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Review article

ON WARFARE

Abstract

We re-examine the phenomenon of war by analysing the three main philosophies of war, by comparing the approach to the notion of war in modern security studies, by examining the main trends of warfare after 1945 and the changing nature of warfare. The author answers the questions about: Total War; the relationship between globalization and war; the new type of wars; and the so-called western way of warfare. The analysis of warfare emphasizes the changed concept of the battlefield, the political narrative of warfare, as well as the revitalization of nuclear weapons and the threat. Exploring the process of warfare cannot escape the cultural, legal and political approach of war. From a methodological point of view, the determination of accurate statistics on armed conflicts and indirect casualties, which is the most numerous categories of death, remains problematic.

Keywords: WAR, WARFARE, CLAUSEVIC, CONFLICTS, TRENDS.

Introduction

Debates about the changing nature of war are as old as the very notion of war. A review of the phenomenon of war, in addition to analysing the three main philosophies of war and explaining the approach to the concept of war in modern security studies, can be done by examining the main trends in warfare after 1945 and answering questions about who conduct the war and who dies in modern war zones. The analysis should then focus on the changing nature of warfare, through the debates over the idea of total war, the extent to which the process of globalization creates new forms of armed conflict called “new wars” and the characteristics that determine the use of military force of western countries in the modern world. More recently, three questions have led analysts to approach this issue. First, how useful is the term “total war” when considering changes in warfare? Second, what is the connection between war and globalization, and does globalization lead to a new type of warfare? And third, what changes are observed in the warfare of advanced industrial democracies in the West compared to earlier historical periods?

1. Social versus military theory and critiques of Clausewitz's theory

Let us recall that from the Enlightenment to Durkheim, most of the greatest sociologists omitted war from their central problem. But this was not neglect; it was quite intentional. They believed that the future society would be pacifist and transnational ... the liberal / Marxist conspiracy suppressed much of the history of the relationship between war, classes, nations and states. Most thinkers of war, on the other hand, tend to treat warfare as an independent process that ultimately operates under its own laws. The problem of war and therefore the problem of society can be seen as a dilemma, whose horns are caught and pulled separately by social and military theory. As a result, work in the sociology of war did not have an integrated focus. The conclusion (of Mann 1988) is that it is necessary to "start from scratch" in building the sociology of war. The new interest in warfare in the generated mass of written papers in the field of military sociology includes studies of military effectiveness in combat (Cohen and Gooch 1990; Van Crefeld 1983), and studies of peace movements. The area also covers welfare issues related to the maintenance of military forces in peacetime and feminist discussions about the relationship between gender and war. Let us emphasize that these are just a few of the reference objects that have been researched by the sociology of war.

What can be learned from the empirical study of war by the famous Prussian military theorist and philosopher of war, Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), and his masterpiece *On War*, is not a system of established tactical and strategic guidelines, but some general features of warfare that are universally valid. However, several events of modern warfare have contributed to undermining the political philosophy of the war advocated by Clausewitz.

The first moment was the changed or, according to some views, missing battlefield concept. Historically, a battlefield has been defined by the geographical location or point of contact between opponents. Today, the battlefield is seen as a complex perception of the comprehensiveness of the factors that affect the battle and is no longer a battlefield but a battlespace. For the ancient Greeks, for example, phalanxes were not suitable for combat except on leveled ground without trees, streams, ditches, or other obstacles that could break their ranks, a perfection that was seldom achieved. Rome preferred the same. By the twentieth century, many military organizations had specialized units trained to fight in specific geographical areas, such as mountains (alpine units), desert (such as LRDG - reconnaissance desert rats), or jungles (such as the British Chindits) and later the U.S. Special Forces) and even those on skis for action in snowy areas. Others were trained to be deployed by aircraft (airborne), gliders or parachutes; and with the development of helicopters, airborne forces also developed. The increasing number of amphibious attacks, and their special dangers and problems, have led to the development of combat divers. Such special forces opened up new battlefields and added new complexities to both attack and defence:

when the battlefield ceased to be physically connected to the supply base,¹ reinforcements and logistics became critical.² Armies have generally avoided fighting in cities when possible, but modern armies are reluctant to give up their freedom of maneuver; why otherwise, when they are forced to fight for control of the city (such as Stalingrad or more recently Kyiv, Mariupol), weapons, tactics and training are inappropriate for the environment. Urban fighting is the only specialty that has not yet emerged. With the modernization of technology, the length of the logistics on which the forces in direct contact depend, becomes increasingly difficult to protect and vulnerable to possible attacks at numerous locations along the supply line.

