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Editorial

Dear readers,

It is with great pleasure that we announce the publication of the 35th issue of the journal *Филозофија/Filozofija*. For our editorial team, this issue is special in more than one way.

First, it brings about a significant change in the status of the journal itself: *Filozofija* now becomes an international, peer reviewed journal, with an editorial board and an advisory board composed of eminent domestic and international scholars in the field of philosophy. Established by a group of enthusiasts in 2001 and published by the Philosophical Society of Macedonia in cooperation with the Institute of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University – Skopje) until 2013, the journal has become an important forum for philosophical reflection, discussion, and development of philosophical thought in the Macedonian intellectual milieu. With this internationalization of the journal, now published by the Institute of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in cooperation with the Philosophical Society of Macedonia, our aim is to further enlarge this forum, to enrich and to deepen the communication with scholars working in the field of philosophy and related fields throughout the world, hoping that many of traditional and contemporary philosophical problems will be addressed in more efficient ways by such joint intellectual efforts. On this occasion, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to all our colleagues who, with their devoted work for more than a decade, succeeded not only to establish this journal but also to keep it vibrant and developing. Thus, we would like to thank the two former Editors-in-chief of *Filozofija*, Lazar Fotev, MA and Ljupcho Mitkovski, as well as all the previous members of its editorial and advisory boards, for creating such an invaluable ground for further intensification of our philosophical activity not only in the Macedonian, but also in the international context.

The second point of special significance regarding this issue of *Filozofija* is the choice of its topic – *Language, Context and Interpretation*. In its wide scope and many interconnected aspects of philosophical relevance, this topic reflects the main guiding principles that have inspired and will continue to inspire the intellectual profile of the journal. On the one hand, it is the principle of acknowledging the irreducible multiplicity and diversity of perspectives, cultural and social contexts from which the "human condition" is constituted; on the other hand - the principle of constant search for ways of bridging the gaps created by these differences, by developing productive forms of communication both on an individual and on a collective level. And human language, by its dual nature of universality and particularity, its capacity for encoding the invariable elements of human relation to the world, but also the most specific, unique and idiosyncratic aspects of this relation as constitutive of our personal and social identity, is a phenomenon that makes it possible to pursue both goals simultaneously. Thus, it seemed adequate that the first international issue of the journal *Filozofija*, which, both by the breadth of its topics and the plurality of languages of publication practically affirms the value of "unity-friendly diversity", be devoted to the problem of language and its many facets – phenomena that have been extensively treated from the origins of philosophical thought until nowadays.

The papers published in the section entitled "Topic of the issue" reflect this historical permanence of the problem of language as a philosophical topic, but also the richness of theoretical and methodological approaches applied in its treatment. The first two of these papers bring us back to the context of ancient philosophy, by shedding light on some aspects of Plato's and Neoplatonic understanding of language and its relation to philosophical activity and reflection. Thus, Viktor Ilievski, in his paper "Language and Knowledge in Plato's *Cratylus*", starts from an analysis of the confrontation of naturalist and conventionalist thesis regarding the problem of the correctness of names, extensively treated in Plato's *Cratylus*. He further investigates the implications of Plato's eidetic epistemology for his general attitude towards language, concluding that one of the main points of the specific design of Plato's dialectical method was the attempt to "avoid and overcome the pitfalls of language". The paper by Anna Motta, "Immagini di Belezza. Questioni di metafisica neoplatonica" ("Images of Beauty. Questions of Neoplatonic Metaphysics") based on a detailed analysis of some fundamental Neoplatonic texts, puts the emphasis on the role of aesthetics in the educational field in the Late Antique context, demonstrating the close interconnectedness of language, exegesis and philosophy in that cultural and historical milieu. Her paper further investigates the specific cognitive, aesthetic and educational role played by the "mimetical speeches" in the Neoplatonic perspective, conceived of as "true language images of the intelligible", i.e. different ways in which the Good reveals itself in the sensible world.

The next two papers in the "Topic of the issue" section introduce a specific contrast with the metaphysical preoccupations characteristic of the ancient views on language and deal with different questions inspired by the philosophy of language of one of the most prominent contemporary figures in this field – Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on the later phase of his philosophical development. Thus, the paper by Hans Julius Schneider, "Is Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy Therapeutic and Does This Mean That It Is Anti-Systematic?" elaborates the question of how much "theory" can be found in the later writings of Wittgenstein, in the light of Wittgenstein's explicit preference of the "descriptive" over the "theoretical" stance. Establishing a productive dialogue with some of the most important contemporary interpretations of Wittgenstein's approach

– like, for example, Dummett's and McDowell's interpretation – this paper explores new horizons for the application of Wittgenstein's views on language. By following and further developing the approach suggested by Eugene Gendlin, the paper emphasizes the specificity and the potential of the creative use of language, which demonstrates the relevance of later Wittgenstein's insights for other disciplines, like, for example, the discipline of psychotherapy.

Wittgenstein's thoughts on language, more specifically, the controversy he initiated over the question whether an individual could master a language by himself/herself (the "private language argument") represent a theoretical basis of Julien Kloeg's paper "Community Rules: What Does Kripke's Sceptical Paradox Imply For Private Language?". Starting from Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's "private language" puzzle, this paper pleads for a novel conception of the phenomenon of rule-following, which relies on the more elaborated concept of "human community" and avoids the counter-intuitive implications of the Kripkean approach to the private language argument.

The last two papers included in the section "Language, context and interpretation" are focused on the questions of interpretation as one of the most important aspects of the functioning of language and our conceptual schemes in different social and cultural contexts. Thus, the paper by Réka Markovich, entitled "Is It Forbidden To Kill Someone? Relevance Theory's Contribution to Deontic Logic" treats the question of interpretation of legal texts as a specific kind of texts with normative contents, by applying the conceptual apparatus of the contemporary deontic logic. More specifically, this paper explores the possibility to use the insights of the Relevance Theory in the realization of the fundamental tasks of deontic logic, especially in the area of norm semantics that sometimes requires retrieving information on the deontic status of certain expressions from textual context alone, without explicit presence of deontic operators.

Finally, Maja Muhić's paper entitled "Интерпретативни модуси во културната антропологија: Исчекор кон нови креативни рефлексии за човештвото" ("The Interpretive Aspect of Cultural Anthropology: A Step towards New Creative Reflections on Humanity") enlarges the range of questions concerning the phenomenon of interpretation by introducing the more general perspective of what is called "interpretive anthropology". This is the discipline that, in the second half of the twentieth century, introduced an important shift in the area of social sciences, directed towards an "interpretive rethinking of human society". By taking a critical stance towards the positivist approach to the study of social and cultural phenomena and bringing forth, at the same time, all the complexities of the interpretive turn in anthropology, the paper shows the important methodological and philosophical potential of the application of the interpretive, hermeneutic perspective to the study of human society.

Besides the papers included in the section "Language, context and interpretation" this issue also comprises one more paper in the "Varia" section – Leandro De Brasi's paper entitled "Accidentality and Knowledge after Gettier". Revisiting the issue raised by Edmund Gettier's famous paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", which gave new impetus to the epistemological research within the last few decades, this paper proposes a new approach "to the project of adding some accidentality blocker to true belief" in order to have knowledge. This new approach aims at replacing the strongly individualist orientation of the traditional epistemology with an orientation that also takes into consideration the social dimension of human practices and posits "a reflective endorsement of the knowledge-yielding procedures that can be met at the social level".

After the above-mentioned papers, in the "Book review" section, this issue includes Dejan Donev's review of the book by Željko Kaluđerović, "The Pre-Socratic Conceptions of Justice" which gives an analysis and a critical appraisal of the content, ideas and the scientific merit of Kaluđerović's book.

In that way, by displaying a productive convergence of ideas and approaches related not only to the field of philosophy of language, but also to the fields of logic, epistemology, aesthetics and philosophy of law, this issue of the journal reflects the richness and the diversity of contemporary philosophical thought explicitly or implicitly inspired by the phenomena of language and interpretation.

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At the end of this introduction of the 35th issue of Filozofija, we would like to give special thanks to the current members of the editorial and advisory boards, for their active participation in the shaping of the new format of this journal; to all the authors who submitted their work, for their trust and their preparedness to collaborate with our team; to the reviewers of the papers who generously agreed to give their professional opinions and recommendations for improving the quality of the content published in it; to the proofreaders, language and technical editors without whom the finalization of the work on the issue would have been impossible. Let's hope that the fruit of our collective efforts will open a new chapter in the history of the journal, by creating new forms of philosophical dialogue and reflection.

Ana Dimishkovska, Editor-in-chief

Language and Knowledge in Plato's *Cratylus*

Viktor Ilievski

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Abstract

The argument of Plato's *Cratylus* is conducted along the lines of examination of two conflicting theories of correctness of names, namely conventionalism and naturalism; in the course of the dialogue Socrates demonstrates that none of the theories provides truly accurate account of the names-objects relation. His own standpoint is that language is unreliable and that things should be investigated and learned about through themselves, rather than through their images, the names. This conclusion pushes the phonetic and semantic investigations aside, and establishes the supremacy of eidetic epistemology over its onomatic counterpart. The main objectives of this paper will be: a) to follow the interplay of Socrates' arguments by which he challenges both theories of correctness of names, and b) to briefly investigate the implications and the impact of the eidetic epistemology thesis on Plato's general attitude toward language. In order to accomplish the second objective, I shall turn to the Seventh Letter and point out some affinity between its philosophic digression and the conclusions of the *Cratylus*. Thus it will be shown that Plato's attitude toward language was not very favorable, and that his method of dialectic was devised in such a way as to ultimately avoid and overcome the pitfalls of language.

Keywords*:* Plato, language, The *Cratylus*, Seventh Letter, naturalism, conventionalism, dialectic

I

Cratylus is Plato's only dialogue where language-related subjects are quite extensively discussed. The issue in the forefront of this work is the question of "correctness of names"[1] (*orthotes tōn onomatōn*), as it is shown by its opening statement (383a3-4).[2] But

[1] By names, Plato in Cratylus implies "a loose linguistic category, understood as including common nouns and adjectives as well as proper names." (Sedley, *Plato's Cratylus* 4). More precisely, "'*onoma*' is used in the *Cratylus* to refer to nonsyncategorematic words, words which can be said to be true of something." (Ketchum 133)

[2] This view is endorsed both by Sedley (2003) and Barney (2001). But it hasn't always been the case. A.E. Taylor, for example, used to hold that the ostensive subject of the dialogue was the origin of language, while its main concern was to consider the function and use of language (see Taylor, *Plato* 77f).

the scope of its interest is much broader: throughout this dialogue the reader follows an inquiry into the nature of language, starting with its most primitive and minimal units, the phonemes, and extending to nouns and verbs (*onomata and rhēmata*), as the basic constituents of a meaningful sentence. Thus, what Plato's Socrates actually discusses in the *Cratylus* is the question of the relation between names and their referents: are the former really capable of properly reflecting the objects they represent? The argument is conducted along the lines of examination of two conflicting theories of correctness of names, namely conventionalism and naturalism; in the course of the dialogue Socrates demonstrates that none of the theories provides truly accurate account of the names-objects relation, although in the language which he and his contemporaries were using, some elements of both of them were preserved. As for the epistemological implications of the discussion, were the naturalist theory true, things could have been knowable through their names alone, but since it is not so, Socrates' own standpoint is that the things should be investigated and learned about through themselves, rather than through their images, the names (*Crat.* 439a-b). This conclusion pushes the phonetic and semantic investigations aside, and establishes the supremacy of eidetic epistemology (understanding things through their essences, or Forms) over its onomatic counterpart. The main objectives of this paper will be: a) to follow the interplay of Socrates' arguments by which he challenges both theories of correctness of names, and b) to briefly investigate the implications and the impact of the eidetic epistemology thesis on Plato's general attitude toward language as a philosophical tool.

In order to be able to establish his own views on language, theory of knowledge and ultimately ontology, Socrates is bound to refute the theories of conventionalism[3] and naturalism.[4] His strategy in accomplishing this task is rather peculiar: he straightforwardly refutes the extreme version of conventionalism and the quasi-ontological conception it presupposes,[5] but seemingly endorses and even strongly advocates the theory of linguistic naturalism. Furthermore, the entire enterprise of the elaborate etymological analysis is meant to reveal that the name-givers of old espoused the allegedly Heraclitean theory of flux.[6] The etymology of the elements is explained on the

[3] Briefly stated, the claim of the extreme conventionalists is that any name set down by any person for any object is the correct one, at least for that particular person.

[4] The naturalists' claim is "that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature" (*Crat.* 383a3). The extreme consequence of this viewpoint is that names which do not belong naturally to objects in question (those mistakenly assigned to them) are not names at all.

[5] It is deducible from the Protagorean absolute epistemological relativism. His *homo mensura* thesis allows only for an extremely relativist ontology, making the being and essence of the things private for each person (see *Crat.* 385e4-5). Such ontology produces, in turn, strong relativism in the field of values as well, and that is certainly not what Plato wants.

[6] The doctrine of constant flux does not allow for any fixed subject of epistemological investigations, which implies that no knowledge is actually possible. This conviction allegedly made the historical Cratylus refrain from discussions and move his finger instead of answering the questions posed to him.

basis of the presumption that the nature of things is unsteady and always moving. The same holds for the most important ethical (*aretē, sōphrosynē, dikaiosynē, andreia* etc.) and epistemological terms (*epistēmē, gnōmē, doxa* etc.), and this seemingly aligns Socrates with the upholders of the flux doctrine. The truth is, of course, exactly the opposite, and that becomes very clear during his conversation with Cratylus. One very interesting thing to note is that Socrates also attributes the doctrine of constant change to the primeval name-givers, and that may have devastating consequences for the naturalist theory which is so much dependent on the authority of those wise men of old:

> And by the dog, it seems to me that I haven't divined badly this thing which right at this moment appeared in my mind, that those men of very ancient times who used to give the names were almost exactly like most of the wise men nowadays, who get dizzy by frequently whirling around while they investigate the nature of the things that are, and thereupon it appears to them that the things themselves go round and are moving in every respect. However, they do not allege that their own internal experience is the cause of this opinion, but claim that the very things are of such nature, and that none of them is stable nor constant, but flowing and moving and full of every sort of motion and constant coming into being. (411b3-c4)[7]

The fact that Socrates does not even attempt to veil the irony so obvious in the above lines, as well as the fact that this conception so detrimentally collides with his own opinion,[8] namely that things possess stable essences (which will be once again presented by the very end of the dialogue),[9] seems to show that what he does here is exercising his eristic powers over Cratylus (who is at this point still only an auditor), with the aim to reduce Cratylus' philosophical standpoint to absurd.

It is really not certain that Heraclitus himself was an extreme Heraclitean of Cratylus' type, or even a flux theorist at all (as reported by Plato and further promoted by Aristotle). Against this view, among some other scholars, argues Marković (1983). The famous "river fragment" (DK B12 = 40 Marković) in his rendition reads: "Upon those who are stepping in the same rivers different and again different waters flow". If correct, this rendition would make the statement that nobody can step into the same river twice a misreading forced upon Heraclitus by his interpreters. Marković concludes that the "river picture" is just another Heraclitus' device to support the notion of *coincidentia oppositorum* within the frame of his general theory of Logos.

[7] The translations are mine, except for the sentences and passages from the Seventh Letter, which are given in Morrow's rendition. I have consulted the Reeve's and Tomovska-Mitrovska's translations of the *Cratylus*.

[8] Advanced much earlier, at 386aff.

[9] *Crat.* 439c, together with the conclusion that the name-givers, if they ascribed names to things in the belief that everything is always moving, were mistaken and consequently deceived their successors.

II

Now let us return to the starting point of the dialogue, where Hermogenes complains to Socrates that Cratylus confuses him with his sarcastic and unclear exposition of the doctrine of naturalism, and furthermore offends him by claiming that his name cannot be Hermogenes. He, in opposition to his interlocutor, advocates the view that the correctness of names in their application to objects or notions is determined by nothing more than an agreement among the users of language.[10] Hence, the main clash that we witness in the dialogue is between the two opposing views on the relation of words (more broadly – language) with reality: Cratylus,[11] the propounder of the first one, maintains that they are connected *physei*, while Hermogenes,[12] who represents the second view (in the order of appearance in the dialogue) holds that the connection is *nomō*. Still not discouraged enough to start seriously questioning his outlook, the latter provokes Socrates' exposition on the correctness of names with the following utterance: *ou gar physei hekastō pephykenai onoma ouden oudeni, alla nomō kai ethei tōn ethisantōn te kai kalountōn* – "not a single name belongs to each of the things by nature, but by custom and habit of those who give it and use it." (384d6-8).[13] Socrates, in reply to his position, advances the idea that the consequence of Hermogenes' theory of naming, if the same principle were applied to things that are, or beings, instead of to names, would result in a doctrine of extreme ontological relativism. This doctrine was originally held by

[10] "I am unable to persuade myself that there is some other correctness of names besides convention and agreement (*synthēkē kai homologia*)." (384c10-d1).

