BALANCE OF POWER AFTER UKRAINE WAR - TRANSATLANTIC FUTURES: NATO 2030

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Abstract: The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will bring fundamental political, military, economic, security and social consequences on global scale, comparable with previous historical events of Westphalian Peace, The Concert of Great Powers, Versailles system, Yalta-Potsdam system and the end of the Cold War.

The aim of this paper is to analyze possible scenarios of Ukraine war and possible global strategic consequences of this conflict, including development of transatlantic link of European security and development of NATO Alliance until 2030. The outcome of the Ukrainian conflict will clearly determine future of political and institutional capability of the West, including NATO and European Union. The same issue will apply for Russian Federation and future of non-West integration platforms, including BRICS, SCO and CSTO. Perspective of multi-polar global and regional security order over unipolar – the United States led global security order. Therefore, possibility of decreasing political, military, institutional and economic power of the United States, NATO and EU and possibility of further integration and development of BRICS, SCO, and CSTO is plausible.

However, NATO Alliance has developed necessary strategies and taken necessary decisions in order to counter security challenges and threats stemming from China, Russian Federation and other global and regional actors. Madrid NATO Summit in June of 2022 has approved new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) which will remain relevant until 2030. NSC outlines necessary decisions, capabilities and actions in order to safeguard territory of the Alliance via strengthening the Eastern flank of the Alliance, substantially increase number of NATO High Readiness Forces and organize other activities in order to facilitate political and military development of NATO. Agenda NATO 2030 is ambitious agenda which will also determine future of trans-Atlantic link and future of the Alliance. The Agenda set out for necessary steps and actions to ensure that NATO remains ready, strong and united for a new era of increased political, military and economic competition with China and Russian Federation, and other emerging regional powers. The Agenda 2030 reveals strategic proposals for NATO development- deeper political and military consultations among the NATO Allies, strengthened deterrence and defense, improved resilience, preservation of technological edge of NATO Alliance, uphold the Rules- based international order, maintenance of NATO Open Door Policy, boost training and capacity building, combat and adapt to climate change, investing in NATO financial capability and allocation of recourses for the defense budgets of member states of the Alliance.

Key Words: Ukraine, War, Balance, Trans-Atlantic, NATO

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1. Introduction

The outcome of the war in Ukraine will bring fundamental political, economic, social, security and military consequences and it will define global and regional balance of power, including effectiveness and efficiency of European Union and NATO. The aim of this paper is to analyze political and military consequences of the military conflict in Ukraine on changes for global and regional balance of power, including of development of Trans- Atlantic link and NATO Alliance until 2030. The hypothesis of the paper is following: the war in Ukraine has created fundamental pre-conditions for change of balance of power in global scale and it has also created institutional and development challenges for the Alliance which are outlined in NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC), and NATO Agenda 2030.

By invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made clash of competing visions a brutal and deadly reality (Munich Security Conference Report, 2023: 7). Moreover, in border geopolitical sense, the war in Ukraine marks the return of contestation over spheres of influence in world politics (Ashford, 2023). Those in the West and Russian Federation, who thought that military engagement in Ukraine could be won by either side within short amount of time proved to be wrong. History is imperfect guide, but it suggests wars that endure for more than a year are likely to go on for at least several more and are exceedingly difficult to end (Kofman and Lee, 2023). Therefore, it is obvious that the outcome of the war in Ukraine will bring fundamental changes in global and regional security environment and, subsequently, it will have fundamental political and military impact on NATO and European Union. Moreover, it will determine whether international rules-based international order survives (Menon, 2023). NATO Alliance will face increasing global and regional competition with other, non-Western security and integration platforms, such as BRICS and SCO. Moreover, China and Russian Federation will increasingly challenge the United States and other members of the Alliance politically and militarily. Strategic objective of China and Russian Federation is to diminish political, economic and military capabilities and coherence of the West, including decrease of effectiveness, efficiency and internal cohesion of NATO Alliance. On the other hand, both-China and Russian Federation is further cooperating on bi-lateral relationships and strengthening non-Western security and integration platforms- CSTO, SCO and BRICS. NATO has approved and delivered political planning documents which will determine its development until 2030- NATO Agenda 2030, decisions of NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, approval of new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). All these documents will strategically determine political and military shape of the Alliance, taking into account previously mentioned challenges for the United States and NATO. One would conclude that, firstly, result of war in Ukraine- the largest and deadliest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War II- will fundamentally shape global and regional security environment. Secondly, it will fundamentally impact and shape political and institutional coherence of the Alliance, especially, future decisions of NATO Open Door policy and possible invitation for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to join the Alliance. Thirdly, it will determine effectiveness of integration process within BRICS and SCO as counterweight to NATO, AUKUS and other Western political and military integration efforts. Taking into account previously mentioned considerations and conclusions- possibility of gradual decrease of political, economic, institutional and military power of the United States, NATO and European Union, and possibility of further integration, expansion and development of BRICS, SCO and CSTO is plausible.