The second point concerns the avoidance of the political narrative of war. Namely, the leaders in the attempts to mobilize their nation and the allies in their calls for religious duty and justice openly apply the eschatological philosophies of war. Often, the narrative with this purpose has serious socio-political repercussions. The powerful 9/11 stories created by the Bush administration are perhaps the most striking example: they legitimized the invasion of Iraq as a patriotic duty, labelling opposing voices as “anti-American” and the stigmatized migrant communities as perpetual suspects (Pemberton and Aarten 2017,2).

The third moment that Clausewitz could not have foreseen was the question of the revitalization of nuclear weapons. With the spread of nuclear technology and the failure of attempts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the world entered the most dangerous phase of nuclear confrontation in the Cold War in the 1980s. Mankind has had the experience of using nuclear weapons, but not the exchange of them in the process of warfare. Nuclear weapons states can use each other as a deterrent but also as a threat to those who do not possess it. The types of nuclear weapons in terms of composition of radioactive materials, mode of operation, strength and manner of application, today, in addition to political implications, can bring significant military advantages if used selectively by the side that possesses it against a side that does not possess such capabilities. Such an application is on the verge of what Clausewitz envisions as a reasonable state activity. Nuclear weapons in this regard, not only do not serve to enhance the political aspirations of the parties involved, but may be more like a guaranteed mutual killing of the participating states. In addition, the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of groups committed to conducting terrorist spectacles without any specific demands is also a break with the Clausewitz tradition.

One of Clausewitz’s criticisms also referred to the changes in military affairs in the technological sense, which are reflected in the fundamental changes

¹ Like in Arnhem in Operation Market Garden, or in Burma or Vietnam, where the geography of the battlefield could not only dictate how the battle would be fought, but also with what weapons.

² Arnhem had failures in both, while in Burma, air supply deliveries allowed the Chindits to do something that would otherwise have been impossible.

in the war in the way Clausewitz interprets it. The modalities of warfare have changed, and Western strategic thinking has had to change with them - from conventional to irregular, from low to high tech. The problem is that new war theorists have accepted these shifts as proof that the basic nature of war must change, and Clausewitz has become irrelevant. However, this is not the case and the authority of Clausewitz's theory of war is immune to the charge of obsolescence born of cumulative massive changes in technological, political or socio-cultural context. Clausewitz attempted to create a vast philosophical treatise on the nature of war as a broad social phenomenon, with the intention of educating and stimulating rather than providing practical solutions. Because they focus mainly on the philosophical nature of war, rather than on military modalities, Clausewitz parameters leave much room for fluidity and contextual change. What critics are wrong about is that war and warfare are not the same thing. Only warfare is subject to change, but not the phenomenon of war.

2. Cultural, legal and political approach to defining war

In the context of culture, war is much more than just a topic for military historians. Understanding how culture limits the way we (and our enemies) think about warfare will help ensure that we are on the winning side in future conflicts; as in the case of different understandings of the terms dignity and honour and appropriate behaviour where it is better to be a bewitched Mongol than a stunned samurai waiting for a divine wind to strike the enemy to bring salvation from a combat-unenviable situation caused by their lack of intercultural understanding.