[11] (Stewart 35) and (Demand 107), relying on other scholars (Raeder and Derbolav, and von Fritz respectively), present the opinion that it was actually Antisthenes who upheld this view, and that Plato is thus arguing with his fellow student and forerunner of an influential school of thought, disguised in the robes of Cratylus. If this were true, it would, of course, add weight to the argument that Plato's initial endorsement of the theory of naturalism was purposeful, namely with the aim to reduce it to absurd. After all, Antisthenes was, in some respect, known as an opponent of Plato.

[12] Whom Stewart (*ibid.*) takes to be a mouthpiece of Protagoras.

[13] This view bears the extreme consequence of absolute linguistic relativism, namely that any individual at any time may name any object with any name, and that such naming would be proper and accurate. It is in fact imposed by Socrates' interjection in the question-and-answer session with Hermogenes: is each name given, either by an individual or the state (*kai ean idiōtēs kalē kai ean polis*), given well?, to which the latter agrees (385a). This prompts (Weingartner 6f) to claim that *this* is the view that Socrates actually battles, and that calling it conventionalism is "misleading to the extreme." It is, however, quite plausible to assume that the extreme relativist view with which Hermogenes gets implicated is just a further eristic twist introduced by Socrates on purpose, so that his interlocutor's position may appear to be really absurd. This move makes his rebuttal of conventionalism proper, whether undertaken seriously or with some ulterior motive, much easier. That Socrates has the broader conception of conventionalism on mind is confirmed by his restatement of Hermogenes position close to the end of the dialogue (433e), where he says that the correctness of names is a matter of agreement among *members of a community* (*to synthēmata einai ta onomata kai dēloun tois synthemenois proseidosi de ta pragmata* (433e3-5)).

Protagoras, who famously stated that of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. Hermogenes, who is the advocate of the conventionalist's theory in the dialogue, reluctantly admits that there were times when he, due to intense internal turmoil, took refuge in Protagoras' doctrine, although without due consideration. Socrates deals a hard blow both to Hermogenes' conventionalism and Protagoras' teachings (refuting in passing yet another sophist's doctrine, the one of Euthydemus, who apparently believed that all the contrary properties are simultaneously present in every object, and consequently all statements whatsoever are true) in a rather interesting and elaborate line of reasoning (385d-391b). Let us try to reconstruct the structure of this argument, which starts off with transposition from names to beings, only to finally return back to names and disprove conventionalism, which was after all Socrates' original intention.

Hermogenes claims: whatever one decides to call a certain thing, that will be its name, and further supports his claim by the fact that different communities have different names for the same things, a truth that holds both among Hellenes and foreigners. Socrates, on the other hand, turns the argument to ontological grounds, and asks whether things have essences of their own, or whether they, in the matter of their being, depend on the opinions of individual men. If they do not have fixed being of their own, then:

a) We would not be able to distinguish one thing from the other,[14] and also we would not have the means to attribute fixed properties to numerically different things if our opinions of them do not coincide.[15]
b) But we do distinguish one individual from another, and we do attribute them properties of, say, goodness and badness, and to a different degree.
c) Therefore, the things of this world have essences or being of their own.

This is Socrates' first interim conclusion in the argument. The things' essences do not stand in relation to our cognitive faculties, do not picture the transient mental states of the humans, but have fixed ontological status of their own.

Next, Socrates assumes that the same holds of actions, and therefore it is both legitimate and important for the later part of the argument to ask whether this assumption of his is well grounded, or presents a case of unjustified extrapolation. The status of events (and for that matter, actions) is a subject of huge debate among contemporary philosophers. Still, there seem to be some peculiarities that are shared by both things and events, one of them being that they are "equally spatiotemporal in as

[14] According to Euthydemus' version.

[15] If man is the measure of all things and Peter's opinion differs from John's, then it would not be possible to definitely say that, for example, the water is either warm or cold.

much as both are non-repeatable, dated particulars" (MacDonald 110). And if events are particulars, that would make them susceptible to having certain other features in common with the things or objects, as for example Socrates' ascribing them fixed nature, or essence, would be. That move can be accomplished when both types of particular entities (objects and events) are subsumed under a sortal term, or, in the case of the events, an event or action type, which would have essence and whose instances the various particular events would be. Davidson, on the other hand, although disclaiming that events have essences (being particulars identified by the causal nexus), still offers good reasons why events should be taken seriously as entities (Davidson 164ff).[16] He also holds that actions can be subsumed under events; of course, not every event is an action, but that fact does not seem to be relevant to the case explicated here by Socrates. Therefore, it is probably safe enough to conclude that Socrates is justified to attribute essentiality to actions, and that they can be described (at least those presented in the *Cratylus*) as "species" of events that are necessarily causally connected with a conscious agent. Let us now resume our argument.

d) As for the actions (weaving, cutting), they also possess nature or essence, and are performed according to it, and not our liking. In order to perform them properly, we must use the appropriate tools that are naturally attached to them.
e) Speaking or saying something is one sort of action.
f) Therefore, correct speech is the speech performed according to nature, and includes saying words in the way natural for their usage. Words are the proper tools employed in the speech act.

This is the second interim conclusion drawn by Socrates. He makes it clear that any enterprise undertaken has to be accomplished according to strict rules dictated by the essential nature of the activity itself. Nobody can perform a surgical operation without separating the tissue of the patient with a sharp metal tool. Similarly, nobody can speak properly without following the rules of the speech-action and using the appropriate tools, which are the names.

Socrates next proceeds briefly to discuss true and false speech, with an intention to point out to Hermogenes that there is a possibility of false, incorrect speech. It is a matter of very basic knowledge of logic that truth-value is to be attributed to propositions, or more precisely utterances, specific uses of sentences. Plato's Socrates acknowledges that, but he, somewhat surprisingly, ascribes truth-value to the constituents, or parts of the statements as well, on the assumption that whatever is true of the unit, has to be true of its parts as well. This seems to be an example of flagrant error in

[16] Any description of an event implies that there is an entity to be described; the logical form of the sentences we use in our ordinary talk presupposes that there are things our sentences are about.

reasoning, known as the fallacy of division.[17] Why would Plato's Socrates commit such a fallacy in the course of what seems to be a valid and stable argument?[18] One obvious answer would be that the very theory he is about to expound presupposes the notion of names as independent bearers of meaning and truth, linguistic microcosms encapsulating within themselves both truth-value and reference. In other words, the theory of true and false names has to presuppose that names do not only refer or designate, or even do not only refer and sometimes suggest descriptions, but that they always necessarily represent descriptions of some kind (Cf. Robinson 334f). The other possible answer would be that this inconsistency is yet another eristic move of Socrates, who is determined to establish the theory of naturalism upon a host of absurdities, just in order to deconstruct it later on.

Be that as it may, since true and false speech is possible, some statements are true, some false; the same, according to Socrates, holds for the smallest parts of sentences – the names. But using names is part of the action of speaking, therefore, using names is also a sort of speech-action. Consequently, if using names is a speech-action, it follows from the interim conclusions II and I that we cannot name things according to our liking or even on the basis of agreement among citizens, but rather have to name them in a natural way, in accordance with their essences and using appropriate tools. Eschewing this procedure of naming would imply failure in the attempt to name things. In this way it is proven that the conventionalist theory of naming and the underlying Protagorean theory of knowledge stand no chance against Socrates' assault.

After Socrates established that speaking or saying was an activity which should be performed in accordance with its own nature and that names were natural tools

[17] Elsewhere (*Soph.* 263 d) Plato clearly asserts that truth-value arises from the combination of names and verbs.

[18] Not all scholars agree that this is a case of fallacy. Taylor (*Plato* 79) flatly denies that, arguing that the attribution of truth-value to names is confined to limited cases of superimposition of private nomenclature on common or public usage of language. With Schofield's transposition (Schofield, "A displacement") of the relevant passage on truth and falsity of names (385b2-d1) after 387c, followed in the standard English translation of Plato's works edited by Cooper, Taylor's argument is not valid anymore, since the passage does not follow the discussion on "private" versus "public" names. Sedley (*Plato's Cratylus* 11ff) considers the above mentioned passage to be an unintentionally left residue from a previous edition of the dialogue which was later on amended to suit the conclusion of the *Sophist*, with the passage in question deleted. This assumption, even if pretty bold, is possible, since the flow of the argument is not interrupted by the omission the disputed passage. On the other hand, the passage cannot be unequivocally pronounced to be completely redundant, since the attribution of falsity to some names may be used for fostering the idea of names' capacity to convey fixed meaning (which is a supporting pillar of the theory of naturalism), by pointing out their inability to do so if not proper (false); after all, the discussion that immediately follows the transposed passage focuses on the usage of proper or natural tools for performing actions. In the light of the above understanding, the proper names would be true, the improper false. Furthermore, even if Plato did edit 385b2-d1 out, that would in no way strengthen the case for the existence of name-forms (which is the present issue), but would mean only one inconsistency less.

for performing that activity (in the same way as surgical knife is the natural tool for the activity of cutting, which has separating of tissue as its purpose), a question may spontaneously present itself to the inquisitive mind: what is the purpose which is to be accomplished by the usage of names as tools for the activity of saying? Socrates gives straightforward and precise answer to this question – the main functions of names are to help us teach (*didaskō*) one another something and separate (*diacrinō*) things. He gives this answer after Hermogenes admits that he does not know what precisely we do when we name things. Isn't it, says Socrates, that by naming we instruct each other, and also separate things according to their nature?, and Hermogenes readily expresses his consent.[19] Now, by the end of the dialogue (439d9), Socrates points out to Cratylus that a well fashioned speech should say of a thing firstly that it is *this* and further on that it is *such and such - proton men hoti ekeino estin, epeita hoti toiuton*.[20] And in order for the later account of function of speech (determining what a thing is (*ekeino*) and then enumerating its properties *(toiouto)*) to be in a similar way reconciled with the earlier account of function of names (*didaskō and diacrinō*), we would have to understand *didaskō* (teaching or instructing) as pointing out the thing's essential nature, while *diakrinō* (separating) as the usual way of defining a thing, or grasping its essence by marking it off from the other things (not belonging to the same kind), through pointing out its *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*. As it was mentioned, Sedley holds that both functions of instructing and separating being are primarily of philosophical nature; they are not meant to simply label things or describe them superficially, but to encapsulate their essence, although most of the names are at a low level of approximation to their ultimate aim. At the face of it, this conclusion sounds reasonable enough, but if it were true, then Plato would be very serious about the naturalist theory of naming. However, his commitment to such a theory is dubious even at this early point, exactly because of the above inconsistency surrounding the attribution of truth-value to names, and, more importantly, because of the assumption underlying the whole truth-value issue

[19] *Crat.* 388b9-10: *ar' ou didaskomen ti allēlous kai ta pragmata diakrinomen ē echei;* Socrates does not elaborate much on these functions of names, but I think that, although closely related, they should be kept separate. 'Instructing' and 'dividing things' (at 388c1 a name is said to be *organon diakritikon tēs ousias* – a tool for separating *being*) here probably mean on the one hand imparting positive information about a particular object, and on the other marking it off from other objects or, better, beings (Cf. Thomas 344). According to Sedley ("Plato on Language" 217 f) both functions are eminently in the service of philosophy; 'instructing' means teaching philosophical truth, while 'separating being' refers to a range of meanings: from pointing out what a thing is by distinguishing it from other things to encapsulating the thing's essence in definition. This seems to be possible only if we accept as true the premise that names are bearers of both meaning and reference, or independently capable of expressing the essence of things. But that is hardly possible; both the truth-value and the capability of forming definitions belong to propositions or statements. Socrates' words here are remindful of Heraclitus' statement (DK B1) that he is teaching by dividing each thing according to its nature.

[20] Sedley ("Plato on Language" 215) interprets this statement as follows: "To utter a complete statement *(logos)*, you must first *name* your subject, then go on to *describe* it."

– that is that names have the power to encapsulate and convey essences, which is actually what was to be proven, if possible at all.

III

As an unassailable master of disputes, Socrates next launches a formidable attack on the theory he was seemingly trying to prove and defend – naturalism. He does that by trying to explain to Hermogenes (who is at this point still his interlocutor) how the names succeed in expressing the nature of a thing.[21] In order to do that, Socrates draws the analogy of a painting. We can easily imagine a picture of a man, and notice that it is composed of many parts, with further components and subcomponents, till we reach the level of individual colors. Similarly, the names may be analyzed and their components discovered, starting with derivative names (*hystera onomata*) – like *agathos*, then the primary names (*prōta onomata*) which constitute them – in this case *agastos* and *thoon* ('admirable' and 'fast'), down to the most elementary parts (*ta stoikheia*), which are the individual phonemes. Now, names are correct when they express the nature of their referent, and the derivatives manage to do that by the means of the primaries, which are composed of elements, not of names. But how do the elements manage to build up a correct primary name? On the strength of their power to imitate the essence or being both of things and qualities (423e1-4). So, in the same way as a picture is a pictorial imitation of reality, so names are vocal imitation which establish a kind of portrait-like resemblance with the things, down to the lowest level of word-analysis, the level of elements represented by sounds, which still carry some semantic value: they express properties, like motion, hardness, softness, largeness, which also have essences. This is, presented in the briefest possible manner, the mimetic theory of names.[22] "If someone were able to imitate the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, wouldn't he be able to reveal what each thing itself is, or not?" (423e6-8). And the one who does that is the original legislator or name-giver, the *nomothetēs*, who, in the prolonged etymological section of the dialogue, was proven to be a flux-theorist.[23]

Socrates, unlike Cratylus, who approximately at his juncture joins the conversations, claims that even names which imperfectly imitate or resemble things, may still

[21] *Crat.* 422d1-2: "But, the correctness of those names we have just examined in detail was meant to be such as to disclose of what sort is each of the things that are."

[22] This is what (Deretić 41) calls a phonemo-analytic model, the last move in the attempt to check the foundation of the theory of naturalism, before undertaking the project of its rebuttal.

[23] As also confirmed at the already quoted 411b3-c4 passage, and at 439b10-c6. For a commentary on these two passages see (Ademollo 449ff).

properly represent them. Even an imperfect image is an image.[24] This claim may lead to the conclusion that not all names are perfect imitation of things, and consequently, not all *nomothetes* are on the same level. But Cratylus strongly objects to this idea, holding that a badly given name is not a name at all, and that a bad name-giver is not a name-giver at all. His stubborn attitude leads him to number of *aporiai*, and allows Socrates to deconstruct the theory of naturalism he was seemingly upholding, and proclaim the ineffectiveness of names in the matter of acquiring true knowledge. He does that by using at least three strong arguments. First, Socrates offers contradictory etymologies which refute the ones previously given, themselves expressing or confirming the theory of flux (437a-d). The alternative rendition establishes rest as a principle, instead of motion, Eleatic ontology instead of Heraclitean.[25] Next, he calls Cratylus' attention to the names of numbers, which do not reflect the nature of what they are applied to (435 b) – a name properly expressing the nature of 'hundred' should consist of hundred units.[26] Finally, since Cratylus claimed that knowing the name meant knowing the thing, Socrates challenges him by saying that if the only way to know a thing is to know its name, then the legislators must have not known the things prior to naming them: "How can we say that are versed in naming and that they are lawgivers, before any name was established and before they came to know them, if the things cannot be known except through names?" (438b5-7). But if they did have some knowledge of them, a premise which Cratylus has to accept as true, then there must be another way to know the things except through their names. That way is to know them directly, through steadfast inquiry in the first principles, which are the Forms. Finally, Socrates once again addresses the inadequacy of the flux theory, and strongly postulates Plato's theory of Forms, arguing that the picture of an-always-changing-universe would certainly make all attempts to know anything futile. It may properly represent the state of affairs in the world we inhabit, but Platonic philosophy directs our gaze higher, beyond the realm of always-changing particulars, where we can identify the Beautiful itself as always beautiful, the Good itself as always good (439c-d).

[24] Even if we take the names to picture reality, they can at most be imperfect and incomplete pictures. Socrates gives the example of the word *sklerotes* (hardness), where lambda is contained, which is supposed to express the opposite quality, namely softness and smoothness (434c-e) That is why, even if we accept that names picture reality, they can at most be imperfect and incomplete pictures.

[25] This is, however, not a detrimental objection. Sedley ("The Etymologies" 142), using examples of etymologizing both in the *Phaedrus* and the *Cratylus* points out that the ancients prided themselves on discovering the 'real' hidden meaning of words and not dwelling on superficialities, as well as that they believed that multiple etymologies were not considered as inconsistencies, but rather as reinforcing each other. The goal of the ancient etymologists was not linguistic pedantry, but discovering the hidden meaning carefully encoded in words (See Barney 47), especially if those were divine names. Finding out that a name combines two or more meanings was not considered as a fault but as an advantage.

[26] This is what (Keller 301) calls "a devastating argument against the naturalistic theory of language."