2. Global and Regional Security Environment after the First Year of War in Ukraine. Changes within Global Balance of Power

" Ukraine has united the world,' declared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a speech on the first anniversary of the start of the war with Russia. If only that were true. The war has certainly united the West, but it has left the world divided (Miliband, 2023). And this increasingly widening gap between the West and the Rest put pressure on existing- the United States led- global and regional security architecture which is increasingly challenged by China, Russian Federation and other emerging actors resulting into increased regional conflicts and security challenges. Since milestone speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 2007, increased political, economic and military tensions among the United States/NATO, China and Russian Federation have resulted into number of regional military conflicts, such as Georgia in 2008, Syria in 2011, Ukraine since 2013, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, Belarus in 2020-2021, catastrophic American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August of 2021, and many others. Moreover, fundamentally different security threat perception and assessment among the United States, China and Russian Federation have led to fundamental challenges in the areas of conventional arms control (CAC), control of nuclear weapons, and CBRN.

Yet another strategic challenge for Europe and the West is fundamental transformation of global and regional security architecture and further decrease of Europe's ability to shape and counter current and emerging security threats and challenges (Munich Security Conference Report, 2020:6). Far- reaching power shifts in the world and rapid technological change contribute to a sense of anxiety and restlessness in Europe. The world is becoming less European and less Western. But, more importantly, Europe itself may become less Western. This is what we call " Westlessness" (Munich Security Conference Report, 2020: 6). For the past decades, the answer to the question what it was that kept Europe and the West together was straightforward: a commitment to liberal democracy and human rights, to a market based economy, and to international cooperation and international institutions. Today, the meaning of the West is increasingly contested again and one is witnessing "the decay of the West" as relatively cohesive geopolitical configuration (Munich Security Conference Report, 2020: 6). The President of France Emmanuel Macron stated in August of 2019 that " we were used to an international order that had been based on Western hegemony since the 18th century. Things change and as the result of these changes is also the emergence of new powers whose impact we have probably underestimated for far too long" (Munich Security Conference Report, 2020: 7). To illustrate such developments and changes, we may recall what Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said as recently as June 2022:" Europe has to grow out of mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems but the world's problems are not Europe's problems"; and on the question which of two camps ("axes") India intends to join: " This is exactly where I disagree. This is the construct you're trying to impose on me. And I don't accept it. I am one fifth of the world's population; I am today the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world. So, I think, I am entitled to have my own side, I am entitled to weigh my own interests, make my own choices" (Kreutner, 2023). Moreover, President of Brazil Lula da Silva has proposed establishment of non- Western political platform to discuss and negotiate lasting peace in Ukraine. What the President outlined " what we have to do is to form group strong enough to be respected at negotiation table. Countries which could

participate in proposed format –Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and others (Lula Da Silva, 2023). These are just a few examples which clearly confirm further division of the West and the Global South on fundamental political and security issues, including attitude towards military conflict in Ukraine and Russian Federation. Therefore, as the result, Europe's ability to safeguard its security and prosperity and conduct an independent foreign policy with the necessary means is already being challenged on various fronts. It is obvious that if Europe will not learn the language of power, it would disappear "geographically" or have others to determine its fate (Munich Security Conference Report, 2020:36).