When we emphasize the *legal approach* to war and warfare, we must refer to the law of war. The law of war is a component of international law governing the conditions of war (*jus ad bellum*) and the conduct of warring parties (*jus in bello*). Laws of war define sovereignty and nationality, states and territories, occupation and other critical terms of international law. Statements have been made by states and writers that the creation of a state of war is incompatible with the UN Charter so that war no longer exists as an institution in international law and no legal consequences follow from describing a particular conflict as an "armed conflict" (widely used today)³ rather than "war". Even writers who do not accept that the concept of war is dead describe it as a "declining concept", thus significantly depriving its meaning. However, the theory that the concept of war has become legally irrelevant as a result of the legal provisions contained in the Charter is by no means universally accepted.

The most popular explanation for the war is the political approach. Kallen (1939, 373) advocates a political definition of war when he writes: "If war can be defined as an armed conflict between two or more sovereign institu-

³ For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin labeled the outbreak of military conflict in sovereign Ukraine as a limited military operation (not a war).

tions that use organized military forces to achieve specific goals, an important term in the definition is 'organized'. ". He further adds that this organization of the combat armed forces extends backwards along the battle lines and tends in modern wars to embrace all civilian activities, such as industrial, productive and commercial, as well as social interests and individual views.

3. Trends in the armed conflicts after 1945

3.1. Classification of modern armed conflicts

Under the UPSAL Conflict Data Program (UCDP), armed conflict is defined as a conflict of disagreement over government or territory, or both, with the use of force between the two sides resulting in at least 25 deaths. The UCDP proposes a framework for classifying the types and scales of armed conflict.

3.1.1. Types of armed conflicts

1. *State armed conflicts* are those in which the government is one of the warring parties. There are several types of state armed conflicts:

- *Interstate armed conflict* occurs between two or more states;
- *Intra-state armed conflict* occurs between the government and internally opposed groups. These conflicts are divided into:
 - A) Civil war, which is fought for government control; and
 - B) State-forming / secessionist conflicts, which are fought between the government of a state and a territorially focused opposition group that wants to redraw the borders of the state.
- *Internationalized interstate conflict* that occurs between the government of one country and internal opposition groups, but also with additional intervention by other countries in the form of an army;
- *Armed conflict outside the state* that occurs between the state and a non-state group outside the state territory.

2. *Non-state armed conflicts* are those where organized armed violence occurs, but a recognized government is not one of the parties to the conflict. An example of this is the violent conflicts between bosses and clans.

3.1.2. Ladders of armed conflict

- *Minor armed conflicts* involving at least 25 war deaths in one year and less than 1,000 dead throughout the conflict.
- *Medium-sized armed conflicts* involving at least 25 war deaths per

year and a total of at least 1,000 deaths but less than 1,000 deaths in one year.

- *War*, an armed conflict involving at least 1,000 war deaths over the course of a year.

3.2. Major trends in armed conflicts after 1945

According to data from the UPSALA Conflict Data Program, there are four major trends in armed conflict since 1945. First, since the mid 1970s there has been a significant decline in armed conflict between states over internal state conflicts that make up the bulk of organized armed violence worldwide. More precisely, a significant number of modern conflicts are not conflicts between states (34 in 2002, down to 25 in 2005, according to Mack 2007, 3). A second major trend is that since reaching a maximum of 52 state armed conflicts between 1991 and 1992, the number has dropped to 40% between 1992 and 2005 (Mack 2007, 1).

The post-Cold War period also saw a sharp decline in the intensity of the world's armed conflicts. The lower level of armed conflict today is mainly due to 4 main factors. First, the end of colonialism removed the main source of political violence from world politics. But colonialism has not yet been completely eradicated because there are still groups fighting for their liberation from imperialist rule. A second key factor was the end of the Cold War, when superpowers stopped fomenting wars in underdeveloped countries. Third, the most important was the rising level of international activism under the auspices of the UN after the end of the Cold War. This activism included efforts for preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping operations and other peace support mechanisms, as well as increased concern for global security. With this increased effort, the international community was more successful in ending wars. The last factor that gives rise to optimism about the future with a reduced number of armed conflicts is the growing popularity of global norms, which prohibit the use of military force in international relations.