IV

What is it, then, that Socrates accomplishes with his rather complex line of reasoning and argumentation in the *Cratylus*? One thing is certain: as shown above, he decidedly rejects Cratylus' version of naturalism, according to which humans are powerless to change the relation between names and objects, which is established by nature. Besides that, Socrates seems to be giving some concession to the conventionalist theory of language: he would prefer the view that names are as much like things as possible, but the reality of our everyday usage of language is that, in both baptizing and using the names of things, we are forced to resort to convention (435c). This, however, does not mean that Socrates embraces thoroughgoing conventionalism and believes in the accurateness of etymologizing (Cf. Thomas 343, fn. 7). He would personally be pleased (*emoi men oun kai autōi areskei*) were the names resembling things perfectly; unfortunately, it is not so, although there are some phonemes which accurately mimic certain properties (426c-427d), and there are some words that properly resemble their nominata (e.g. the words *psychē and sōma* (399d-400c)).[27] Still, since the natural accurateness of most of the names remains in the realm of wishful thinking, (Cf. Weingartner 24) Socrates' observations on the correctness of names and their power to properly represent the things they stand for, conclude as follows: "But surely, not a single man endowed with reason will entrust himself or the cultivation of his soul to names (*oude pany noun echontos anthrōpou epitrepsanta onomasin auton kai tēn autou psychēn therapeuein*), trusting them and their givers so much as to affirm confidently that he knows something" (440c2-5). So what will a person endowed with *nous* do instead? The well known answer to this question is that he will investigate and learn about things through themselves, rather than through names (*poly mallon auta ex autōn kai mathēteon kai zētēteon ē ek tōn onomatōn* (439b5-6)).

These two statements taken together are the main conclusion of the dialogue, and not only that we should not do philosophy through etymology, as (Keller 285,303) claims. Etymologizing had undoubtedly been an established practice by the times when Plato lived (see Barney 50ff); however, aside from the assumption that Cratylus himself, or the group of intellectuals he represented, was embracing epistemological speculation as a way of doing philosophy, we do not have much textual evidence that it used to be a prominent way of philosophizing,[28] indeed so prominent that Plato dedicated an entire dialogue to its rebuttal. Besides, the model etymologist in the dialogue is Euthyphro, who is far from being a model philosopher as well. Finally, the names' correspondence to things is not established only through etymological analysis, but also through the mimetic power of the phonemes. Therefore, I believe that Plato's purpose in the *Craty-*

[27] For a view that there might have been a slight possibility that Plato held the nature-theory of names, see (Robinson 325).

[28] Although it was practiced by some of the Sophists, and used widely in some other areas, as for example in theology, as a means of analyzing and explaining divine names.

lus is to emphasize, when it comes to philosophical investigation, the insufficiency and inadequacy of language in general – and not only of the etymological enterprise[29] – and, more importantly, to give a hint of the true way of acquiring knowledge. This true way is represented by what was previously in this paper called eidetic epistemology, or knowing things not through their names, but directly; and knowing a thing directly or through itself means knowing it as it is, discarding all images derived from sense-experience, i.e. knowing its Form (*eidos)* – which is the only object of real knowledge, or *epistēmē*.[30] Plato makes this clear in the closing section of the dialogue (439c-440d), where he uses the Beautiful itself (*auto to kalon*) as an example of a stable object of knowing, and contrasts it with the things that are in constant flux (*panta rhein*), and none of which can, due to their always changing nature, be known by anybody (*oud' an gnōstheiē he hyp' oudenos*) (439d-e). Knowing is thus "logically prior to naming," (Levinson 38) and attaches itself to the unchanging nature of the real being, while the activity of naming is limited to human *doxa*, which cannot reach beyond the realm of sensible particulars (401a).

These conclusions granted, it still remains rather obscure how the lauded unmediated investigation is supposed to be conducted, what is its method, or, simply, what direct learning, i.e. eidetic epistemology, actually amounts to. No straightforward answer to this question is offered in the *Cratylus*, but Plato there has to be hinting at his favorite, indeed exclusive method of inquiry into the highest objects of knowledge, i.e. dialectic.[31] Now, dialectic, understood in any sense of the term, does not refer to inquiry which

[29] This is in contrast with Ademollo, who gives much narrower scope to Plato's claim that learning about things should be conducted without names: "All [Plato] needs to say here, and all he does say, is that the investigation of reality is independent of the (etymological) *investigation* of names – not of their *use*" (Ademollo 445).

[30] Plato posited the Forms as the only suitable objects of knowledge (see *Rep.* 477a-b), since, unlike the sensible particulars that partake in them, they are ever-existing, stable and pure. In this way he had established what became famous as the Two-Worlds Theory, according to which the two distinct sets of objects, namely those of the Forms and the particulars, are accessible through the powers of knowledge (*epistēmē*) and opinion (*doxa*). This theory is advanced elaborately in the divided line section of the *Republic* VI (509d-513e), and more succinctly at *Rep.* 477a-b and *Tim.* 51d-52a. Consequently, I believe that when Keller states concerning Plato's method of direct investigation that "to look to a thing itself is to think about or observe the thing, rather than thinking about or observing the name of the thing" (Keller 303, fn. 29), his interpretation is not as "plausible and straightforward" as it may seem at first glance.

[31] For two alternatives to this view and some objections to them, see (Thomas 351ff). The author designates these alternative views as the *acquaintance model*, upheld by Reeve and Silverman, and the *field-work model*, proposed by Irwin. The former stands for some way of acquiring direct knowledge of the Forms, which, according to Thomas, presupposes either "cognitive contact ... with forms in a previous life; or ... cognitive contact with the forms earned by the end of a long life of linguistic instruction" (Thomas 353). According to the latter, inquiry without names is not necessarily directed at the Forms. It takes as its starting points certain commonly held beliefs concerning an object or phenomenon, which, upon practical examination of the given object or phenomenon, are being revised in such a way as to produce new, more accurate beliefs.

disposes of language altogether, but still it is supposed to *culminate* in cognition fully independent of any knowledge that could be conveyed through names.[32] We shall touch upon the subject of this form of dialectic inquiry in the concluding section of the paper.

The failure to identify the interconnected statements that the world is not fully cognizable through words, and that the way to know things is to investigate them directly as the main theses of the dialogue, lands some commentators in difficulties and robs them of the opportunity to see the positive contribution of the *Cratylus* to Plato's views on language and knowledge. Thus Modrak holds that in the *Cratylus* (as well as in the *Theaetetus*) Plato attempts to explain how we grasp the reality, which is not too controversial a claim; but then she goes on to assert that "this is best accomplished by identifying the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of meaning and knowledge" (Modrak 167), which turn out to be the roots, or the elemental constituents of words. In order to accomplish this goal of his, "Plato rejects any philosophical theory that has the consequence that meanings become unstable. In the *Cratylus*, the rejected theory is a version of conventionalism ..." (ibid.), and consequently aligns himself with the naturalists. The upshot of this understanding is that Plato's attempt to explain how we know things hits impasse and the dialogue ends aporetically. However, I believe that both in this paper and earlier it has been established that in the *Cratylus* naturalism was rejected as well, even possibly shown to be the prime object of Socrates' criticism. I also believe that Plato's aim in the Cratylus in not precisely to explain how we cognize the world, but how we cognize the world *through names*, or language. His conclusion is that we actually do not and cannot, at least when it comes to the higher order realities, but he nevertheless has a positive alternative to offer. The whole purpose of the dialogue form which Plato adopted in order to present his thoughts is to give the audience a chance to reflect upon what has been said and draw independent conclusions, hopefully in the right direction.[33] Thus, the *aporia* in the *Cratylus* is only apparent; it is Plato's "lit-

[32] Thomas also claims that Plato's 'inquiry without names' "takes the form of a dialectical inquiry into metaphysical first principles" (Thomas 356), i.e. signifies investigation of the Forms, which she calls 'transcendental metaphysics.' As exemplified in the *Cratylus*, its method is application of transcendental arguments (see Thomas 360f), which are structurally quite similar to Kant's transcendental argument. The main problem with hers, otherwise very subtle and penetrating, analysis of the Cratylus' last section is that the transcendental arguments only provide *conditions* for acquiring stable knowledge, and not direct apprehension of the Forms, which is *epistēmē* in the real sense of the word. Furthermore, as Thomas ascribes the practice of transcendental metaphysics to the original *nomothetes*, the method proves the be highly fallible, since these, as I believe, mythical wise men of old were dragged to very wrong conclusion concerning the nature of reality. That is certainly not how Plato wants his dialectical method to be.

[33] For an argument that Plato's Socrates rather often lets the reader know what position he holds, although the same is not to be found in the dialogue's conclusion, see (Penner 131ff). Now, in this article of his Penner tries to isolate and confirm the philosophical views of the historical Socrates, which were being stealthily introduced in the above way, but the same strategy of presenting ideas can uncontroversially be transposed to Plato, who is, after all, the one who devised it.

erary device for reinterpreting the Socratic elenchus as the preparation for constructive philosophy. The reader is to accompany the interlocutor in the recognition of a problem. But the more astute reader will also recognize some hints of a solution" (Kahn 100).[34]

V

The preceding paragraphs make it rather clear that Plato in the *Cratylus* does offer an answer to the question of correctness of names and, subsequently, utility of language. What remains to be seen, however, is whether the thesis of the priority of the direct access to the realities, over its linguistic counterpart, has any parallel in the rest of Plato's writings. At first, one feels compelled, together with many critics, to acknowledge that "This is not a happy outcome nor is it one that at the end of the day Plato embraces, as is evident in his lifelong interest in dialectic and definition" (Modrak 169). However, after a more careful consideration and thorough rethinking of the notion of dialectic, the seemingly 'unhappy outcome' may turn out to be not that un-Platonic or absurd.

In fact, the conclusions of the *Cratylus* are closely connected and in a kind of doctrinal affinity with the Seventh Letter's digression on language and true, i.e. Platonic, philosophy (*Ep. VII* 341b-345c). It is impossible here to enter the vexing debate on the Letter's authenticity;[35] deciding on the issue is, however, not necessary at all. It is enough to somehow confirm that the author, whoever he could be, wrote the philosophical digression with genuinely Platonic attitude, as well as that he in it expressed genuinely Platonic ideas. And I believe that Taylor (1912), Morrow (1929) and Stenzel (1953) have already argued quite convincingly in favor of the validity of that supposition. Now, the philosophical digression in our letter is induced by the need to offer an evaluation of the book, or handbook (*technē*) on philosophy that Dionysius wrote, upon hearing a single introductory lecture by Plato. The author of the Letter deems that impossible: philosophy is not about presenting view-points and arguing for or against them; it is a way of life and presupposes strict daily discipline, unwavering dedication to the cause and purity of mind and conduct. "Those who are really not philosophers but have only a coating of opinions" (*Ep. VII* 340d6) become easily discouraged and give up the pursuit as soon as they learn how much labor and sacrifice it demands. But even more importantly, the very enterprise of expressing deep philosophical truths in

[34] The most eminent representative of the viewpoint that the same conclusion applies also to the other dialogue Modrak is discussing, namely the *Theaetetus*, is Cornford (1935).

[35] While not that long ago many distinguished scholars, including G. R. Morrow and A. E. Taylor, were in favor of the view that our Letter is either Plato's work, or otherwise genuinely Platonic (having, however, opponents in Edelstein, Cherniss, etc.), more recently it seems that the opposite understanding is becoming predominant among the historians of Platonism: Irwin, Schofield, Burnyeat and many others consider it pseudo-Platonic.

written or even spoken language, for the purpose of instructing others in the matter is futile.

> So much at least I can affirm with confidence about any who have written or propose to write on these questions, pretending to a knowledge of the problems with which I am concerned (*peri ōn spoudazō*)[36]... : it is impossible, in my opinion, that they have learned anything about the subject. There is no writing of mine about these matters, nor will there ever be. For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences. (341b-c)

This emphatic statement of the author of the Seventh Letter does not stand in such a stark contrast with Plato of the dialogues, as many have assumed. It is in perfect accord with the outcome of the discussions in the *Cratylus*, which directs the reader's attention to the weakness, even impotency of language when it comes to grasping and depicting true being. It is also not very far from the depreciative outlook on writing offered in the *Phaedrus* (277d-279a); the *aporiai* of the second part of the *Parmenides*, which to a significant degree steam from the inadequacy of language; the unsuccessful attempts in the *Theaetetus* to define knowledge; the *Timaeus* statements that the ultimate principles are known only to god and those dear to him (549d) and that the father and maker of the universe is difficult to find and impossible to speak about to everyone (28c).[37] For all that, neither Plato in the dialogues, nor Plato or the Platonic author in the Seventh Letter is, by no means, putting forward the agnostic thesis of impossibility of knowledge. From the very beginning of his attempts to establish authentic methodology of philosophical investigations (first discernible probably in the *Meno*),[38] he holds that knowledge is attainable and that the method to attain it is dialectic. Dialectic, however, is a multi-layered concept which develops together with the maturing of Plato's philosophy, and thus eschews easy description. The term basically refers to philosophical inquiry conducted through conversation: "It consists of the methodic organization of questions and answers, of the proposing of hypotheses and of their examination, of a sorting out of types of objects by means of concepts, using what is later called the method of collection and division" (Weingartner 9). However, there is more to it; the ultimate goal of philosophy is to become as godlike as possible,

[36] These are, as (Morrow 330) points out, the first and highest principles of nature.

[37] The format of this text allows only for a brief mention of a few places in the Platonic corpus that are possibly in affinity with *Ep. VII*. For tracing back to the dialogues of many of the ideas presented in the Letter's digression, see (Morrow 335ff).

[38] Although *Cratylus* is the first dialogue where the name of the practitioner of the art is mentioned – "the *Cratylus* passage might have been designed to introduce the term *dialektikos* for the first time, since its appearance is prepared by careful *epagōgē*" (Kahn 306) – together with some hints of the method itself (see *Crat.* 436d, and cf. *Rep.* 511b; *Crat.* 438e and *Rep.* 534b-c).

(see Sedley 1999) or to approach the Good. This goal cannot be attained without the intellectual grasp (*noēsis*) of fundamental realities, which in turn requires arduous training. "The training and the method of approach is what Plato calls dialectic" (Kahn 292). So, the method of dialectic is specifically contrived to ultimately reach the highest subsection of the divided line, to grasp the *archai*. That is the verdict of the *Republic*, where the method is most fully described. The lower segment of the *epistēmē* section, the one concerned with mathematicals, uses hypotheses and sense-data, while "the dialectic method proceeds only thus as to make away with hypotheses and move to the first principle itself, so as to be secure" (*Rep.* 533c7-d1).[39] The art of dialectic has a very complex structure and in the broader sense it includes the method of hypotheses (as taught and practiced in the *Meno* and *Phaedo*), the method of collection and division (*Phaedrus, Sophist* etc.) and dialectic proper, as presented in the *Republic* VI and VII. They are all linked together by the unifying purpose of discovering the ultimate realities behind the fleeting phenomena. Discursive reasoning and language are indispensable in this pursuit, but they are far from being sufficient. In fact, in order to realize any real being, three intermediaries are necessary: the name (*onoma*), the definition (*logos*), the image (*eidōlon*), while knowledge (*epistēmē*) is the fourth thing. On the fifth place stands the object itself, which is the knowable and truly real being – *ho gnōston te kai alēthōs estin on* (*Ep.VII* 342a-b).[40] To use an example from the *Cratylus*, in order to comprehend what a shuttle is, we will have to know its name (*kerkis*), its definition (e.g. an instrument for separating the web and weaving), and its material shape. Next we have to possess an understanding of all these features in our minds, which is "distinct both from the thing itself and the three things previously mentioned" (*Ep.VII* 342c). Finally, there is the form of the shuttle itself, which should properly be called the real shuttle – *auto ho esti kerkis* (*Crat*. 389b). Now, the author of the Letter continues, due to the innate weakness of language (*dia to tōn logōn asthenes*), the four means for reaching the real thing are as prone to make clear its appearance, or some quality (*to poion ti*), as its being (*to on*). The soul, however, is endeavoring to know the essence, not the particular quality of a thing (*ou to poion ti, to de ti, zetousēs eidenai tēs psychēs*), and therefore no sensible man would venture to express his deepest thoughts in accounts and rely on them exclusively. For, every image is just an imperfect approximation, the names are arbitrary and by no means fixed (*onoma te ouden oudeni bebaion einai*), and the same is true for the definitions

[39] (Benson 478) further explains that dialectic also uses hypotheses, but, unlike the dianoetic method, seeks for their confirmation. Thus the difference between the two methods amounts to a difference between the use of sense-experience and the *a priori* method, and between treating hypotheses as though they were confirmed and as mere unconfirmed stepping stones in need of justification, respectively for the dianoetic (applicable to mathematicals) and the dialectic method (applicable to first principles).