One can argue that the beginning of the 21st century has accelerated development and scope of simultaneous security threats and challenges, such as competing ideologies, further radicalization of a societies due to political, ideological, economic and security challenges, weak institutional capabilities of international and regional organizations, threats to social order, public safety and security, negative impact of uncontrolled migration, rise of terrorism, development of organized crime networks, illegal drug and human trafficking, cyber threats, CBRN threats, development and use of new technologies- all abovementioned security threats are just a few which have been seriously impacting global, regional and national security (Rublovskis, 2019:102). Considering fundamentally different approaches of various states, global and regional security organizations to address these threats effectively, it will be difficult to develop and deliver common and sustained approach.

Moreover, the beginning of military conflict in Ukraine in February 24 2022 has brought considerable changes of approach of the United States and NATO on assessment of global strategic security environment, persistent and emerging security threats and challenges. NATO Strategic Concept 2022 outlines strategic outlook on emerging security environment after outbreak of military conflict in Ukraine. It is clear that Euro-Atlantic area is not in peace; therefore Alliance cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability, recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected (Munich Security Conference Report, 2023:7). Furthermore, the United States intelligence community assesses that the United States and their NATO Allies will confront complex and pivotal international security environment dominated by two critical strategic challenges that intersects with each other existing trends to intensify their national security implications. First, great powers, rising regional powers, as well as an evolving array of non-state actors, will vie for dominance in the global order, as well as compete to set the emerging conditions and the rules that will shape that order for decades to come. Strategic competition between the United States and its allies, China and Russia over what kind of world will emerge makes the next few years critical to determining who and what will shape narrative perhaps most immediately in the context of Russia's actions in Ukraine which threaten to escalate into broader conflict between Russia and the West. Moreover, some scenarios describes possible direct military confrontation between NATO and Russian Federation in case of further strengthening of NATO's northeastern flank and Russian military answer (M. Priebe and Associates, 2023). Second, shared challenges, including climate change, and human and health security, are converging as the planet emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic and confronts economic issues spurred by both- energy and food insecurity. Rapidly emerging and evolving technologies continue to have the potential to disrupt traditional business and society with both- positive and negative outcomes while creating unprecedented

vulnerabilities and attack surfaces, making it increasingly challenging to predict the impact of such challenges on the global landscape. These two strategic challenges will intersect and interact in unpredictable ways that could challenge our ability to respond (Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2023:4). Ideological confrontation between the United States, their NATO Allies and other global and regional powers will further increase possibility of military conflict between the parties. It is presumed in NSC 2022 that authoritarian actors challenge NATO's interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test the resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness, digitalization of NATO nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at forefront of deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022:3).

Taking into account abovementioned analysis of global and regional security environment, one would argue that The United States and NATO will increasingly face security threat from further political, economic and military cooperation between Russian Federation and China both- bilaterally and through international cooperation and integration platforms of SCO and BRICS. Moreover, Iran and other considerable regional powers will increasingly integrate into previously mentioned political platforms. Therefore, Russian Federation and China will increasingly challenge the United States-led Western political and military global security order. One can conclude that status of Russian Federation and China in official documents of NATO Alliance has changed fundamentally. In NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2010 which was adopted in NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, China is not mentioned whatsoever whereas relationships between NATO and Russian Federation is described as" NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia, enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation in areas of shared interest" (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010:5). On the contrary, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 states that " The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022:5). Moreover, escalation of the conflict in Ukraine to the military confrontation between Russia and the West carries the greater risk, which the world has not faced in decades (Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2023:12) ,but the US intelligence community had not been prepared for the China threat (Schiff, 2021). On the other hand, there had been views which considerably underestimated status of internal Chinese challenges and perceived political weakness of political leadership of the country (Johnson, 2023).