A third significant trend in the 1945 armed conflict has been the decline in casualties. If the average death toll on the battlefield (in state conflicts) was 38,000 a year in 1950, by 2005 fell to 700 which is a decrease of 98%. The death toll does not include the international level of civilian casualties or so-called indirect death from war-related diseases or famine. In terms of non-state armed conflicts, a similar trend is observed: from 2002 to 2005. The decline in casualties in non-state conflicts was 71% (Mack 2007, 7).

The fourth trend is the shift in the regional spread of armed conflicts. Historically, restrictions imposed by climate and geography have meant that major wars were fought in relatively small areas (Keegan 1994, 68-73). From 1945 it became clear that at different times certain regions had more wars than others. For example, by 1970, East and Southeast Asia had the most casualties from war, while in the later stages of the Cold War, most of the casualties were

in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Since the mid-1990s, sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be the region with the highest conflict-prone area.

3.2.1. Who fights and who dies?!

The opponents in modern armed conflicts are not only the states, i.e. the political units. War actors have different shapes and sizes. Other actors involved in the war are international organizations, as well as various non-state entities. International organizations are at war for a variety of reasons, but mostly as a result of peacekeeping operations in areas of ongoing conflict. The UN, the EU, NATO and the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union have had the most recognizable forces on the ground involved in the conflicts. When it comes to armed non-state actors, then the most common participants are private military companies and the most diverse military, paramilitary and self-defence territorial forces as well as suicide bombers. A newer trend is the increasing number of child fighters in modern conflicts. They can also be recruited by the state but more often by the non-state actors mentioned above. It is estimated that in 2005 there were approximately 300,000 child combatants who then fought or had just been demobilized and another 500,000 child combatants who were then mobilized in non-combat armies (Singer, 2005).

Although there has been a reduction in the number of conflicts, as well as the consequent reduction in the number of casualties, we are not surprised by the trend according to which civilians continue to make up the majority of those killed in modern armed conflicts. According to a study (Human Security Center, 2005, 75) between 30% and 60% of those killed in modern conflicts are civilians, although the difficulty in obtaining reliable systematic data from war zones makes it impossible to know the exact number of civilians killed.

Part of the reason for the rising number of civilian casualties is that, according to sources at the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDP) Program, there has been a more than 50% increase since 1989 in civilian carnage campaigns committed by governments and non-state actors, with humanitarian workers also becoming targets of deliberate violence. After decades of relative immunity of humanitarian workers, from 1997 to 2005 the number of aid workers killed increased by 50%, although the rate of violent attacks on aid workers increased only slightly in the same period (Stoddard 2006).

Most of those killed in modern armed conflicts are from the so-called indirect death. This applies to people (mainly women, children and the elderly) who die from war-related illnesses and malnutrition, usually intensified by displacement. Although it is the most numerous categories of death, this species is the least researched and documented because the measurement of indirect death is accompanied by problems arising from the methodology (especially how to measure and compare normal to abnormal mortality rates) of data collection, because the registered data have been altered due to propaganda. How-

ever, there is a general consensus that the changing demographics of the victims are related to the way modern warfare works.

4. The changed nature of warfare?!

4.1. Total war

Although the notion of total war was coined by German General Erich Ludendorff in 1918, fears of such a development have prevailed in the West since the 1800s. That fear was confirmed by the horrors of World War I and World War II, in which the death toll was estimated at 20 million and 55 million, respectively. Although some modern wars have approached these conflicts in intensity, the longevity of the idea of a total war is often used to explain / compare the terminology of "limited warfare", such as the wars in Korea (1950-1953) in the Falkland Islands (1982) or the Gulf (1991).

Basically, the idea of total war refers to the notions of escalation and participation. Fear of escalation stems from concerns that once war breaks out, it is difficult to control. This means that the war will intensify according to the degree of violence (both geographical and by the number of casualties) and the intensity of the war, erasing the limitations of the war. Participation refers to the increased participation of citizens in the war as soldiers who are ready to fight and die for the homeland but also as workers willing to help (sacrifice for) the war by working at home (in the homeland).

