. (2014). Political conflicts and migration in the MENA states in Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. Past Developments, Current Status and Future Potentials. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam.

- Fargues, P., Fandrich, C. (2012). Migration after the Arab Spring. MPC Research Report No. 9. European University Institute, Fiesole.

- Global Commmission on International Migration. (2005). Migration In An Interconnected World: New Dimension for Action. http://gcim.org;

- Hampson, F. O. (2008). Human Security in Security Studies: An Introduction. Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York.

- Independent Commission on International Development Issues. (1980). North South: A Programme for Survival. The MIT Press, Cambridge.

- International Organization for Migration. (2000). World Migration Report 2000. United Nations Publication.

- International Organization for Migration. (2013). World Migration Report 2013. Migrant Well-Being and Development. Geneva.

- International Organization for Migration. (2020). World Migration Report 2020. Geneva.

- Jackson, R. (2001). The Evolution of International Society in The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Jolly, R., Ray, D. B. (2006). The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates. NHDR Occasional Paper 5, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

- Kegli, Č. V., Vitkof, J. R. (2004). Svetska politika. Trend i transformacija. Centar za studije Jugoistočne Evrope/Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu/ Diplomatska akademija Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore, Beograd.

- King, R., Lulle, A. (2016). Research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities. A Policy Review. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

- Martin, P., Zurcher, G. (2008). Managing Migration: The Global Challenge, Population Bulletin Vol. 63, no. 1.

- Martin, P. (2013). The Global Challenge of Managing Migration, Population Bulletin Vol. 68, no. 2.

- McAuliffe, M., Triandafyllidou, A. (2021). World Migration Report 2022. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.

- Menon, S. (2007.) Human Security: Concept and practice. MPRA Paper No. 2478, p. 1-28.

- Migali, S., Natale, F. *et al.* (2019). International migration drivers. A quantitative assessment of the structural factors shaping migration. Joint Research Centre (JRC). Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

- Mikac, R., Dragović, F. (2017). Masovne migracije: izazovi, posljedice i put naprijed. Forum za sigurnosne studije, god.1, br.1, 130-152.

- Mosneaga, V. *et al.* (2018). Europe and the Migration Crisis: the Response of the EU Member States. Stowarzyszenie Naukowe Instytut Badan nad Polityka Europejska, Gdansk.

- Muguruza, C. (2007). Human Security as a policy framework: Critics and Challenges. Yearbook on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights No. 4, p. 15-35.

- The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2014). International Migration Outlook 2014. OECD Publishing, Paris.

- Simon, O. B. (2008). Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect Approach. A Solution to Civilian Insecurity in Darfur. Human Security Journal, Vol. 7, p. 46-61.

- Stalker, P. (2002). Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe. International Migration Vol. 40 (5), Blackwell Publisher, p. 151-179.

- Statista Research Department. (2023). The most unstable countries worldwide according to the Fragile States Index in 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/752063/20-most-fragile-countries-worldwide/

- Strozza, S. (2010). International migration in Europe in the first decade of the 21st century. Rivista italiana di economia, demografia e statistica, vol. LXIV, no. 3, p. 7-43.

- Tadjbakhsh, S. (2014). Human Security Twenty Years On, Expert Analysis, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre-NOREF, p. 1-8.

- Tatalović, S. (2010). Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi. Politička kultura, Zagreb.

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2015). World at War. Global trends. Forced Displacement in 2014.

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2016). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015.

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2020). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2019.

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2021a). Refugee Data Finder. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2021b) Yemen Humanitarian crisis. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/yemen/.

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2023). Global trends. Forced displacement in 2022.

- United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco.

- Ullah, A. (2016). Refugee mobility: Causes and perspective in the Middle East. Orient 1, p. 60-68.

- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2020). International Migration 2020 Highlights.

- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017a). Migration and population change – drivers and impacts. Population Facts no. 8.

- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017b). International Migration Report. Hightlights. United Nations, New York.

- United Nations Department of Economis and Social Affairs. (2019). International Migration 2019. Highlights. United Nations, New York.

- United Nations Development Programme-UNDP. (1994). Human Development Report 1994. Oxford University Press, New York.

- United Nations General Assembly. (2002). Strenghtening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change. Report of the Secretary General, A/57/387, paragraf 39.

- Vaughan-Williams, N., Peoples, C. (2014). Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Routledge, London.

- World Bank Group. (2018). Piecing Together The Poverty Puzzle. Poverty and Share Prosperity. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington.

- Zlotnik, H. (2002). Trends of International Migration since 1965: What Existing Data Reveal. International Migration Vol. 37, Issues 1, p. 21-61.