However, the world has clearly changed. China has very different and assertive leadership. It has more than tripled the size of its economy since 2008 and now has stronger

capabilities to pursue adversarial policies (Paulson, 2023). Taking into account previously mentioned fact that NATO Strategic Concept 2010 did not mentioned China, one can notice fundamental changes in attitude towards China in NATO Strategic Concept 2022.China's ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO's interests, security and values. People's Republic of China employs broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Allied security (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022:5). China's strategic objective is to make China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage (Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2023:6). Therefore, China will increasingly combining its growing military power with its economic, technological and diplomatic influence to strengthen China's political and military reach. Increasing conventional military capabilities, development of WMD and space capabilities, cyber and other technologies will threaten the United States and its Allies (Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2023:6). As Chinese President Xi Jinping stated in the 20th Congress of China Communist Party, October 16, 2022 " external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time (Munich Security Conference Report, 2023:17). Therefore, from NATO perspective current and evolving global and regional security threats and challenges primarily stem from Russian Federation and China. Moreover, potential of increased political, economic and military cooperation between two powers is seen as rapidly evolving threat to the United States and NATO Alliance. In February 2022, just three weeks before the beginning of the military confrontation in Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced new strategic partnership that would have no limits (Power, 2023). Many observers perceived that China had backed Russian military action in Ukraine or, at best, willfully ignored it (McKim, 2023). Therefore, EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated in Munich Security Conference 2023 that Russian-Chinese attempt to fundamentally increase their cooperation is culmination of a long-standing campaign. It is an act of defiance. It is a clear revisionist manifesto. It is manifesto to review the world order (Munich Security Conference Report, 2023:17).

Abovementioned security environment and evolving security challenges and threats for NATO stemming from increased attempts of Russian Federation and China to challenge current global and regional security provisions will be extremely important for small countries in the Eastern Flank of NATO Alliance. Taking into account that most of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constituting NATO's Eastern Flank, are small in terms of size of territory, size of population, size and capabilities of their military forces- increasing political and military tensions between the United States, NATO and Russian Federation, China- could pose direct and existential threat to their independence and very existence. Therefore, national security threats stemming from fundamentally worsening security environment, will primarily target small states because small states are heavily dependent for their own security and defense arrangements upon politically powerful and militarily capable global actor or upon a security and defense organization where such an actor plays prominent role (Rublovskis and Associates, 2013:14). However, the United States which is considered as global politically powerful and military capable actor has substantial foreign and security policy challenges (Schake, 2023). In this light, the key issue to determine whether or not state is small, it is necessary to address key security and defense issues and take into account the fact that external factors shape a small state security mentality (Vayryanen, 1997:98). Taking also

into account the fact that military power has returned as the key element of state foreign and security policy since the beginning of the 21st century, it is obvious need for debellicased societies of Europe(Grey, 2005:95) to increase level of resources allocated to state defense thus strengthening NATO. Therefore, one can conclude that after the war in Ukraine- global and regional security will be fragmented into multi-polar hostile political and military alliances which will end unipolar- the United States –dominated global security order, and constitute post-war balance of power.

3. Political and Military Impact on NATO after the First Year of Ukraine War

George Kennan issued his warning already in 1948 that no Russian government would ever accept Ukrainian independence. Foreseeing a deadlock struggle between Moscow and Kyiv, Kennan made detailed suggestions at the time about how the United States should deal with a conflict that pitted an independent Ukraine against Russia. He returned to this subject half a century later. Kennan, then in his 90s, cautioned that the eastward expansion of NATO would doom democracy in Russia and ignite another Cold War (Costigliola, 2023). One would confirm that George Kennan's point of view has prevailed and current military conflict in Ukraine is the result of previously mentioned facts.