Although these trends are present in modern history, total war is an ideal species, because despite the series of available circumstances that are unachievable in reality, in practice there are always restrictions on warfare. For example, although some of the available weapons may not have been used, as in the case of the United States in its decision not to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War. Why some weapons are not used is a matter of debate. According to some analysts, the limited use of poison gas in World War II reflects the power of normative restrictions on the warring parties. Others argue that this was due to pragmatic concerns about the unpredictable effects of gas.⁴ Another way of interpreting why war is not total is because no warring party can use all its resources in warfare. Even in World War II, the warring parties mobilized between $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$ of the labour force and spent $\frac{3}{4}$ of national production on the needs of war (Overy, 2005, 154).

Considering these limitations, the question arises why the idea of total war occupies an important place in the collective psyche of analysts and practitioners?! A recent study suggests that several tendencies fuelled the "totality" of the war between 1861 and 1945. (Chickering, 2005). These tendencies were most

⁴ Under the influence of meteorological conditions their own forces were affected by the effects of the gas as well.

intense from 1914 to 1945. First, technological and industrial advances in that period allowed the methods of warfare to become more destructive, enabling the killing of people quickly and consistently. Second, governments were able to mobilize state resources (both through state institutions and through private or semi-private actors) and spend them on warfare. Third, the scope of military objectives has expanded. According to Imlay (2007, 554), limited goals, such as gaining territory or economic progress, were replaced by the determination to achieve victory, not only by defeating the enemy forces but also by replacing their political regime, which meant a period of post-war occupation. Fourth, war has increased the global domain as more and more countries in the world became embroiled in conflicts stemming from European politics.

A key feature of total war is the blurred distinction between the civilian and military spheres. Ordinary citizens became involved in warring up the war and later became the target of large-scale and mass violence. For example, in World War II, when large-scale atrocities were committed by the Japanese military against Chinese civilians, or on the Eastern Front in the German-Soviet war, where civilians died and were killed en masse, and in the case of atomic bombs dropped on Japanese towns. The temptation to attack civilians was aided by advances in military technology, which enabled strategic bombing of Dresden, Coventry, and Osaka during the war. As a result, World War II became the first conflict after the European Thirty Years' War, where the number of civilian casualties exceeded the number of war casualties (Imlay, 2005, 556).

Although the idea of total war is a dominant feature of war analysis literature, it is a confusing and useless concept. Because, in reality, war will never be completely total, the debate about how close to that ideal it can be seems meaningless. Simply put, the war is either total or not. Thus, a more useful approach to the study of real warfare is to analyse the different degrees of intensity of different indicators of warfare, such as the effort / resources spent on the gains or losses of war (Imlay, 2005, 556-567).

4.2. „New Wars“

The second direction in thinking about the changes in the warfare includes the arguments that especially after 1945 globalization has led to specific forms of violent conflict referred to as “new wars” (Kaldor, 1997). The main elements of the thesis of “new wars” are the following:

- New wars are in, not outside the countries.
- New wars occur in the context of state failure and social transformation driven by globalization and liberal economic forces.
- In the new wars, ethnic and religious differences are more important than political ideology.
- In the new wars, the civilian casualties are significantly increasing, primarily because in those wars civilians are deliberately targeted.

- In new wars, the collapse of state authority blurs the distinction between public and private fighters (Newman, 2004).

In new wars, the traditional division of wars (violence between states or politically motivated organized political groups), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial gain) and large-scale human rights violence (state or private violence against individuals, mainly civilians) becomes blurred.

According to Caldor, the new wars differ from the "old" ones in terms of goals, methods and funding, which reflect the erosion of the state monopoly on organized violence. The goal of the fighters can be understood as a struggle between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identity groups, exercising control over the violence of ethnic cleansing. In terms of methods, new wars are being waged through new ways of warfare through guerrilla techniques and counterintelligence. This kind of warfare is specific because decisive conflicts are avoided and the territory is controlled through political manipulations showing "fear and hatred" and not "reason and feelings". It is not surprising that paramilitary groups are hired for this purpose because they spread fear and hatred among civilians more effectively than professional military forces (Mueller, 2000). This explains the increasing degree of unilateral massacre mentioned above. Paramilitary gangs are also popular because it is difficult to trace the line of responsibility for their actions to the clients, i.e. to political leaders. According to Caldor, the last feature of the new war is that it is financed through a global military economy that is decentralized, international, and in which warring units are self-financing through the black market or foreign aid (Duffield, 2001).