[40] As we learn from the *Republic* 532a, the essence of each thing is to be sought through the exercise of the method of dialectic, which implies leaving aside everything perceptible (*aneu pasōn tōn aisthetōn*).

and accounts, because they are comprised of names (*Ep.VII* 342e-343c). And this was exactly the conclusion of the *Cratylus*: the words by themselves, although indispensible – since we have no other means of communicating our thoughts and insights – are insufficient, fallible instruments when it comes to grasping reality. Therefore, the inquisitive soul should busy itself with the 'fifth thing,' which is the object as it is, the real essence. However, unlike Socrates in the *Cratylus*, the author of our *Letter* gives a clearer idea about how this task is to be accomplished. We are once again urged to embrace the practice of dialectic, but having in mind that dialectic is much more than an intellectual exercise: it means submitting oneself to the philosophic way of life, which involves training in virtue and perfect conduct, and employing the four instruments of knowledge by listening to and conversing with the teacher in good faith and without envy (*Ep.VII* 344b). After such "long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, [knowledge] is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself (*en tē psychē genomenon auto heauto ēdē trephei*)." (*Ep.VII* 341c-d)

I believe that the points presented in this paper allow us to conclude that Plato's general attitude toward language, at least starting with the transitional period between the writing of the so-called early and middle group of dialogues – where the *Cratylus* most probably belongs – was generally unfavorable. Regardless of whether he upheld the naturalist theory of language before the *Cratylus* or not, starting with this dialogue, and especially with the development of his Theory of the Forms, he believed that both words and *logoi* were possibly deceptive, and had to be dealt with most carefully. In his striving for knowledge, however, Plato could not dispense with language altogether, and that is why he devised the dialectic method as a powerful fence against the imperfections of language. As far as dialectic itself is concerned, in the light of the obvious affinity between the teachings of the *Cratylus* and the Seventh Letter presented here, the following two theses may be postulated: a) for Plato, philosophical inquiry, or dialectic, culminates in the awakening of the reason's natural ability to illuminate its objects (*eklampse … peri hekaston … nous*); b) consequently, the concepts of illumination (*eklampsis*) and direct seeing (*theōrein*) play a crucial role in Plato's epistemology, and is therefore nothing a modern student of Plato should shy away from, as being too 'mystical' or 'Neoplatonic'.[41] It is the only tool appropriate and available to the eidetic epis-

[41] This would imply that Plotinus' understanding of dialectic (see *Enn*. I.3), and some other aspects of Platonism, was much closer to the original intent of the master than we nowadays are willing to acknowledge. After all, we learn from a canonical text that the method of dialectic allows the philosopher, who has spent long years cultivating his soul, "to grasp the Good itself by intellection alone:" *auto ho esti agathon autē(i) noēsei labē(i)* (*Rep.* 532b1). It thus has the power "to lead up the best part of the soul to direct vision of the best among the things that really are:" *epanagōgēn tou beltistou en psychē(i) pros tēn tou aristou en touis ousi thean* (*Rep.* 532c6). The seeing here is unmediated, much as the vision of the sun is not brought about by any intermediary, but is a matter of interaction between the efflux of the inner light of the eye and the external light of the sun. Plato reiterates the same

temology, put forward already as early as the times of the *Cratylus*. The full explication and defense of these theses must be postponed for some other occasion.

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point even more explicitly at 540a: those who have passed all the tests on the path of dialectical anabasis must finally be lead to the completion of their efforts and full realization of the truth. That is to be accomplished by "directing the beam of the soul upwards and fixing it on that which gives light to everything" (*anaklinantas tēn tēs psychēs augēn eis auto apoblepsai to pasi phōs parechon*). Thus the metaphor of light and the notion of direct cognition are very much present in Plato's most mature and penetrating passages on dialectic.

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Immagini di Bellezza. Questioni di metafisica neoplatonica

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Trista quella vita (...) che non vede, non ode,
non sente se non che oggetti semplici, quelli
soli di cui gli occhi, gli orecchi e gli altri
sentimenti ricevono la sensazione.
(G. Leopardi, *Zibaldone*, 4418)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show, through some essential Neoplatonic texts, how Aesthetics can also touch the educational field in the Late Antique context and how language, exegesis and philosophy are closely related. The philosophy of art and Plato's and Aristotle's aesthetic sense are based on the concept of *mimesis*, concept which the Neoplatonists gather in order to explain the necessity of a scholastic *curriculum* made of mimetical speeches, i.e. true language images of the intelligible. These speeches, read and studied according to an exact order, can help to confer the right importance to sensible beauty, only an instrument to reach intelligible beauty. Each speech is one of the way in which the Good reveals itself in the sensible world and appears as the most beautiful expression of art able to create an aesthetic and cognitive delight.

Keywords: mimesis, speeches, exegesis, language, sensible, intelligible, beauty.

1. Introduzione: μίμησις, arte e filosofia

Tί ἐστι τὸ καλόν è la domanda su cui verte *l'Ippia Maggiore*, dialogo – come chiarisce il secondo titolo testimoniato da Diogene Laerzio (III 60, 11) – sul bello, ma anche fondamentale per l'elaborazione della teoria platonica delle Idee.[1] Socrate, infatti, interroga Ippia non su che cosa sia bello, ma sul Bello in sé (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν), sulla possibili-

[1] Plat. *Hipp. Maj.* 286d 1. Cfr. Casertano, *Paradigmi della verità in Platone* 18-19.

tà di cogliere l'unità della natura del bello.[2] *L'Ippia*, concludendosi in maniera aporetica e senza definire che cosa sia il Bello, sottolinea il limite delle spiegazioni empiriche su τὸ καλόν. Al fine di acquisire un punto di vista su di esso è pertanto necessario superare quella superficie fenomenica delle cose che si rivela importante soltanto per riconoscere la traccia anamnestica del Bello in sé[3]. Così, partendo dalle espressioni sensibili, la via platonica verso il Bello prosegue più chiaramente nel *Simposio*, che, invece, il sottotitolo laerziano (III 58, 21) indica come dialogo sul bene:

> Questo è dunque il procedere o il farsi guidare da un altro correttamente alle cose d'amore, cioè iniziando dalle cose belle [di questo mondo] risalire sempre in vista di quella bellezza (ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ), come servendosi di gradini (ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον), da uno a due e da due a tutti i corpi belli, e dai corpi belli alle istituzioni belle, e dalle istituzioni belle alle belle scienze, e dalle scienze belle pervenire a quella scienza che è scienza di nient'altro se non di quella stessa bellezza, per riconoscere infine ciò che è Bello in sé (Plat. *Symp.* 211b 7-d 1).

Mentre Platone – come abbiamo letto – sostituisce alla nozione di bello l'entità assoluta, sottolineando il ruolo dell'eros che conduce l'uomo al livello divino, Aristotele circoscrive il bello alla dimensione dell'arte. Di un'opera d'arte è importante – e questo è già nel *Fedro* (246c) – la composizione armoniosa, perché, aggiunge lo Stagirita nella *Poetica*,

> Ciò che è bello, sia animale sia ogni cosa composta di alcune parti, non soltanto deve averle ordinate, ma anche essere di grandezza non casuale; ciò che è bello lo è infatti in grandezza e in disposizione (ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει) (Arist. *Poet.* 1450b 35-37).

Platone e Aristotele rappresentano i vertici dell'estetica classica, vertici con i quali i filosofi successivi devono confrontarsi.[4] Partendo da tale considerazione, si cercherà di riflettere su alcuni aspetti dell'estetica neoplatonica, e in particolare su come l'esegesi neoplatonica dei classici mostra che il bello non è limitato all'arte, ma che l'estetica, strettamente legata alla metafisica, può toccare la sfera dell'educazione scolastica. La filosofia dell'arte e il senso estetico di Platone e Aristotele sono incentrati sull'idea di μίμησις,[5] idea che esegeti neoplatonici, come Proclo e l'alessandrino anoni-

[2] Cfr. Lombardo 46-48 e Leszl 113-197.

[3] Le cose belle, ritrovabili a tutti i livelli nell'esperienza umana e, quindi, anche nell'intuizione sensibile, sono difficili; cfr. il detto in Plat. *Hipp. Maj.* 304c. Vd. anche Plat. *Phaed.* 72e-78b, 100b.

[4] Cfr. Benediktson 162-170 e Tatarkiewicz 5.

[5] Scrive Sheppard, *Aesthetics. An introduction to the philosophy of art* 8: "The Greek term used by Plato, *mimesis*, is something translated as 'representation' rather than 'imitation'... 'representation' is more

mo autore dei *Prolegomena* a Platone, riprendono e riformulano per spiegare la necessità di un *curriculum* costituito da dialoghi mimetici e, nella loro bellezza, rappresentativi dell'intelligibile. Le parole filosofiche – vere immagini dell'intelligibile, perché ispirate dal dio[6] – consentono un processo graduale di risalita che porta dal visibile all'invisibile, dal sensibile all'intelligibile, dall'immagine al modello e dal molteplice all'Unità.

È noto che, in epoca classica, le opere d'arte e le osservazioni dei filosofi sono fonti di idee estetiche e che l'influenza reciproca tra arte e filosofia permette di ricorrere all'arte per chiarire certi aspetti dell'estetica filosofica e alla filosofia per spiegare alcune espressioni artistiche. Filosofia e arte condividono nella tarda antichità – come ha suggerito André Grabar[7] – i risultati estetici sottesi a quella teoria della visione e della conoscenza artistica espressa negli scritti plotiniani e basata sul concetto per cui la μίμησις è capace di cogliere "come uno specchio" (Plot. *Enn*. IV 3 [27], 11.7) il riflesso di una forma. Tuttavia le realtà inferiori non si limitano a riflettere le realtà superiori, ma cercano di congiungersi e assimilarsi a esse. Osservare un'opera d'arte significa, quindi, interpretare il valore metafisico delle immagini, trascendere la forma sensibile che partecipa della oscura non-realtà materiale e carpire così la sua luce intellettuale: scrive Plotino che chi contempla la bellezza fisica non deve inseguirla, ma, dopo essersi reso conto che si tratta di un'immagine, deve dirigersi verso ciò di cui, appunto, essa è solo un riflesso.[8] Il fondatore del neoplatonismo esamina la bellezza di un'opera d'arte come manifestazione ed emanazione di bellezze superiori: le arti, creando secondo un principio interno, non producono semplicemente rappresentazioni mimetiche di quanto è visibile, ma risalgono ai princìpi da cui la natura muove.[9] Seguendo la teoria metafisica plotiniana, la bellezza prodotta dall'artista umano è più debole rispetto alla sua origine, ma nello stesso tempo, proprio perché la realtà si genera per emanazione dai gradi più alti, un'opera d'arte mimetica può essere osservata al di là della sua più immediata configurazione. Plotino attenua la presunta ostilità platonica verso l'arte e ciò conferma che la sua importanza "nella storia dell'estetica non deriva tanto dalle sue riflessioni esplicite sulla rappresentazione artistica, quanto dai modi in cui egli rese

likely to suggest the context of art". Su questo termine tecnico nel linguaggio di Platone e Aristotele cfr. Palumbo, *Μίμησις. Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di Platone e nella* Poetica *di Aristotele* 9-26, 488-543.

[6] Cfr. Plat. *Ion.* 533e 6-9; *Phaedr*. 245a 1-8. Per questo aspetto in Platone e Aristotele cfr. Palumbo, *Μίμησις. Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di Platone e nella* Poetica *di Aristotele* 63-67 e Palumbo, "*Mimesis* ed *enthousiasmos* in Platone. Appunti sul *Fedro*" 157-172. Sull'ipotesi neoplatonica di un'ispirazione divina che accomuna per contenuti poeti, teurgi e filosofi cfr. Porph. *Vita Plot*. 15.1-6 e Cardullo 207-217.

[7] Cfr. Grabar 15-34. Lo stesso concetto di *Spätantike* è stato elaborato in ambito storico-artistico, prima che letterario e storico-filosofico: Elsner 271-308.

[8] Cfr. Plot. *Enn.* I 6 [1], 8.6-8.

[9] Cfr. *ibid.* V 8 [31], 8. 8-23.

disponibile quel modello più generale di contemplazione metafisica che poi altri pensatori seppero riutilizzare per i loro propri fini teorici" (Halliwell 275).

2. Μίμησις e λόγοι: Proclo, Olimpiodoro e l'Anonimo dei *Prolegomena*

Alcuni secoli dopo, Proclo sviluppa aree della teoria estetica plotiniana trattate solo sommariamente. Per esempio, Plotino parla delle arti visuali, della pittura e della scultura senza assegnare un posto preciso alla letteratura, che con i neoplatonici tardi diventa una parte importante della filosofia.[10] Proclo, difatti, non separa la μίμησις artistica dai requisiti filosofici della verità e della produzione letteraria.[11] Per Platone "al di là del Bello – scrive Proclo – c'è il Bene e al di là dell'essenza delle Idee c'è Dio (*In Crat.* LX, p. 26, 17-18)": proprio il Bene e i continui riferimenti a esso rendono l'interessante testo degli anonimi *Prolegomena* a Platone – che sembra dipendere da un perduto scritto procliano[12] – non una semplice introduzione ai dialoghi, ma il ritratto del maestro e l'affresco filosofico di un cosmo dialogico che si dispiega di fronte agli studenti in tutta la sua bellezza. Dell'estetica 'visuale'[13] – che l'anonimo testo alessandrino propone – sono importanti e strettamente legati, e vanno perciò indagati, il fine e gli effetti. L'arte – in cui agiscono i dialoghi di Platone concepiti come immagini scritte delle discussioni orali e analogicamente come immagini sensibili dell'intelligibile[14] – ha l'effetto di produrre, nell'aspirante platonico, un piacere estetico e cognitivo,[15] perché il suo fine non è di spiegare, attraverso la bellezza, quel che l'allievo può cogliere da solo, ma di aiutarlo a vedere con lo sguardo intellettivo ciò che l'occhio fisico non può vedere.

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[10] Cfr. Plot. *Enn.* I 6 [1] e V 8 [31]. Cfr. anche Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' Commentary on the* Republic 10 e Sheppard, "*Vedere un mondo in un granello di sabbia*: teoria letteraria ed estetica in Proclo" 69-90.

[11] Cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* I 59.13: «Il filosofo, infine, da tutte le forme sensibili si prepara alla visione di quelle intelligibili, di cui le sensibili sono immagini».

[12] I *Prolegomena* mostrano la dipendenza del suo anonimo autore da Proclo: cfr. Motta, *Prolegomeni alla filosofia di Platone* 26-81. Gli studi critici ritengono che Proclo sia l'autore di un importante manuale introduttivo a Platone: Westerink LXXV e Mansfeld 28 pensano che Proclo abbia scritto anche una introduzione ad Aristotele; Hadot 31 crede invece che gli schemi che derivano da Proclo facciano parte di un unico lavoro sui due grandi filosofi.

[13] L'attenzione allo sguardo è una delle caratteristiche più rilevanti e discusse anche della ritrattistica tardo-antica. Onians 1-24 sostiene che gli scrittori tardo-antichi siano più capaci dei loro predecessori di vedere grazie al ruolo fondamentale giocato dall'educazione retorica. Cfr. anche Neri 66-68 e 150-151.

[14] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 13.17-25.

[15] Cfr. Arist. *Poet.* 1448b 5-9. Nella *Retorica* (I 1366a 33-36) lo Stagirita afferma che la bellezza è ciò che ha un valore in se stessa e nello stesso tempo dà piacere. L'estetica del discorso tiene conto di questi aspetti, della proporzione, della riproduzione del divino, ma anche dell'utilità e del modo in Platone usa i racconti mitici: vd. An. *Prol.* 7.19-42.

L'elaborazione di una didattica filosofica di questo tipo è il risultato di una riflessione storica, artistica e letteraria molto lunga e complessa, ma soprattutto di un'intensa attività esegetica sull'intero *corpus* platonico. Un passo del *Fedone*, quello nel quale Socrate riflette sulla ricerca della vera causa delle cose, è interessante per coglierne alcuni aspetti:

> Mi sembrò [...] che dovessi stare attento a non subire ciò che subiscono quelli che contemplano e osservano l'eclissi di sole: alcuni, infatti, rovinano gli occhi, qualora non ne osservino l'immagine nell'acqua o in qualcosa del genere. Pensai anch'io nello stesso modo e temetti di diventare completamente cieco nell'anima (τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην), guardando le cose con gli occhi e tentando di coglierle con ciascuno dei sensi. Mi parve di dovermi rifugiare nei discorsi (εἰς τοὺς λόγους) e di dover indagare in essi la verità degli enti (Plat. *Phaed*. 99d 4-e 7).