However, NATO Alliance has drawn the first conclusions after outbreak of Ukraine war in February 24, 2022. Before the beginning of the war, Russian Federation presented the United States with the list of demands what it said were necessary to stave off large-scale military conflict in Ukraine. The Russian government asked for formal halt of NATO's eastern enlargement, a permanent freeze of further expansion of the Alliance's military infrastructure- military bases and weapon systems- in the former Soviet territory, and the end of Western military assistance to Ukraine (Trenin, 2022). This Russian proposal was rejected by the United States and NATO and this finally led to outbreak of military conflict in Ukraine. However, current military conflict in Ukraine has slowly evolved and escalated since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, and it was obvious that the conflict itself is about much more than Ukraine and its possible NATO membership. It is about the future of European order crafted after Soviet Union's collapse. During the 1990s, the United States and its allies designed Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which Russia had no clear commitment or stake, and since Russian President Vladimir Putin has come to power, Russia has been challenging that system (Stent, 2022). Taking into account previously mentioned statements; it is obvious that the conflict in Ukraine has become fundamental test for unity and coherence of European Union, NATO, internal political coherence within the United States and other member states of EU and NATO. Attempts to find diplomatic solution which would lead to compromise between Russian Federation and Ukraine in the second part of 2021 and the beginning of 2022 have failed in February 24, 2022 (Belin, 2022). The beginning of Russian military operation brought fundamental dilemma for decision-making process in European Union and NATO on strategic issues of further enlargement of both organizations, development of new strategies towards Russian Federation and Ukraine, sustainment of Open Door Policy for accession of new member states into both organizations, decisions of enhanced political, economic, financial and military support for Ukraine. One would argue that just before the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and early stages of that conflict, there were fundamentally different points of view how to respond to the crisis and what decisions

should be taken towards Russian Federation and Ukraine. From the very beginning such an environment increased difficulties to take comprehensive and timely political decisions; however, there was an understanding that political, economic and military approach towards conflict in Ukraine has to consolidate quickly. On the one hand, politicians and experts outlined different possible scenarios for outcome of Ukraine conflict ranging from analysis of Russian military victory and subsequent transformation of Europe (Fix and Kimmage, 2022), and Ukrainian military victory with subsequent end of current political regime, transformation and possible political disintegration of Russian Federation (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2022).

Taking into account previously mentioned broad spectrum of opinions before the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and, subsequently, variety of points of view concerning decision-making process on support of Ukraine and further containment of Russian Federation, one would argue that fundamentally important political and military consequences after the first year of the conflict in Ukraine are following: creation of NATO Agenda 2030, outcome of NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022, subsequent Declaration of Madrid NATO Summit, and adoption of new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). These decisions and documents have established consolidated approach on current and emerging global and regional security environment, security threats and challenges stemming from this environment, fundamental objectives and tasks for NATO development within 2030 timeframe. Under such fundamental and radical change of global and regional security environment, based on military consequences of the conflict in Ukraine, the Alliance has adopted considerable political changes towards Russian Federation and China. Firstly, new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) fundamentally changed approach towards Russian Federation. In NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2010, which was adopted in NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, China is not mentioned whatsoever, whereas relationships between NATO and Russian Federation are described as" NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity, enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared cooperation (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010). On the other hand, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 states that " The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic area (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022). The new era of competition and security challenges stems also from " People's Republic of China, who challenge NATO's interests, security, and values and seek to undermine rules-based international order (NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, 2022).

Secondly, yet another fundamental consequence has occurred and it is directly influenced by the first year of war in Ukraine. Enhancement of the Open Door Policy of the Alliance and subsequent enlargement of NATO is direct consequence of the war. The decision of the Alliance to invite Finland and Sweden to join NATO is fundamental shift for security and defense policy of these two nations, and, subsequently, fundamental change in regional security environment in the Baltic Sea Region and NATO's Eastern Flank. Thirdly, the major consequence of the first year of the war in Ukraine is substantial increase of financial and other resources allocated to state defense. Since 2014, there was a considerable progress on Allied defense spending (NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, 2022). Previous agreements put 2% of GDP as threshold of defense spending for member states of the Alliance. Some

NATO members, especially- Central and Eastern European countries-increased their defense spending well above 2% benchmark since 2014, targeting even 3% of GDP and more within 2024-2027 timeframe.