Such wars are difficult to end because some individuals are gaining significant political and economic benefits from warfare and are not interested in ending the conflict. Victory may not be desirable for most warring parties, because perhaps the reason for the war is precisely the legitimacy it provides for activities that would be sanctioned as a crime in peace. That is why Caldor says the solution to the new wars lies in rebuilding legitimate (cosmopolitan) political communities that trust public authorities, regain control of organized violence, and restore the rule of law. It is a cosmopolitan enforcement of the law in the form of large-scale peacekeeping operations involving a combination of military, police and civilian personnel.

Caldor's views have been challenged by two critics: First, most of the elements she cites are not new (Newman, 2004). Thus, for example, violence against civilians is a feature of all wars and there is no evidence to suggest a temporary, qualitative shift in the use of crime in the 21st century. The second critique concerns her view of globalization as a new process that changed the nature of warfare after 1945. According to Barkavi (2006), globalization is not a new phenomenon as Caldor says, but an old process that refers to circulation, i.e. a process by which people and places become interconnected. Barkavi notes that war has historically been an important form of interconnectedness between societies, and that war has long been a globalizing force. In and through the war,

people on both sides are becoming more and more aware of each other, reconstructing the image of themselves and others, reacting to other people's moves. To fight means to connect with the enemy. Such a relationship imposes social processes and transformations that fall under globalization ... From a military and social perspective, war can be considered an opportunity for interaction, a form of circulation between the warring parties. Societies are transformed in and through war, while society shapes war (Barkawi, 2006, 169). Military and war are places of cultural interference and hybridity. The military, which travels through cultures, exposes soldiers to foreign influence and leads them to reconsider their own ideas about their own homeland. Soldiers returning from abroad transmit new ideas and practices to the homeland ... whether to understand globalization - as economic globalization, trans regional connectivity or global awareness - war and the military play a much more important role than globalization studies point out ... An assessment is needed of the ways in which war is centrally implicated in the process of globalization (Barkawi, 2006, 172).

Understood in this way, globalization is not separate from war, aiming to change the nature of warfare as Caldor argues, but war has been closely linked to the globalization of world politics for thousands of years.

4.3. Modern western way of warfare

The third consideration for the changed way of warfare refers to the way Western countries use military force. The basis for this debate is that although the great wars between the Western powers will disappear, the West will still retain its ability to wage war as it normally does. Today's way of fighting in the West can be compared to the role of a spectator. According to Mann (1988, 184-185) who first used that metaphor, limited modern wars involve Western client states that, aided by its professional advisers and small expeditionary forces, simultaneously mobilize Western nations not as players but as spectators ... Wars like the Invasion on Falklands or Grenada are not qualitatively different from the Olympics. Because they still involve "life and death", the emotions that accompany them are deeper and stronger. But these are not emotions driven by the dedication of personal resources. They do not involve real or potential sacrifice, except by professional troops.

Contrary to the dynamics of escalation, which leaves the possibility of turning into a total war, McInnes (2002) argues that modern wars waged by Western countries are localized in both behaviour and influence. This is due to (1) the fact that there are no global conflicts summing up the losses (unlike the Cold War and its idea of holding back against expansion), the Western definition of enemies has changed from state and citizen opposition to narrow concern for change of a particular regime or leader; and (3) since civilians are no longer a legitimate target, efforts are now being made to reduce "collateral damage". The "US-led war on terror" has replaced the Cold War as a global conflict with which local conflicts are linked.