Fondamentale è – nella pagina platonica – la riflessione sui λόγοι filosofici, immagini dell'invisibile, μιμήματα delle Idee, così vicini agli enti eidetici che Socrate considera possibile osservare in essi la vera realtà di quelli.[16] A livello artistico e con la μίμησις – come afferma Evanghelos Moutsopoulos (Moutsopoulos 41) – alcune realtà intelligibili possono essere espresse nel fenomenico e proprio nel testo dei *Prolegomena* i dialoghi appaiono un microcosmo, μίμησις dell'universo macrocosmo: qui l'arte letteraria segue le leggi che governano il mondo, scopre il piano divino del cosmo e foggia oggetti in accordo con esso, perché il grado più alto del bello si trova nell'universo. Il Platone dei *Prolegomena*, agendo come il demiurgo del *Timeo*, rappresenta il divino in un cosmo di opere d'arte, di dialoghi, cioè di entità visibili perché scritte e di conseguenza soggette alla nostra percezione, ma in grado di mostrare ad alcuni l'invisibile.[17] La relazione proposta da Platone tra il demiurgo e l'artigiano è alla base delle considerazioni neoplatoniche sulla bellezza dei dialoghi. Il mondo del *Timeo* è un'opera d'arte, con una struttura razionale essenziale, che si distingue da qualunque prodotto accidentale. Dunque, dire che il mondo è un'opera d'arte significa dire che ha una struttura intelligibile, e mostrare l'immagine di tale opera vuol dire rendere visibile l'intelligibile.[18]

Già il neoplatonico Olimpiodoro, prima dell'Anonimo, accenna all'analogia cosmo-letteraria. Egli afferma che lo scritto elaborato in maniera migliore è simile al miglior essere vivente e quest'ultimo è il κόσμος,[19] termine con il quale letteralmente in

[16] "I *logoi* – scrive Centrone 23 n. 145 – sono un riflesso, ma comunque un riflesso meno lontano dal vero di quanto non lo siano le cose (ἔργα) che il senso comune ritiene più reali". Su questo passo cfr. Casertano, *Paradigmi della verità in Platone* 57.

[17] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 15.7-9 e 13.18-25. Fondamentale su questo aspetto è Coulter 120-126.

[18] Cfr. Perl 81-92.

[19] Cfr. Olymp. *In Alc.* 56.14-18 e Motta, "The Visible Cosmos of Dialogues. Some Historical and Philosophical Remarks about Plato in the Late Antique Schools".

greco vengono indicati "l'ordine", "la proporzione". L'Anonimo paragona il dialogo non al migliore, bensì al più bell'essere vivente (τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν ζῴων).[20] Poiché il più bel discorso è analogo al più bell'essere vivente e il dialogo è analogo al cosmo, allora il dialogo è il più bel discorso. I due superlativi usati – ἄριστος da Olimpiodoro e κάλλιστος dall'Anonimo –, nel rimarcare la superiore bellezza dell'essere vivente, contribuiscono entrambi a esplicitare alcune caratteristiche estetiche e, soprattutto, metafisiche del "vivente – come lo definisce, tra gli altri, Proclo – perfetto".[21]

La bellezza dei λόγοι è determinata dallo sguardo dell'artefice dialogico che, poiché compone diversi, unici e unitari artefatti dialogici mentre contempla l'armonia del cosmo intelligibile, dona ordine e proporzione alla propria creazione sensibile. L'artefatto letterario non può che risultare bello e ben ordinato, visto che il suo demiurgo, realizzando non un'immagine qualsiasi, ma la più bella che può ottenere dal mondo intelligibile, ha operato prendendo a modello ciò che vi è di più perfetto e di più bello.[22] Anche lo σκοπός, il criterio esegetico formulato nel secolo IV d.C. da Giamblico per riconoscere il proposito unico e unificatore di ogni scritto, è presentato dall'Anonimo attraverso l'analogia cosmica. Esso corrisponde, nella sua teoria letteraria, a ciò che l'Uno-Bene è a livello metafisico:[23] infatti, estendendo la teoria neoplatonica delle cause[24] all'esegesi e seguendo la corrispondenza fra elementi costitutivi di un'opera d'arte letteraria e del mondo, lo σκοπός appare la causa finale cui ogni sezione e aspetto del testo mira e da cui trae significato, come ogni cosa trae essere e valore dall'Uno-Bene.

Riprendendo alcuni punti salienti della speculazione di Plotino, per il quale ciò che è più bello nel sensibile è la rivelazione di ciò che è migliore tra gli intelligibili,[25] l'*Introduzione* neoplatonica a Platone insegna a cogliere l'architettura divina dei dialoghi, ma soprattutto il loro essere immagini in grado di rimandare a qualcos'altro. Del resto, attraverso quella vista dell'anima – di cui si è parlato nel passo del *Fedone* sopra riportato – che vede l'invisibile, che distingue tra apparenza e realtà, e quindi anche tra bellezza sensibile e bellezza intelligibile,[26] lo scritto, o meglio l'intero cosmo dialogico

[20] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 15.18-20.

[21] L'estetica neoplatonica, sin da Plotino, si fonda sulla vitalità dell'opera d'arte: Plot. *Enn.* VI 7 [38], 22. 25-35. Su questo aspetto Pigeaud 131-148. L'espressione "vivente perfetto" è, p.e., in Procl. *Theol. Plat.* V 14, 45 23.

[22] Cfr. Procl. *In Tim.* I 236.13-28. Su questo aspetto vd. O'Meara, *Pythagoras revived. Mathematics and philosophy in late Antiquity* 182 e Steel, "Why should we prefer Plato's *Timaeus* to Aristotle's *Physics*?" 175-187. Cfr. anche Procl. *In Parm.* I 682.9-13 e *In Alc.* I 22.10-11. Plasmare i λόγοι come fa il demiurgo è ciò che rende il filosofo diverso dagli altri artefici di discorsi: cfr. Lavecchia 12-16.

[23] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 21.23-36; *In Remp.* I 11.9-12; 7.1-14.

[24] Cfr. Procl. *In Tim.* I 357.13-15.

[25] Cfr. Plot. *Enn.* IV 8 [6], 6.23-28.

[26] Cfr. Plat. *Phaedr.* 250e 1-251a 5 in cui si legge: "Chi dunque non è iniziato da poco o si è corrotto, non si porta con acutezza da qui a lì, verso la bellezza in sé, quando ne contempla l'omonima di qui. [...] Ma

opportunamente introdotto e studiato, può mostrare una traccia dell'Uno che è – come si legge nella *Epistola II* (312e 1-2) – causa di tutte le cose belle. Ciò emerge dalla delineazione di una precisa τάξις ("un ordine") di lettura che va dagli scritti più facili a quelli più difficili e in cui la modalità di avvicinamento alle realtà superiori avviene anche – come si cercherà di argomentare – attraverso un'educazione alla bellezza e alla visione di essa.[27]

3. Μίμησις, vista e cecità: Proclo, Ermia e il ruolo dell'etimologia

Al fine di comprendere meglio questo aspetto dei *Prolegomena* è utile esaminare il passaggio degli *Scholia in Phaedrum* (*In Phaedr*. 75.1-79.3),[28] in cui l'alessandrino Ermia commenta il paragone platonico tra Socrate e i poeti Omero e Stesicoro[29] discutendo di cecità e vista, di τὸ αἰσθητὸν κάλλος e τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος. La cecità può essere interpretata come una malattia divina provocata dall'eccessiva attenzione rivolta alla bellezza sensibile.[30] In una prima interpretazione la cecità di Omero è conseguenza di una sorta di peccato di empietà commesso quando ha cantato, nei suoi *Poemi*[31], la storia di Elena come origine dei mali della guerra di Ilio. Tuttavia, con la seconda esegesi proposta, è la vista a costituire un limite, a impedire la visione del Bello:[32] Tamiri, cantore e musico trace, viene accecato dalle Muse che vogliono liberarlo dagli ostacoli e dalle illusioni prodotti dalla vista sensibile e tenerlo lontano dall'esaltare la bellezza materiale. Riletta in questa prospettiva – spiega Ermia – la cecità è un dono divino di cui sarebbe esempio massimo Omero e non Socrate.[33]

chi è appena iniziato, chi prima ha avuto molte visioni, ogni volta che vede un volto di aspetto divino o una qualche figura corporea, che rappresenta bene la bellezza, prima prova un brivido e qualcuno degli sgomenti di un tempo lo assale, poi fissandolo lo venera come un dio".

[27] Il testo degli anonimi *Prolegomena* ci restituisce l'ordine giamblicheo di lettura dei dialoghi: cfr. Motta, "La tarda scuola neoplatonica di Alessandria: aspetti dell'*Introduzione* alla filosofia di Platone" 35-46 e la bibliografia ivi citata.

[28] L'importanza 'estetica' di questo commentario – come si comprende dal suo σκοπός individuato nel bello di ogni genere – è sottolineata da Moreschini, "Motivi esegetici e filosofici negli *Scholia in Phaedrum* di Ermia Alessandrino" 99-117, in part. 110-115.

[29] Cfr. Plat. *Phaedr*. 242e-243c; D'Alfonso 167-175.

[30] Sulla cecità come un vedere al di là delle apparenze cfr. Peixoto 159-179.

[31] Cfr. Hom. *Il.* II 176-178; *Il.* III 156-160; *Il.* VI 344-358; *Od.* XI 436-439; *Od.* XIV 68-69. Sull'interpretazione pagana e cristiana del *topos* della cecità dei poeti classici cfr. Agosti 33-50.

[32] Nella *Repubblica* (Plat. *Resp*. V 476b) gli amanti della vera bellezza sono contrapposti a coloro che desiderano *semplicemente* vedere e udire.

[33] Cfr. Hom. *Il.* II 594-600. Omero racconta di un accecamento causato dall'ira delle Muse che Tamiri si vantava di superare nel canto. Diversa rispetto a quella di Ermia è l'interpretazione di Proclo per il quale Tamiri compone il più basso tipo di poesia, ossia il tipo di poesia fantastica: Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' Commentary on the* Republic 92-95.

Per giustificare questa nuova lettura, riabilitante nei confronti del sommo poeta greco che, appunto perché cieco (ma di una cecità fisica che non consente distrazioni sensibili), è in continua contemplazione noetica, Ermia dà una originale etimologia del nome «Elena». Egli connette la parola ἑλενόη con il termine νοῦς e sottolinea che il nome della moglie di Menelao rimanda alla bellezza intelligibile: l'Elena iliadica, rimandando a qualcosa d'altro, è così un εἴδωλον in senso metafisico e non letterale.[34] Come per Proclo, autore di un *Commento al Cratilo*, pure per Ermia – allievo anch'egli di Siriano dal cui corso ateniese ha probabilmente trascritto le note sul *Fedro*[35] – l'analisi etimologica è in grado di rivelare l'essenza della cosa nominata purché si superi il livello sensibile della materia fonica.[36] Ad Alessandria Ammonio,[37] figlio di Ermia, e Olimpiodoro[38] contribuiscono a mostrare, dopo Ermia e con ulteriori esempi, che l'indagine etimologica fa parte dell'esegesi filosofica del mito: questi ultimi aggiungono peculiari riflessioni sul rapporto tra linguaggio, poesia e filosofia.[39] L'autore degli *Scholia in Phaedrum*, da parte sua, trova il modo di opporsi alla più comune voce dei poeti su Elena, alla fama di un nome, dice Gorgia, nel famoso *Encomio di Elena*, divenuto memoria di disgrazia.[40]

In ambito poetico, le etimologie, usate solitamente – come sottolinea Mario Vitali – in momenti decisivi della rappresentazione tragica, sembrano avere una funzione rivelativa/risolutiva.[41] Nell'*Agamennone* di Eschilo il nome di Elena è promessa e rivelazione di sventura; infatti il coro chiede:

> Chi mai la chiamò / con un nome così profondamente vero? / Forse qualcuno a noi invisibile, / qualcuno che sapeva / prevedere il destino, / cogliendo con la parola

[34] Il termine greco si traduce letteralmente con "fantasma": infatti, in taluni casi, il rapporto che si stabilisce tra l'εἴδωλον e il modello porta a una convergenza totale, quindi, alla creazione di un vero e proprio doppio. Con questa accezione esso viene usato da Omero, Stesicoro ed Euripide. Su questo tema cfr. Vernant, "Figurazione dell'invisibile e categoria psicologica del 'doppio': il kolossos"; Bettini 25-38; Brivio 144-150.

[35] Una ricapitolazione dello *status quaestionis* è in Moreschini, "Alla scuola di Siriano: Ermia nella storia del Neoplatonismo" 515-578. Sul debito contratto da Ermia nei confronti di Siriano cfr. Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' Commentary on the* Republic 39-103.

[36] Nel *Cratilo* (423a-424e) per definire la funzione del nome non basta parlare di rappresentazione fonica.

[37] Cfr. Amm. *In De Int*. 16a 21-29. Su questo passo ammoniano vd. Sedley, "Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and Ancient Semantics" 87-108; Sheppard, "Proclus' philosophical method of exegesis" 147 ss.; Abbate, *Dall'etimologia alla teologia: Proclo interprete del* Cratilo 30-39.

[38] Cfr. Gritti 155-204.

[39] Per quanto riguarda il mito di Elena, la lettura ermiana, probabilmente debitrice di quella sirianea, è diversa da quella procliana (*In Remp*. I 175.16-176.5): per il Diadoco ateniese Elena è simbolo della bellezza sensibile. Cfr. Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' Commentary on the* Republic 66-67; Cardullo 143-144; Manolea 149-156.

[40] Cfr. Gorg. DK82B11 = *Hel. Enc*. 2 e Casertano, "Verità, errore, inganno in Gorgia" 95-108.

[41] Per quest'aspetto cfr. Vitali XXXII-XXXVI.

> nel segno / [...] Elena, / rovina di navi (ἑλένας), rovina di guerrieri (ἕλανδρος), / rovina di città (ἑλέπτολις) (Aesch. *Ag.* 681-690).

Tuttavia, secondo una tradizione che risalirebbe, *in primis*, a Esiodo,[42] Elena non sarebbe mai giunta sul suolo troiano. A Paride sarebbe stato dato – in luogo dell'ambito corpo – un εἴδωλον, un simulacro fatto d'aria: "Non è vero quel racconto / né tu fuggisti sulle navi dai bei banchi / né giungesti sulla rocca di Troia".[43] Il poeta Stesicoro, proprio attraverso questi versi della *Palinodia*, composta per fare ammenda della colpa di aver cantato la storia di un'Elena adultera, sarebbe tornato a vedere. Ma Ermia, che riprende non solo la storia di Elena bensì quella dell'intera guerra di Troia, va oltre ogni tipo di interpretazione poetica per proporre una riflessione filosofica che si appoggia sulla funzione del nome-ἄγαλμα.[44]

Quando il commentatore alessandrino costruisce etimologie e interpreta passaggi omerici e mitologici, spiega, invero, alcuni nuclei concettuali fondamentali della filosofia platonica:[45] compiendo un'esegesi 'metafisica' del mito omerico, non può non prescindere dalla lettura del *Cratilo* in cui le parole sono μιμήματα, immagini che rappresentano le essenze, che danno visività all'invisibile.[46] Scrive Proclo, seguendo Platone (*Crat.* 388b 13-c 1), che il nome è uno strumento didascalico e rivelativo dell'essenza delle cose (*In Crat.* XLVIII, p. 16, 12-13) ed Elena, infatti, è – nella lettura di Ermia – ἡ ἐφελκομένη εἰς αὐτὴν τὸν νοῦν ("colei che attira a sé l'intelletto"), cioè simbolo della bellezza intelligibile, strumento sensibile in grado di condurre all'intelligibile. Nel *Commento alla Repubblica* la spiegazione procliana è ancora più chiara. Il Diadoco ateniese, a proposito di Omero ed Esiodo, maestri di Platone, dice che

> Osservarono che la natura stessa, quando produce immagini di forme immateriali e noetiche e quando intesse questo mondo con rappresentazioni mimetiche (τοῖς μιμήμασιν) di quelle cose, rappresenta la realtà indivisa (ἀμέριστα) in maniera divisa (μεριστῶς), usa strumenti temporali per dare immagine dell'eterno, usa strumenti sensibili per dare immagine all'intelligibile. [...] In tal modo [...] essi formano anche immagini degli dèi attraverso parole che sono opposte ai loro oggetti e da essi molto

[42] Cfr. Hes. *fr.* 358 Merkelbach-West.

[43] Cfr. Stes. *fr.* 192 Davies. La *Palinodia* è la ritrattazione in cui Stesicoro afferma che un εἴδωλον di Elena seguì Paride a Ilio. Questa versione del mito è ripresa nell'*Elena* di Euripide. Secondo Christina Manolea la tragedia greca ha influenzato l'interpretazione allegorica di Ermia/Siriano. Per ulteriori indicazioni sulle fonti ermiane cfr. Manolea 147-156.

[44] Cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* I 166.12-24 e Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie im Neoplatonismus* 1-35.

[45] Cfr. Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' Commentary on the* Republic 47-48, 92-95.

[46] Su questo dialogo si vedano, p.e., Sedley, *Plato's* Cratylus; Aronadio 329-362; Palumbo, "La spola e l'*ousia*" 65-94; Palumbo, "Il *nomos* e la trasmissione dei nomi nel *Cratilo* di Platone (a proposito di *Crat.* 388D12)" 397-412.

lontane; nel fare questo, producono rappresentazioni mimetiche (ἀπομιμοῦνται) del potere trascendente dei loro modelli (Procl. *In Remp.* I 77.13-24).