One would conclude that the most important political and military consequences for NATO Alliance after the first year of the war in Ukraine are following: NATO's decisions to significantly strengthen deterrence and defense posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022), understanding of current and potential security environment and threat assessment which resulted into fundamental change of policy towards Russian Federation and People's Republic of China. NATO decisions to enhance Open Door Policy, subsequently led to invitation for Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, thus launching another round of NATO's Enlargement, decisions of the Allies to significantly increase resources allocated to state defense and, finally, development and approval of fundamental NATO documents- NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022.

4. Future Challenges for Trans-Atlantic Link. Agenda NATO 2030 and NATO Strategic Concept 2022- Blueprint for NATO Development and Effectiveness

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, NATO had developed and approved fundamental documents which will determine political and military effectiveness and efficiency of the Alliance. NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) describe global, regional and national security environment, analyze military and other threats and challenges which will threaten the Alliance until 2030, and outline framework of actions and capabilities needed to counter those threats and challenges. The most important challenges which could further endanger global and regional security environment are increasingly dangerous discourse on use of nuclear weapons and internal political and military coherence within the Alliance.

Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine last February, there has been near-constant debate about Russian President Vladimir Putin's nuclear arsenal – and what he might do with it (Van Bruusgaard, 2023). After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it seemed like transformational moment for European security. Surely now Europe would finally get its act together on defense. But as the war enters its second year, such a transformation has not materialized. The fault for the ongoing stasis lies with many parties- European states, NATO, the European Union and even the United States-all of who have defaulted to the comfortable practices of the past in the hope of preserving an untenable status quo (Bergmann and Besch, 2023).

In order to prepare intellectual and political framework for the adoption of new NATO Strategic Concept, which has been long overdue since the adoption of NSC in 2010, Agenda NATO 2030 has been approved in NATO Summit in Brussels, June 14, 2021. NATO 2030 is an ambitious agenda to ensure that NATO remains ready, strong and united for a new era of increased global competition and more unpredictable threats, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, and Russia and China's challenges to rules-based international order (NATO Agenda 2030, 2021:1). The Agenda outlined fundamental strategic proposals in order to achieve abovementioned objectives in 2030. Those strategic proposals are following: 1. Deeper political consultation and coordination on issues of arms

control, climate change, security, emerging disruptive technologies, terrorism, economic sustainability and stability issues, 2. Strengthened deterrence and defense- agreement to bolster Allied deterrence and defense capabilities and commitment to maintain appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities, including NATO-agreed guideline to spend 2% of GDP on defense needs, 3. Improved resilience- NATO Allies will take a broader and more coordinated approach to resilience. Development of resilience objectives in order to guide nationally-tailored resilience goals. NATO would better advice and assess national resilience efforts in support of NATO collective defense, 4. Preserve NATO's technological edge due to the fact that NATO Allies can no longer take their technological edge for granted. NATO Allies need to boost trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies. 5. Uphold the Rules-based international order- Allies will enhance cooperation with like- minded partners and international organizations and forge new engagements including Africa, Latin America, and Asia. NATO will also maintain Open Door Policy for countries which aspire for NATO membership. In order to remain successful and ensure security and stability in Euro-Atlantic area-NATO needs to adopt global approach to tackle global challenges. 6. Boost training and capacity building- NATO will support efforts to build capacity of the partners of the Alliance in areas of counter-terrorism, stabilization, countering hybrid threats, crisis management, peace-keeping and defense sector reforms, 7. Combat and adapt to climate change-NATO become an actor in climate domain, 8. Development of the next NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) in NATO Madrid Summit in 2022, 9. Investing in NATO- Allies will ensure that the Alliance will have right resources-both through national defense expenditure and NATO common funding in order to deliver NATO 2030 goals (NATO Agenda 2030, 2021:1-4).

