Хјумовата концептуализација на човековата природа и персоналниот идентитет

Апстракт

Hume's philosophy lays on three conceptual foundations: human nature is the only concern of the human knowledge, the right method of examining human nature is the empirical one, and the result of this empirical inquiry is that man is not completely rational being. The most controversial point in Hume's inquiry of human nature is his concept of personal identity. This article points out the contradictory views designated in the first and the second book of the "A Treatise of Human Nature" that illustrate Hume's hesitation of solving this problem into the light of his principal philosophical ideas. In the theory of personal identity, the theory of causal relations plays a fundamental role that rises problems in reconciling practice and theoretical explanation. Accepting preestablished epistemological or ontological facts would open the way for accepting the notion of the thinking substance or the pure subject that would be in discrepancy with Hume's empiricism. In order to overcome these problems in Hume's theory, this article is referring to Locke's definition of personal identity.