Alla luce degli *Scholia* e dei commenti procliani è chiaro che compito dei filosofi è quello di curare prima di essere privati della vista (τυφλωθῆναι), di insegnare – sulla scia di Omero di cui Platone è seguace[47] – a guardare al νοῦς con gli occhi dell'anima, di dimostrare che solo questi ultimi vedono la verità che è presente nella bellezza sensibile. Tale riflessione tardo-neoplatonica è quindi in linea con il pensiero plotiniano. L'autore delle *Enneadi* si chiede, infatti, prima di indicare ai suoi ascoltatori il mondo intelligibile, l'orizzonte delle idee eterne e immutabili, come superiore sorgente di tutto ciò che è bello: "E allora da dove rifulse la bellezza di Elena che fu oggetto di tante contese? (V 8 [31], 2. 9-10)". L'interpretazione del nome della figlia di Leda è un esempio interessante dei risultati cui la filosofia neoplatonica, con la sua riflessione sul linguaggio, giunge: Elena diventa, con una torsione prospettica che si appoggia sull'etimologia del suo nome, emblema della forma assoluta, simbolo evocativo di un ideale classico di perfezione estetica, tensione erotica, orizzonte di una mancanza che alimenta il desiderio di ἐπιστροφή.

Non tutte le parole – come si apprende dal *Cratilo* – hanno diritto all'etimologia, ma solo quelle che rivelano il mondo, parole-ἀγάλματα il cui complesso costituisce, come l'insieme dei dialoghi, la strutturazione del mondo in significati e persino il significato stesso del mondo. Ciò è confermato dal confronto col *Simposio* e dall'interpretazione neoplatonica di questo scritto,[48] in cui la conoscenza filosofica avviene attraverso ἀγάλματα, i λόγοι silenici di Socrate"[49] ἄγαλμα è il termine chiave dell'interpretazione procliana e neoplatonica dei dialoghi, perché è un tipo di εἰκών – scrive Stefania Bonfiglioli – che "sta lì a indicarci che la filosofia apre scrigni, anzitutto perché tali scrigni sono stati fra i primi modelli della sua ricerca di senso, quella che non può dissociarsi (distinguersi), come Platone ben sapeva, dal senso del *logos* (Bonfiglioli 225)".

Dal *Timeo* si ricava che il mondo sensibile viene plasmato dal demiurgo ad immagine di quello intelligibile: esso è, proprio in questo contesto, detto ἄγαλμα degli dèi eterni.[50] Non solo il nome è ἄγαλμα, ma anche i discorsi di Socrate sono immagini dell'intelligibile, sono proprio – così suggeriscono il *Simposio* e il *Timeo* riletti nelle scuole neoplatoniche – ἀγάλματα θεῶν. Il linguaggio, descritto nel *Cratilo*, è un particolare

[47] Cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* I 73.16-30; 172.6-9; 158.16-159.6.

[48] Non possediamo alcun commento neoplatonico al *Simposio*, ma la sua importanza, per la speculazione dei filosofi tardo-antichi, è deducibile da numerosi rimandi in altri testi di commento. Cfr. An. *Prol.* 26. 41-43; Herm. *In Phaedr.* 12.15-25.

[49] Cfr. Plat. *Symp.* 221d 7-222a 6 e Motta, "Socrate, i discorsi e gli *agalmata theon*: l'interno del *Simposio* di Platone".

[50] Cfr. Plat. *Tim.* 37c 6-7.

tipo di rappresentazione mimetica, più precisamente una μίμησις immaginativa,[51] ma anche i discorsi, i dialoghi, costituiti – si legge nei *Prolegomena* – da una veste materiale e formale[52] lo sono: questi, se studiati anche attraverso la loro "semanticità", si rivelano non solo immagine del cosmo, ma la più bella immagine del cosmo. Come le lettere e le sillabe sono per il Platone del *Cratilo* veicolo di visualizzazione,[53] così i personaggi e i costituenti dei dialoghi contribuiscono – aspetto che emerge dagli anonimi *Prolegomena* a Platone – a disegnare e rimandare alla forma invisibile, a evocare la bellezza intelligibile: essi non sono che uno strumento di rievocazione, una via che *apre* alla verità.

4. Osservazioni conclusive

Il cammino curricolare, il quale si sofferma prima sulla struttura del singolo dialogo e poi sull'analisi del disegno complessivo dei dialoghi, consente quindi di ritrovare e di unificare l'identica bellezza dei molti discorsi belli, consente cioè di ricondurre la molteplicità all'Unità. Tale percorso mostra un microcosmo letterario bello, perché nulla è disposto a caso, ma tutto ha – quasi come si legge nel passo aristotelico citato in apertura – una grandezza non casuale, più propriamente un canone. Il termine κανών ("misura") è usato nelle arti plastiche e trova – come altre parole di evidente influenza pitagorica (p.e. armonia, simmetria, proporzione) – un produttivo impiego nelle scuole e nella speculazione dei filosofi della tarda antichità. Per i neoplatonici esiste una misura dei dialoghi, ossia un numero e un ordine perfetti: è la misura (intesa come accordo tra le parti e proprietà numerica) che contribuisce a determinare – come in tutta l'opera di Platone[54] – la bellezza delle cose, in quanto conferisce loro unità. La perfezione si realizza nel procedimento di selezione attuato proprio da Giamblico, autore della pitagorizzazione del sapere filosofico, e testimoniato nei *Prolegomena*. Qui l'intero *corpus platonicum* viene ridotto a un cosmo di dodici dialoghi e poi ancora da dodici a due.[55]

Il verbo utilizzato è συναιρέω, il quale indica propriamente la riduzione che conduce all'unità. L'ordine degli scritti sembra inoltre mostrare la circolarità del principio di causalità:[56] dal punto di vista 'discendente', la gerarchia dei princìpi procede dal ver-

[51] Cfr. Palumbo, *Μίμησις. Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di Platone e nella* Poetica *di Aristotele* 147-153, 334-364.

[52] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 16.8-17.18. La presa di coscienza della complessità strutturale e contenutistica dei dialoghi consente l'inizio dell'ascesa: cfr. Herm. *In Phaedr.* 11.33. Sul *Fedro* neoplatonico e sul suo valore teologico cfr. Motta, "Eros ἀναγωγός e filosofia nell'esegesi tardo neoplatonica" 71-82.

[53] Cfr. Plat. *Crat.* 424d-425d e Palumbo, "Scenografie verbali di V secolo. Appunti sulla natura visiva del linguaggio tragico".

[54] Cfr. p.e. Plat. *Pol.* 284e; *Tim.* 87c; *Phil.* 64e-65a; *Prot.* 356d-357b.

[55] Cfr. An. *Prol.* 26.13-21.

[56] Cfr. Procl. *El. Theol.* 33.

tice verso un progressivo aumento della molteplicità, ma dal punto di vista 'ascendente' della tensione assimilativa – quella mostrata dal *curriculum* –, l'inferiore si volge al superiore, il causato verso la causa, l'immagine verso il modello, il molteplice verso l'Unità. La gerarchia del sistema metafisico è chiaramente articolata in una molteplicità organizzata in diversi livelli dell'essere in cui ogni piano o ente inferiore contiene in sé e rappresenta in modo dispiegato (ἀνειλιγμένως) ciò che nel superiore sussiste in modo concentrato (συνῃρημένως).[57] Studiare Platone partendo dall'*Alcibiade I*, progredire fino al *Filebo*, ossia attraverso dialoghi che rappresentano in modo dispiegato la realtà divina, e poi passare al *Timeo* e al *Parmenide*, scritti che la rappresentano in maniera concentrata e riunita,[58] consente l'ἐπιστροφή, il ricongiungimento dell'intera realtà, in tutte le sue specifiche articolazioni, con l'Uno, che è il fondamento della bellezza, la causa di essa.

Per assimilarsi a Dio[59] – fine della filosofia – è, dunque, necessario produrre ordine e armonia nell'anima, poiché solo un'anima bella può contemplare (e rivolgere i suoi occhi al) la Bellezza.[60] A tal fine, il percorso curricolare dell'aspirante filosofo si configura come un'educazione alla bellezza attraverso un preciso numero e ordine di dialoghi.[61] Questi ultimi, immagini di bellezza, stimolano la vista intellettuale e preparano alla divina visione, perché il bello intelligibile rimanda necessariamente all'Uno-Bene, vale a dire al Principio Primo che governa il Tutto, fonte e causa di tutte le cose belle, causa finale di ogni scritto e dell'intero κόσμος.[62] Sembra pertanto evidente che, nelle scuole

[57] Συνῃρημένως è l'avverbio derivato dal participio perfetto medio di συναιρέω, verbo che si trova già in Plat. *Phaedr*. 249c 1-2: "Bisogna infatti che l'uomo comprenda basandosi sulla cosiddetta 'idea', cioè procedendo dalla molteplicità delle sensazioni all'unità messa insieme (συναιρούμενον) con il ragionamento". Cfr. Procl. *In Tim*. I 341.4-9.

[58] Il *Timeo* raccoglie tutti gli scritti fisici e il *Parmenide* sintetizza tutti quelli teologici, l'uno si occupa della realtà sensibile, l'altro della realtà intelligibile. Cfr. An. *Prol*. 26.19-21 e Procl. *In Tim*. I 13.4-6.

[59] Sull'assimilazione a dio nel neoplatonismo cfr. O'Meara, *Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity* 31-49. Cfr. anche Plat. *Theaet*. 176b. Cfr. Amm. *In Porph*. 3.1-2.

[60] Cfr. Coulter 77-94. Scrive Plot. *Enn*. VI 9 [9], 1.1-17: "Tutti gli esseri sono esseri per l'Uno (...) E la salute c'è quando il corpo è coordinato in unità, e la bellezza c'è quando la natura dell'uomo tiene insieme le parti". Inoltre con un'interessante analogia Plotino (*Enn*. I 6 [1], 9.30-34) afferma che "nessun occhio ha mai visto il sole senza diventare simile al sole, e lo stesso vale per l'anima che non può vedere la bellezza se non dopo essersi fatta bella".

[61] Ogni singolo scritto platonico rivela quel legame col divino che consente di risvegliare le nozioni innate dell'anima con le quali è possibile conoscere ricordando. Nelle nostre anime particolari l'accesso alle ragioni innate è stato temporaneamente bloccato ed esse, cadute nell'ignoranza e nella potenzialità, devono essere stimolate dall'esterno, risvegliate dalla percezione sensoriale. Cfr. Steel, "Breathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate Knowlewdge of the Soul" 293-309.

[62] In questo senso il termine 'estetica' è, rispetto al neoplatonismo, in un certo qual modo, anacronistico, perché la riflessione sul Bello sfocia necessariamente in una 'meta-estetica', cioè nel superamento della stessa nozione di Bello. Sull'argomento cfr. Abbate, "Il fondamento del Bello: la meta-estetica neoplatonica" 47-70. Cfr. anche Plot. *Enn*. VI [7], 42.17 e VI [7], 33.20 e Procl. *Theol. Plat.* II 7, 47.2-3.

neoplatoniche, i contenuti e la struttura delle lezioni introduttive a Platone e ai suoi scritti non possono mettere da parte fondamentali temi della filosofia tardo-antica tra cui la metafisica, l'estetica e il linguaggio: obiettivo dei neoplatonici tardi è di restituire un'anima all'arte letteraria, di richiamare alla mente immagini e di insegnare al lettore a vedere non solo ciò che si presenta sotto gli occhi, non solo la veste fonica delle parole, non solo la struttura esterna dei dialoghi. Pertanto, il neoplatonismo non abolisce l'estetica, ma la assorbe all'interno del proprio sistema metafisico-teologico che rende l'arte veicolo di rappresentazione del divino e la bellezza strumento educativo. Leggere Platone è, quindi, nei *Prolegomena*, ammirare dei veri e divini capolavori, nei quali – come scrive Winckelmann riguardo le opere d'arte greche, le uniche, a suo giudizio, degne di imitazione – si trovano non solo "la più bella natura, ma anche più della natura" (Winckelmann 32).

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Is Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy Therapeutic and Does this Mean that it is Anti-Systematic?

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Abstract

The paper takes the word 'therapeutic' that is used by some interpreters of the later writings of Wittgenstein (like McDowell) to characterize its 'unsystematic' side, as a starting point for a discussion of how much 'theory' can be found in these writings despite Wittgenstein's statements that theory has to give way to description.

It takes sides with McDowell (against Michael Dummett) in that it agrees that an axiomatic-deductive type of theory is not feasible for natural languages. But from this it does not follow (as Dummett had feared) that we learn the sentences of our languages one by one. Instead, so the paper argues, we do find a systematic body of insights in the later writings of Wittgenstein that specify *kinds of linguistic procedures* that are not restricted to single cases. The crucial point is that the capacity to invent and understand metaphors is a central ingredient of our natural-language competence and that this ability cannot be captured by axiomatic systems. While Wittgenstein mainly discussed the *pitfalls* resulting from these kinds of linguistic moves, Eugene Gendlin is credited for highlighting the positive side of this competence, including its use in Psychotherapy proper.

Keywords: theory of meaning, Wittgenstein, Gendlin, creativity, therapy

1. Introduction: Therapy and Philosophy

This paper will explore whether Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language can be characterized as therapeutic in a sense that would imply and justify the claim that it (and its subject matter) lacks a systematic character.[1] It will oppose both parts of this claim: The change that Wittgenstein wants to provoke in his readers is different in kind from the change intended in therapeutic encounters. And the picture of language and of linguistic competence that Wittgenstein argues for is a systematic one, in the follow-

[1] This is a revised version of a paper read at the conference 'Philosophy of Psychotherapy' at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, in July 2011. – I would like to thank Timothy Doyle for correcting my English.

ing sense: For him (as for Gottlob Frege) our advanced linguistic abilities are made possible by our simpler ones; for example, we understand complex utterances by using our understanding of their parts and of the ways in which these parts are related to each other. In the context of a discussion of Frege's work this is known as the 'principle of compositionality'. What is new in Wittgenstein's approach is that he no longer likens the 'deriving' of the complex content from the simple ones to mathematical calculation, but instead draws on other linguistic abilities like our ability to comprehend metaphors. The last part of the paper will briefly introduce some pertinent thoughts of the as yet little known phenomenologist and therapist Eugene Gendlin, because they offer a more positive account of the linguistic competence Wittgenstein has in mind.[2]

In the realm of what used to be called 'psychotherapy', an outsider perceives a new tendency for avoiding this label. And indeed one can ask whether 'health' and 'sickness' are the proper words for the kinds of problems that are 'treated' (in *some* sense of this term) in the mental realm. When psychoanalysis was first developed by Sigmund Freud, dramatic cases directly involving the body seem to have been more common than they are today: a person, who was unable to stand up and walk, would do just that, after having gone through nothing but Freud's so called 'talking cure'. One might think that *because* it was the body that had not been functioning, the problem was perceived to be a medical one. But with many mental problems like fears, guilt-feelings, or shyness, this classification seems less natural. So there might be good reasons for the aforementioned tendency to avoid the term 'therapy' and to speak for example of 'supervision' or 'coaching' instead, or, in certain cases even of some kind of spiritual help being needed.

But if this is so even in the traditional domain of psychotherapy, it is all the more advisable for philosophers to avoid the impression that their work is concerned with health and sickness. Nevertheless we can ask: What could it be in philosophy that might have a 'family resemblance' to what happens in the medical realm?[3] In order to get closer to an answer here, it seems advisable to distinguish two questions. Both concern our understanding of what philosophers can and should do.

The first question is this: should philosophers be concerned with the 'practical' or 'existential' understanding that members of a given culture or sub-culture have of themselves? This domain of 'existential self-understanding' is different from that of psychotherapy. It is smaller insofar it leaves out obvious cases of sickness, but at the same time it is broader insofar it includes the traditional philosophical question what a 'good life' would consist in, whereas psychotherapy, as Freud has famously stated, may be successful in curing your ills, but only to leave you on the level of "common unhappiness" (Freud 305).

[2] The term 'little known' is true for the philosophical context only. In psychotherapy Gendlin is famous as the inventor of the method of 'Focusing'. For his philosophy cf. Levin.

[3] For a discussion for the positive effects of working with language cf. Purton.

The second question is the following: In case we give a *positive* answer to this *first* question, is it a part of what a philosopher should do, not only to *talk* and *write* about such ways of self-understanding, but also to practically shape the view someone has of himself and thereby shape this person's character? Would we want to call this a *philosophical*, or rather a *psychological* task? Applying this to the philosopher himself and speaking with Wittgenstein: Is it the case that "working in Philosophy ... is really more a working on oneself"? (Wittgenstein, "Culture and Value" 16e). And how would this kind of work relate to language? Does it imply what some interpreters of Wittgenstein's later work, most notably John McDowell, have called a 'therapeutic' understanding of what philosophers do?