Based on abovementioned strategic proposals of the Agenda 2030 and the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 shaped tasks and objectives of the Alliance until 2030. NATO Strategic Concept is overarching document which will determine development of the Alliance via address of current and emerging security threats and challenges. NSC 2022 describes the overarching security environment in which the Alliance operates states NATO purpose and core tasks, set strategic direction for its political and military implementation. Current and emerging security threats and challenges within global and regional security environment will determine following tasks and objectives for the Alliance: 1. NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of the Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure collective defense against all threats from all directions, 2. The transatlantic bond between the United States and Europe is indispensable for security of the Allies, 3. NATO will remain the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultation, coordination and action on all matters related to individual and collective security. The Alliance will be strengthened based on indivisible security, solidarity, and ironclad commitment to defend each other, 4. NATO will continue to fulfill three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security, 5. NATO will enhance individual and collective resilience and technological edge. These efforts are critical to fulfill the Alliance's core tasks (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022:3).

Previously mentioned threats and challenges stemming from current and emerging global and regional security environment will consolidate NATO commitment to address these threats and challenges effectively. The Agenda 2030 and NATO Strategic Concept is blueprint for development of the Alliance to provide all necessary resources, infrastructure, capabilities

and forces to deliver fully on NATO's core tasks and implement decisions (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022: 11).

5. Conclusions

The beginning of the war in Ukraine has created unprecedented security challenges for Europe. Never since 1945, has Europe witnessed conventional military conflict on such a level of intensity. Moreover, this conflict has already involved global and regional actors beyond borders of NATO and EU- China, India, Brazil and other emerging regional powers leading to fundamental changes in global balance of power in post-war security environment. Taking into account rapidly increasing political, economic and military influence of these countries, it is obvious that NATO and European Union will have to take into consideration point of view of these actors. Current and emerging security threats and challenges stemming from security environment around Ukraine have created profound impact on NATO Alliance. On one hand, the war in Ukraine have triggered further development of the Alliance, attempts to improve internal coherence, and increase of institutional effectiveness and efficiency of NATO Alliance. On the other hand, there have been increasing signs of fatigue of some member states of NATO over war in Ukraine and, subsequent differences in opinions how to proceed with further political and military support of Ukraine. Difference of opinions potentially could lead to decrease of political, economic, financial and military support for Ukraine and, subsequently, to decrease political unity and coherence within NATO and European Union. The reality is that Ukraine cannot sustain the fight if its external political, economic, and military support dries up. (Lin, 2023)

However, decisions of strengthening the Eastern Flank of the Alliance and Open Door Policy had been confirmed by NATO Summit in Madrid in summer of 2022. At the same time, in 2022 NATO had been able to increase political and military support for Ukraine substantially via Ramstein Format; however, in 2023 level of support could decrease due to challenges of NATO member states to sustain production of military hardware which would comply with increasing needs of Ukraine.

In order to respond effectively to current and emerging security threats and challenges, the Alliance has designed number of strategic documents and declarations which have to ensure that NATO will remain strong, united and effective organization able to reach its political and military objectives. NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 have described global and regional security environment, current and emerging security threats and challenges which stem from abovementioned security environment. In order to remain ready, effective and efficient to address and counter current and emerging security threats, NATO has developed and approved several overarching documents- NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022, which have designed necessary strategic proposals for development of the Alliance until 2030, and necessary actions in order to ensure that NATO will remain effective and efficient. The hypothesis of the paper has been verified- the war in Ukraine has created fundamental institutional and development challenges for NATO Alliance and it has created conditions for change of global balance of power, leading from unipolar-the United States- dominated global security architecture-to multipolar security architecture which will be characterized by multiple regional political and security alliances hostile to the United States, European Union and NATO.

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