SEVERAL LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS AS THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN MODERN FEDERALISM

Апстракт

This paper explores the legal foundations necessary for ensuring
constitutional stability in modern federal systems. Federalism, as a system of
governance, requires a well-defined distribution of powers between central and
subnational governments, supported by a clear legal hierarchy and mechanisms to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts. The coexistence of two parallel legal orders,
necessitates structured mechanisms to maintain legal coherence, prevent conflicts,
and uphold constitutional supremacy. The study examines key principles that
contribute to federal stability, including the supremacy of the constitution, the
hierarchy of legal acts, and judicial review as a mechanism for resolving legal
disputes. It analyzes two primary approaches for addressing conflicts between
federal and state laws: the primacy of federal law and judicial review as an
enforcement mechanism. Additionally, the paper highlights the role of
constitutional courts in adjudicating disputes over legislative and executive
competences, emphasizing their function in preserving the federal balance. Further,
the paper explores the right of federal entities to initiate review of constitutionality
of federal laws, comparing systems where this right is explicitly granted, with those
where it is restricted. Finally, it addresses jurisdictional conflicts both among
federal entities and between federal and subnational governments, demonstrating
how constitutional courts serve as arbiters in resolving such disputes. Ultimately,
the paper argues that federal systems require a combination of legal hierarchy,
judicial enforcement, and institutional checks and balances to function effectively.
By ensuring compliance with constitutional norms, preventing excessive
centralization or fragmentation, and maintaining a structured conflict-resolution
framework, these mechanisms contribute to the long-term stability and coherence
of federal governance.