We can imagine quite different responses to these questions. Richard Rorty, for example, certainly had a point when he remarked many years ago that practitioners of Analytical Philosophy would see themselves as specialists for intellectual puzzles. For those who take this as a definition of the *whole* field of philosophy, even the realm characterized in the first question above would have no place in it: trying to spell out the existential self-understanding of your time is no intellectual puzzle. But even a philosopher, who accepts the activity mentioned by the first question as legitimate in philosophy, might refuse to discuss his *own* life. The 'working on himself', that he might indeed be engaged in, for example when he tries to get rid of an addiction to a medication, is – he might say – of no concern for any outsider. It has nothing to do with philosophy as a discipline and when his colleagues and students hear about it they have no right to mention it to someone else.

What did Wittgenstein then mean by the phrase 'working on oneself', what kind of work did he think of? A number of authors have contributed highly interesting and convincing considerations about this question, most extensively perhaps Eugen Fischer ("Therapie"), who investigated, among other things, Wittgenstein's use of Freud's expression 'drive' and the relation of Wittgenstein's thinking to antique conceptions of philosophy as a 'form of life' (as put in focus by authors such as Pierre Hadot). Also one should mention here the work of Stefan Majetschak ("Psychoanalyse") about similarities and dissimilarities in the methods of Wittgenstein and Freud.

In the given context, a proposal of a minor modification must suffice. It seems to be preferable not to use the term 'drive' ('Trieb') in a philosophical context. Although Fischer ("Therapie") carefully explains his use of the expression 'cognitive drive', sticking to this expression still invites misunderstandings. According to the ordinary understanding, drives are *biological* forces; we are born with them, and we know that they will break their way through to their respective goals, even if this will be in a distorted form. The process of socialization is unable to eliminate them. This has the consequence that they will show up in many unexpected places where it is sometimes hard to identify them. The psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt to detect these hiding places (as far as they produce suffering), and bring them out into the open.

So to signal a clear distinction, it seems advisable to use the term 'inclination' instead of 'drive' (Wittgenstein uses both terms). We have the *inclination* to misunderstand the workings of our language, and this is a *cultural*, not a *biological* fact. It will later be shown that the roots of this inclination can be found in the workings of language structures and that this inclination has also positive effects. Its occurrence shows that in choosing our words we have a degree of freedom, which permits good and bad uses. In order to understand the kind of problems we sometimes get into when using language, according to Wittgenstein, it is important to see that its acquisition is not a step in our biological, but in our cultural development.

It is true that the inclination for misunderstanding is not the result of a decision; one follows the inclination without thinking. It is possible to express this by saying that one is *not consciously* acting in this way. But allowing this does not mean speaking of 'the unconscious', in Freud's sense. Therefore Fischer certainly is correct when he states that 'philosophical therapy' (if we want to call it so) is of a special (non-medical) kind. It does not touch on the very early settings of the agendas for our lives, the revision of which requires access to what governed life at the time when language had not yet been acquired.

Thus, it emerges that we have reasons to keep separate philosophy, on the one hand and the medical context of illness, on the other. But this does not mean to suggest that in our discussion of Wittgenstein we are allowed to lose sight of what was above called our practical or existential self-understanding and also the personal activity of 'working on oneself'. I think that, as philosophers, we should cling to both of these aspirations, and that it is up to the profession of psychotherapy to decide where it wants to situate itself in this context. A tendency of some of its members seems to be to stick to the medical realm and the realm of science. Here some people seem to have great expectations about the future of brain research. The other tendency is to stay close to philosophy.

When we now turn to some aspects of our linguistic competence as we find them discussed in the later work of Wittgenstein, the aim is to show that this competence is *systematic* in character. In trying to show this, the paper is opposing readings of Wittgenstein that claim that there are no systematic insights about language to be found in his later work and which are using the term 'therapeutic' to characterize their understanding of what Wittgenstein is doing and of what it means to work in his spirit. According to this reading, the philosopher can do nothing but 'treat' every upcoming problem separately from all others. Accordingly, expressions like 'philosophy as therapy' are used to express the opinion that systematic thinking should not be seen as a virtue in the philosophy of language. This is what the current paper opposes; it tries to show that this view is mistaken (even if restricted to a hermeneutical claim about Wittgenstein) and it recommends that philosophers should not see themselves as doing therapy in this sense. It advocates the view that on the contrary it is essential for an understanding of Wittgenstein's work to see that there are *ways* in which we 'make moves' in language games. And where we have *ways* of doing something there necessarily is more involved than just single cases.[4] The claim is that to understand these 'workings of language' it can be helpful if we try to engage in the "working on oneself" that Wittgenstein demands from the philosopher. This view will now be spelled out in five more specific claims, which will be argued for in the next sections.

1. Our inclination to make use of *misleading analogies* (analysed in detail by Eugen Fischer in his paper "Philosophical Pictures") is not a matter of individual mistakes, stemming from personal deficits. Instead, its basis is a systematic procedure in language itself. Its negative sides have been widely discussed in philosophy. But it should be acknowledged that it is at the same time the source of linguistic creativity, of our ability to linguistically open up new territory. This second point plays a major role in Eugene Gendlin's philosophy.

2. If one were to name a single main insight that distinguishes Wittgenstein's later from his earlier philosophy, a good choice would be what he has described as a reversal of the direction of projection in his treatment of the relation between the 'world' and language. Metaphorically speaking, it is not that the structure of the world sends its light-rays to language and thereby determines its structure, but it is the other way around. *We* are projecting given structures of language into ever new areas of experience, and somehow our hearers manage to understand us in many cases, although strictly speaking (i.e., from the perspective of how language had been used up to this point) these results of projection are devious.

3. Some philosophers (notably Gottlob Frege and Rudolf Carnap) thought it would be possible to avoid such devious projections by devising means to express the 'real logical structure' of the case at hand. Thus it seemed possible to improve language in such a way that clinging to 'logical grammar' would guarantee remaining in the realm of meaningful utterances. Wittgenstein has shown that this is an illusion. To understand the systematic character in the workings of *natural* language means to see that the idea of such a 'logically correct' language makes no sense.

4. But from this impossibility of an improvement of language that would guarantee the meaningfulness of our utterances 'once and for all', it does not follow that language has no important systematic aspects. The very principles and procedures that make possible complex speech and new insights also invite combinations of words that can turn out to be nonsensical.

5. It is true that the later work of Wittgenstein does not supply us with an *axiomatic-deductive* theory of meaning as Michael Dummett (What is a "Theory of Meaning" I, II) had projected it. On the contrary, Wittgenstein supplies good reasons for us to understand why such a project cannot be realized. Also, we do not find in Wittgenstein

[4] For a more detailed exposition and justification of these claims see Schneider, *Wittgenstein's Later Theory of Meaning.*

an empirical theory. What we do find, however, are detailed and interconnected observations about the workings of natural language. Wittgenstein was not opposed to systematic thinking; his work is more than a collection of aphorisms.

2. Can there be a Theory of Meaning (M. Dummett vs. J. McDowell)?

For substantiating these claims, a good starting point is the following quotation from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (quoted in the following text as 'PI' with the paragraph number of part one):

> The real discovery[5] is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question. – Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
> [There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.] (PI § 133)

Here, the ability to break off philosophizing when one wants appears as a result of having at one's disposal a plurality of *methods*, as they are exemplified in Wittgenstein's book. These are capable of bringing peace. Immediately before the quoted sentences, Wittgenstein has characterized his goal as complete clarity: "…the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear." (PI §133) This harmonizes with a sentence from *Culture and Value* (43e) in which Wittgenstein says: "Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for." What is at stake here is a modification of the attitude the philosophizing person has towards philosophical problems and (one could expand) to life in general; it is not that only one particular problem is solved or resolved.

What now does it mean when Wittgenstein speaks of methods, of paths one is not walking only once, paths he can exemplify and communicate to the readers of his book? How does this kind of generality relate to passages in which Wittgenstein distances himself from scientific procedures? One such passage is the following:

> There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All *explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – from the philosophical problems. These

[5] The word 'discovery' has to be taken here with a grain of salt: Something is 'discovered' that has, Wittgenstein thinks, been visible all the time, but has still not been seen.

> are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized – despite an urge[6] to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries,[7] but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. (PI §109)

Negatively Wittgenstein here says that his aim is not to explain something by forming a hypothesis about something happening behind the public phenomena of speaking. As an example of such an explanatory way he mentions the attempt to form a hypothesis about a hidden world of 'thought' consisting of some kind of 'meaning bodies'.[8] Such an approach might try to explain why certain sentences make sense and others do not by referring to the characteristics of these hidden entities: some of them fit together, others do not. This is not Wittgenstein's way. But what does he propose in a positive vein?

In the quoted passage he speaks of an *insight*, i.e., something that can be stated in a sentence, and he calls it an insight "into the workings of our language." And now he stresses an important opposition between an urge to misunderstand the 'workings of our language', on the one hand, and the insight into the ways in which language really works, on the other. If one has seen how language really works, it is exactly this insight that makes it possible to escape the bewitchment of one's understanding. So an adequate understanding should free us from an acute case of bewitchment *and* should help to stay clear (or get out) of these traps in future cases, even if it cannot guarantee for it.

This opposition between a correct and an incorrect understanding of language's workings Wittgenstein also expresses in his well-known picture that language would sometimes work (as it should), but would at other times 'go on holiday', i.e., it would not work. In the second case, an expression would be like an idle wheel, unconnected to the other wheels of the mechanism of which it only *seems* to be a working part. When we accept what this picture is meant to express, this includes that we are able to distinguish the two cases. And this means that when Wittgenstein in other contexts states that philosophy would leave everything as it is, the scope of *this* remark has to be restricted to the cases in which language *works*. When for example in PI §124 we find him saying, "Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language...", then what here is called 'the actual use' can only be a case in which language works. The same is true when two paragraphs later he says:

[6] The German word here is 'Trieb'.

[7] See above, fn. 5.

[8] Wittgenstein describes the position he criticizes in terms of the following picture: "words fit together in the sentence, i.e. senseless sequences of words may be written down; but the meaning of each word is an invisible *body*, and these meaning-bodies do *not* fit together". ("Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology", 10)

> Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us.
> The name 'philosophy' might also be given to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions. (PI §126)

So we can say that Philosophy is a critical reflection on our own linguistic activities, the goal of which is to substitute a wrong understanding of the workings of our language by a correct one. But what is needed here is nothing but mindfulness; it is not any new discovery (of the kind known in the sciences).

The next questions now have to be: Can an account of the workings of language be systematic? More sharply put: Will such an account take the form of a 'theory'? What kind of 'theory' could this possibly be, if we accept Wittgenstein's point that philosophy is an activity that is different in kind from science? There has been a long controversy about these questions, and no consensus has yet been reached. It has a sequel in our days in some aspects of the controversy between 'traditional' and 'resolute' readers of Wittgenstein, as exemplified in the book by Crary and Read. The situation is quite complicated, but the following paragraphs will try to provide a fair sketch of its outlines. In this context, the current paper will agree with some of the points made by the resolute readers, but it will be critical of defenders of the 'therapeutic' view when they claim we would have to leave the philosophy of language to the followers of Donald Davidson.

The most prominent advocate of a systematic account of language in the spirit of Gottlob Frege is Michael Dummett. He thinks that without such an account, no understanding of our linguistic competence is possible. But Dummett reads Wittgenstein as denying this possibility, and he thinks that accepting this denial would force upon us an absurd consequence, namely the claim that we must learn each individual sentence of our language.

Dummett begins with the simple observation that we can infer the meaning of a sentence we have not encountered before on the basis of our knowledge of the meanings of its constituent words and of the meanings of the sentence-building devices that are employed in the new sentence (the 'principle of compositionality'). At first glance, it seems convincing to suppose that this inferring process is only possible on the basis of a system of rules that we might not be able to immediately spell out, when asked, but that we nevertheless know implicitly. Consequently, it seems to be the job of the philosopher of language to make this system of rules explicit and thus formulate a theory of meaning.[9]

The 'therapeutic' opposition to this conception, articulated for example by Richard Rorty (257 ff.) and John McDowell, denies that our linguistic competence can

[9] Note that what Dummett is advocating here is not a *scientific* theory.

be accounted for in a philosophically illuminating way by making explicit an implicit knowledge of a system of rules that would form a 'theory of meaning'. The decisive question of this controversy now is: What exactly is meant by the terms 'system of rules' and 'theory' here? Before taking it up, one should mention that Rorty and McDowell, in attacking Dummett, take sides with Dummett's main target of attack, with Donald Davidson. Although it is true that Davidson and Dummett both see the logician Gottlob Frege as the philosopher who has shown us the way, Dummett demands much more of a philosophy of language than Davidson, and in this point this paper *agrees* with Dummett, against Rorty and McDowell.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view we can say that Dummett's opponents claim that in our attempts to understand the systematic sides of linguistic meaning, we must be content to stay on the level of what Wittgenstein calls 'surface grammar' (PI § 664). This is the level of the *sound* of a sentence, the level we know from the grammar books we used in school. For Dummett (and for Wittgenstein, so it is claimed here) this is not enough. Dummett indicates what he thinks would be missing by calling Davidson's account of meaning a 'translation manual'. More particularly, he demands that a philosophical account of meaning cannot take the traditional philosophical language of 'concepts' for granted and should not restrict itself to describing how 'concepts' are related to the words of a particular language. Dummett asks what the command of a concept consists in and sticks to the old idea that the philosophy of language should be of epistemological relevance.

Dummett's point is echoed in Wittgenstein, first in his many remarks that criticize accounts of meaning that treat it as something 'in the mind' (translation into a 'language of concepts' is of no philosophical use) and second in his contrast of 'surface grammar' with what he calls 'depth grammar', and his special concern with the latter. His reason for making this distinction is that even logic (and logic in particular) treats phenomena as equal that are in fact of quite different kinds. So if the goal is to see the 'real workings of language', we have to give an account of the possibility of this disproportion between the sameness of form (surface) and the difference in content (depth grammar). As has been indicated above, the basic ingredient of such an account is to acknowledge that natural languages work with analogies. Since analogies cannot be deciphered in a mechanical way, i.e., on the level of the forms of surface grammar, we have to turn to depth grammar, i.e., to a level that a theory of meaning of the Davidson type cannot reach. It is no use to repeat the rules of surface grammar in the language of concepts. Instead, we have to understand that, and how, the same surface structures are put to use in categorically different ways. It is true, for example, that our language treats numbers as objects (in sentences like 'seven is odd'). But a philosophy of language that has given up all epistemological ambitions can no longer discuss in which contexts a treatment of 'something' as an object is justified and in which it is not. To answer such a question for Wittgenstein means to give an account of the actual work that (in our case) numerals do when we use them, an account that can help us to avoid misleading follow-up questions, like asking for the location or the colour of a particular number.

To be sure, the anti-systematic (or 'therapeutic') side in this dispute has some comments on this, but it claims that these necessarily are restricted to the particular case. Speaking with Wittgenstein's well-known picture: for therapeutic readers, every 'bump' that "...the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (PI §119), has to be treated separately. There is nothing general the therapist can offer. If this were true, it would mean that a philosophically interesting theory of meaning would be impossible.

3. Reversing the Direction of Projection

We are now in a position to propose a new answer to the questions of this controversy by indicating in what sense one can speak (with respect to the later work of Wittgenstein) of systematic insights into the workings of language that are more than descriptions of the 'physiognomy' of a particular case.[10] Three points should be mentioned. Firstly, Dummett is right in his claim that we should not be content with accounts of meaning that ignore the level of 'depth grammar'. Only if we reach beyond surface grammar can we describe 'the workings of language' in such a way as to be helpful for avoiding philosophical pitfalls.

Secondly, in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, we find more observations concerning the systematic side of language than both Dummett, and the 'therapeutic' readers are ready to acknowledge. Much of what Wittgenstein discusses transcends the respective particular case and so allows us to learn something for future cases. Only if this is the case, can philosophy have the result that 'thoughts are at peace'.

Thirdly, the 'therapeutic' readers, however, are right when they point out that the proper way of taking into account the systematic side of language will *not* result in the kind of theory that Dummett originally had hoped for. Therefore, some people might not even want to call it a 'theory'.

So the position this paper argues for is a middle position that can be formulated thus: On the one hand it is correct to say that the meaning of a sentence we have not encountered before in a certain sense 'flows from' the meanings of its parts and the respective sentence structure. We do indeed use our past linguistic experience when we understand a new sentence; we do *not* learn sentences one by one. But the way in which we arrive at the new meaning, the way it 'flows from' our past experience, is not the way of calculation. Using Robert Brandom's ("Between Saying and Doing", 91, 117) helpful terminology, we can infer that the ability to speak and to understand a natu-

[10] This is a term used by Wittgenstein, for example in PI §235 and 568.

ral language is not an 'algebraic ability'. It is a 'hermeneutic' one. Therefore it cannot be represented in terms of an axiomatic-deductive theory, but it involves recognizing what Kant had called the 'faculty of judgment' (*Urteilskraft*). In particular, it involves the ability to recognize analogies and to work with them.