Another essential feature of modern Western wars is that they do not involve large social participation, but are led by a small number of professional representatives (i.e. the armed forces). That is why in a war of choice and not because it is imposed, a relatively small number of victims can have political repercussions, even when it comes to a military superpower such as the United States.⁵ Low casualty tolerance has been linked to the fact that wars waged by Western countries in places like Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and Sri Lanka are wars of choice to help achieve liberal political goals rather than imposed wars of survival. When it comes to key national interests, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, tolerance for victims may be greater.

In this context, McInnes identifies several key features of sport-spectator warfare. First, these wars are expeditious, based on the desire to localize conflicts and fight outside the western homelands. Second, the enemy is more closely defined as the leadership / regime of the target state, not the whole of society. Unlike in the past, even enemy armed forces are not always the target of destruction. Making combat contact with enemy forces is no longer desirable. Third, the desire to reduce collateral damage has increased, as only a small part of hostile society is a legitimate target. Lastly, the protection of forces, i.e. the need to reduce the risks to Western troops is a priority.

In this kind of warfare, Western countries emphasize the importance of aviation (and precision cruise missile strikes). Military aviation is much easier to deploy (on the ground) compared to land and naval forces, and provides quick and direct access to enemy leadership, can be very precise, the West has a huge advantage in this way of fighting, and can attack the enemy center of gravity directly without involving the mass of enemy forces. However, in practice there are many limitations to the use of aviation as an ideal tool for conducting "humane and non-risky warfare" (McInnes, 2001). First, although the division between civilians and warriors seems quite easy, on the ground such a distinction is difficult to make. Second, targeting errors, operational errors, and technical errors lead to civilian casualties. Third, many of the strategically important goals are also part of the civil economy. Fourth, even surgically precise strikes on settlements terrorize citizens due to the constant fear of possible mistakes. Until recently, one more thing could be said, namely the protection of the pilot flying at higher altitudes was offset by the efficiency due to the presence of uncontrolled phenomena such as clouds. But the latter is less and less true because laser-guided bombs and drones are coming to the fore.

Sport-spectator warfare applies to only a few countries in the world and is not useful in fully understanding the dynamics of world warfare, especially if large forces are at war with each other, as opposed to a large force against regional or local forces. However, this new way of warfare highlights some of

⁵ For example, 18 US soldiers were killed in October 1993. In Mogadishu, Somalia, were sufficient to provoke a strategic withdrawal of Washington and its allies from the country. Two weeks later in Haiti, just a glimpse of the emergence of paramilitary thugs in the port of Porto Prince was enough to withdraw *USS Harlan County*.

the modern trends in Western thinking and provides some explanation of how it wants / favours the West to go to war and how the enemies will try to fight.

Conclusion

From the empirical study of war by the famous Prussian military theorist and philosopher of war, Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831), and his capital work *On War*, certain general characteristics of war can be drawn which are universally valid and applicable. This philosophy is challenged by several events in modern warfare: the disappearance of the concept of the battlefield, the avoidance of the political narrative of war, the revitalization of nuclear weapons, and the revolution of warfare in a technological sense. However, critics are wrong in equating war and warfare. Only warfare is subject to change, but not the phenomenon of war. The study of war can be done through a cultural, legal and political approach. There are four main trends in modern (post-1945) armed conflicts: Decline in the intensity of armed conflicts, increase in the number of intra-state conflicts, decline in the number of deaths in armed conflicts, and regional displacement of armed conflicts. The actors of warfare come in all shapes and sizes. Civilians continue to account for the majority of casualties in modern armed conflicts. Most of the dead in modern armed conflicts are from the so-called indirect dying.

The idea of total war occupies an important place in the collective psyche of analysts and practitioners. Total war is an ideal type, because in addition to the range of available circumstances that are unattainable in reality, in practice, limitations are always imposed on warfare. Globalization has led to specific forms of violent conflict labelled "new wars." The criticisms of such views are that new wars do not have new specific elements and that the globalization of war is not a new process. Modern wars waged by Western states are localized in both behaviour and impact, and they do not involve large-scale societal participation.

Sport-observation warfare applies only to a few countries in the world.

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