For our context the most decisive of the changes leading to the later philosophy of Wittgenstein is his rotating by 180 degrees the direction of projection characteristic for the relation between world and language. This comes into view when we ask: Where does linguistic structure come from? When we acknowledge that we build sentences from single words and that sentences differ from random lists of words in that they exhibit a structure: Where does this structure come from? Frege's answer was that we find it fixed and ready in the realm of 'thought', so he set for his 'concept script' the goal of following this given structure as accurately as possible. In this way, it would capture the structural side of all possible contents. So Frege thought of language as a mirror of a pre-existing order, even if in the case of natural languages the mirror is not a perfect one. Metaphorically speaking, in this conception the rays of projection are going *from* the world of thought *to* language; the structure of language follows the structure of the world of thoughts. It thus appears natural to see in Frege's concept script the core of a theory of meaning for any chosen language.

The decisive step taken by the later Wittgenstein was to turn this picture of projection around, so that now the rays of projection go *from* language *to* the world of thought.[11] In the new picture we have highly specific local structures that we ourselves have developed in the contexts of particular, simple activities, for example the schema of 'actor and action' (like in 'Peter walks'). And these schemata are then projected into many new contexts of different kinds. So the projection goes from locally constructed language structures to ever new realms of our (human) 'world', as it is opened up and developed in the course of history. Accordingly, the generality of these structures, including the logical structures, is the result of our own activity; it is not something we have found in the world. When, for example, we say 'after midnight the fighting stopped', grammatically 'the fighting' appears to be an actor (comparable to what the word 'Peter' designates in the example above), and the stopping (like Peter's walking) appears to be an activity. But both appearances are misleading if judged from a semantic point of view.

This can be expressed by saying that the actor-action-scheme has been *projected* into a context to which it, strictly speaking, does not fit. In this sense we can speak of a metaphorical movement. Since in the given example it was a syntactic structure that has been projected, we can make use of an expression originally coined by Eric Stenius (Stenius 212) and speak of 'syntactical metaphors' here. What does this now mean for

[11] A quite succinct formulation of this claim is: "The subject-predicate form serves as a projection of countless different logical forms." (Wittgenstein "Philosophical Grammar" 205) For an extended discussion of this claim as well as its bearings for *logical* structures see: Schneider, *Wittgenstein's Later Theory of Meaning*, chapter 5.

Wittgenstein's claim that some philosophical problems (as he had said already in the foreword of his *Tractatus*) stem from a 'misunderstanding of the logic of our language', and what does this mean for his already quoted claim that they "...are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized – despite an urge to misunderstand them"? (PI §109)

If indeed, as has been argued here, the reversal of the direction of projection in our picture of language is one of the central steps taken in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, then in it we have an example of a quite general, systematic claim about the *workings* of language, generally, not only about one specific problem. So here we have an important ingredient of a method, which he says he had been demonstrating, that would give "philosophy peace", and which he says enables him "to break off philosophizing when I want to." (PI §133)

Applying this to the aforementioned case of the actor/action-scheme would mean that once we see that its generality is a result of our projections, it is easier for us to raise the question whether in the context of a particular problem it is the subject matter or only the form it has received in our language that is problematic. The sentence 'after midnight the fighting stopped' is of no philosophical interest. But we are entering highly contested territory as soon as we raise parallel problems for verbs such as 'to mean' or 'to intend'. Are they signifying inner ('psychological') activities, as their surface grammar suggests, or are they even standing for brain processes? These are acute problems, getting much attention these days. For example, does it make sense to spend a large amount of money on a brain scanner in order to find out what exactly the 'activity of intending' consists of?[12]

Similar questions can be raised with regard to names. Does the linguistic fact that language allows numerals to take the subject-position in sentences indicate that abstract objects exist? Does the fact that the expression 'God' is a proper name, indicate that speakers using it believe that in the most distant areas of the universe a person could be detected with help of a radio telescope, if only this instrument would be big enough? Are believers entertaining such ungrounded hypotheses, as Richard Dawkins thinks, or does religious language require an understanding that is completely different from understanding the claims of science?

In all these cases, in trying to see the 'workings of language' we have to be attentive to projections, which (for example) bring numerals to the subject-position of sentences and which make us articulate religious experiences in a language of personifications. Both cases point beyond themselves. If we understand reification in the case of numbers, we will understand it also in the cases of concepts, sets, or possibilities; and surely religion is not the only area where personifications can be found. Thus, it is possible to learn a general lesson from a particular case in which we consider the

[12] For a detailed discussion of some of these problems cf. Hans J. Schneider, „Reden über Inneres".

nature of a problematic way of speaking—to learn something that will be of use for the treatment of other cases. This, however, does not mean that it is possible to handle all the mentioned cases in a strictly parallel way in a sense that would allow us to *calculate*, and to avoid *thinking*. This is why Kant's 'faculty of judgement' was earlier mentioned. Gods and feelings are different from numbers and concepts.

These considerations should explain why the position developed in this paper has been characterized above as a middle-position in the struggle about the possibility of a theory of meaning. We indeed use our past linguistic experience when we succeed in understanding sentences we have never encountered before, but this is not a matter of calculation. In understanding the new sentences we again and again have to comprehend steps of projection and in doing so we have to use our imagination, that is to say, an ability that is completely different from the ability to calculate. So the process of making explicit our implicit knowledge of language, about which Dummett and later Robert Brandom ("Making it Explicit") have spoken, will not result in the formulation of a calculus. Instead, it turns out to be necessary to reflect on other human capacities with a much broader scope. The relevant knowledge here often is a quite particular kind of a linguistic 'knowing how', an ability to find one's way in kinds of situations involving language games. And it should by now be clear that our linguistic competence does have important systematic aspects.

4. Eugene Gendlin and the Positive Side of Projection

So far, in the discussion put forward in this paper, what was treated under the title of 'projection' may have appeared to be something negative, because it easily leads speakers into problems and mistakes. Projection often results in states that ask for correction, for 'therapy'. To quote Wittgenstein again, "Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language." (PI §109) This one-sided picture now has to be explicitly corrected by calling attention to the fact that these same activities of projection also have a positive side. For the speaker, projection is a vehicle with the help of which he can raise a new issue, can find words for something outside the normal course of things, indeed for something that has never before entered the 'universe of discourse'. This is true for metaphors and models in the realms of science and technology; such innovative moves are also possible in our use of language in ordinary life and of course in poetry; and also in the realm of therapy, when we attempt to articulate a peculiar personal experience. It is one of the philosophical merits of the therapist and philosopher Eugene Gendlin to have directed our attention to this function of language, not only by talking *about* it, but also by making use of it in his unique way. For readers not yet familiar with his work, here is an illustration. Gendlin begins one of his papers as follows:

> This paper will attempt a way of thinking with, and about, that which exceeds logical forms and distinctions. Today it is widely held that any form (rule, pattern, concept, distinction, category .....) always invokes an inseparable so-called excess. It is furthermore held that that excess is chaotic, a limbo. I will show on the contrary that excess is a vital part of thinking, and that it is not chaos but a greater order. (Gendlin, "The Wider Role", 192)

In a footnote Gendlin ("The Wider Role", fn. 1) gives the following comment on the expression in brackets that had paraphrased his word 'form' (by 'rule', 'pattern', etc.): "I often use a string of words instead of just one in a given slot." And about the five dots he had put at the end of his list he says they would "...leave room for other possible words. After the string and the sequence of dots once appear, any one of the words can later say what is meant." In a comment on a similar example we read:

> In whatever way I might actually say it, you would let the word work newly and freshly when it comes into a spot like that. All the words can in this way acquire a new meaning, provided of course they're part of the situation, part of a context, part of an interaction. It is right to say that language is inherent in experience, but we have to understand by language this way in which words can work newly in a given spot. (Gendlin, "The Wider Role", 193)

So it is possible for well-known linguistic means to do a new kind of work, if the situation requires it. To succeed in this, speakers and hearers must be able to keep a certain distance to the expressions, to behave freely with respect to them. They do recognize the given expression as one they know from past contexts and are able to use themselves. But in the cases Gendlin has in mind here they are required to grasp that something new is being said, that is only *analogous* to the past uses they already know. The new use is mediated by the old ways of using the words in question (most new poems, for example, are made up of quite familiar words), but at the same time the new use is different from the old one. The hearer must recognize that a projection is taking place (an analogical, metaphorical use of words or syntactic means), and he must guess its meaning, i.e. he must grasp the resulting sense with help of his hermeneutic understanding of the situation. The new meaning cannot be arrived at by calculation, but still the 'new content' in most cases cannot be expressed without using old words.

This tension between the familiar and the unfamiliar is a typical trait of many linguistic jokes. A great part of their charm is due to their creating a *distance* to language, a freedom that lets us feel a margin for play, in the literal sense of 'play'.[13] It is this margin that Wittgenstein, as well as Gendlin, are pointing to. In most cases of philosophical

[13] A nice German example is: 'Je preiser einer gekrönt wird, desto durcher fällt er.'

commentary, Wittgenstein's concern is seen as one in which we are rescued from a philosophical pitfall. But also for him the loose and humorous aspect of such a distance to language is something he is acutely aware of, as the following remark exemplifies:

> Given the two concepts 'fat' and 'lean', would you be inclined[14] to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or the other way round? (I am strongly inclined towards the former.) Now have 'fat' and 'lean' some different meaning here from their usual one? – They have a different use. – So ought I really to have used different words? Certainly not. – I want to use these words (with their familiar meanings) here. (Wittgenstein, "Philosophy of Psychology" § 274, 227e, = *Philosophische Untersuchungen* / "Philosophical Investigations", 1958, part two, 216e)

In Gendlin's work this liberty in the use of language is employed for helping the client to get a fresh view on his own past in the context of what he still calls therapy, but also for creative work of all kinds. He encourages us to take a positive attitude towards those of our inclinations that offer themselves in such moments of liberty, that come up as respective new steps. This means that we should consider at least the possibility that they flow from a 'greater order', a process that we often grasp intuitively, without (or: without yet) being able to articulate it.

So the inclination to utter a certain linguistic expression is not in itself something that must lead us astray because it is 'irrational' by being nothing better than an inclination. It can also result in new insights, in creative solutions. For this reason the state in which 'thoughts ... are at peace', of which Wittgenstein said it would be 'what someone who philosophises yearns for', seems to a large degree to be made possible by winning such a liberty, a distance towards language, and this in turn can be greatly helped when we appreciate what has been discussed here under the title of a 'projection'. The insight in this particular one of the 'workings of our language' helps that we are 'no longer tormented by questions'. But it is clear that this is not a matter of *knowing that*, but of a very special kind of *knowing how*, and, more than that, of actually acting accordingly. And here the 'working on oneself' comes in, not in the sense of therapy, but rather in the sense of gaining 'peace' in one's thinking, or, in more traditional words, of gaining some degree of wisdom.

5. Conclusions

After it has been argued that the kind of work exemplified by Wittgenstein's later philosophy has its place not on the natural level of drives, health, and sickness but on the

[14] The German word here is 'geneigt'.

cultural level of language (and hence should not be called therapeutic) the paper examines the character of this work. Does it (in Wittgenstein's opinion) involve systematic relations between partial linguistic abilities (as his expression 'methods' suggests) or does it consist of unconnected remedies, applied as the case may be? The paper shows that it is the first alternative that Wittgenstein is arguing for.

Especially, it is shown that 'the workings of our language' include the use of analogies and metaphors even on a syntactical level, i.e., procedures by which given structures are projected into new fields of application. Understanding the resulting utterances rests on a prior understanding of the involved linguistic means (principle of compositionality), but an understanding of the resultant sentences cannot be achieved by an algebraic type of calculation alone; for this reason, a theory of meaning cannot take the form of an axiomatic-deductive system.

Finally, it is shown that understanding the discussed 'workings of our language' can (and, Wittgenstein thinks, should) result in a relaxed attitude to philosophical problems, it can overcome the 'bewitchment' he is talking about, and it can bring to the reader a state of mind in which 'thoughts are at peace'. Achieving this can be seen as a fruit of a kind of 'working on oneself', but this work is not therapeutic in the strict sense of this term.

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Community Rules: What Does Kripke's Sceptical Paradox Imply for Private Language?

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's private language argument is often taken to imply that an individual could not master a language by himself. This conclusion is explicitly drawn in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein on the basis of general considerations on rule-following. But is an individual really not able to follow rules, as Kripke also contends? In this paper I argue for a novel conception of rule-following that can incorporate the insights of the private language argument without accepting its most counterintuitive implication.

Keywords: rule-following, private language argument, meaning, human community, Wittgenstein, Kripke

Introduction

Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982) contributed to a resurgence of interest in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1958) and simultaneously opened a new line of investigation in the philosophy of language. The work consists of two parts: a skeptical paradox and a skeptical solution. Both have been influential and have inspired a mixture of praise and criticism from the 1980s onward. Kripke thinks of the paradox as a fundamental problem, which was perhaps the underlying motivation behind Wittgenstein's "analogous" positions in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mind[1] (Kripke 4). Stating this versatile problem with clarity is a challenge in itself, if only because Kripke's own statement of the problem has given rise to different interpretations.

Crucial to Kripke's account is his skeptical solution of the paradox, which attacks part of the skeptic's reasoning. In particular, it denies the supposed dependence of

[1] Kripke continually refers to passages from Wittgenstein in order to show that the argument is loyal to its source. At the same time, Kripke shies away from the conclusion that his argument is already to be found on the pages of the 'Investigations' (Kripke 5). In this paper I am not interested in exegetical matters.

meaning on 'matters of fact' in favor of an account that sees meaning as rooted in a community. In this essay, I assume both that the skeptical paradox is a real philosophical problem and that the 'communitarian' solution is correct. In addition, I presuppose that what is at stake in the argument against the existence of private language is the possibility of an individual following a rule by himself. Though language is more than following rules, the latter is necessary for the former: I follow Kripke in that respect.

I depart from Kripke in that I re-think the consequences of his skeptical solution for Wittgensteinian well-known arguments against the existence of private language. Using the standard example of Robinson Crusoe,[2] I apply a second skeptical solution to the destructive side of Kripke's initial one. According to Kripke, if we consider Crusoe "by himself and in isolation", we will see that Crusoe's utterances are not meaningful (Kripke 69). At this point, Kripke's own strategy can be turned against him. Crusoe is not affected by the argument against private language: I argue that because Crusoe is part of the human community, he can be a rule-follower. We can grant the 'communitarian' character of meaning without drawing Kripke's conclusions. Of course, this raises the question of what the private language argument is good for, if it cannot be used against individuals considered in isolation. I close by formulating an answer to that question.

In order to make clear why all of this is necessary, I begin by retelling Kripke's story in a way that will allow me to refer to it in later sections. Once we a have a clear view of the problem, I will sketch Kripke's skeptical solution and the implications he thinks it has for the notion of private language. That will set the stage for my own development of the problem, which will draw on Stephen Davies' account of the 'human community'.

§1 Kripke on Rules and Private Language

1.1 The Skeptical Paradox

Our ability to function in everyday life depends on many factors. Perhaps one of the most important ones is the correct application of rules.[3] Kripke's paradox states that it is up for grabs, because there is no fact in virtue of which some application of rules to new cases is correct rather than another. I use Kripke's own example – arithmetic – but the story that follows is my own.

Learning to add numbers is about grasping a concept (Kripke 19), which involves grasping a rule. In primary school, small children are required to master this rule on the basis of a finite set of examples.[4] The children will encounter many addition problems lat-

[2] More specifically, 'a born Crusoe', i.e. a person that has never been part of any social community.

[3] While I believe that the central problem is about application, Kripke mentions the word only twice (Kripke 19, 55) and Simon Blackburn is the one commentator who makes use of it (Blackburn 281).

[4] "Given only in terms of finitely many cases (...)" (Kripke 22).

er in life that were not among the 'original' ones they were taught in school. One may say that this is precisely what it means to grasp a rule: the ability to glean a procedure from a finite set of initial examples and then to apply the same procedure to new cases. In the case of addition, the possibilities are literally infinite. Let us imagine a child, called Junya, who finishes primary school and grows up to be a successful architect. We encounter him at a certain point in his development. Let us say that he has recently started his own business at the age of 30 (the details do not matter, so long as we have a definite point in time in mind). When filling out the first tax forms for his new firm, Junya has to add two numbers he has never added before: 317 and 237. He writes down 554, but suddenly starts to doubt himself. Is this really the amount that he owes the IRS in taxes?

That same night, a tax inspector haunts Junya's dreams. With an accusatory tone of voice, the inspector asks: "You are aware of the fact that it is illegal to evade taxation, are you not? Let me do the addition for you: 317 + 237 = 1000. So why did you only declare 554 dollars? The fine is rather substantial, you know." Junya objects that he has known how to add since primary school, and is quite certain that the sum of 317 and 237 is not 1000, but 554. The inspector has little patience for him. "A likely story. You are saying that you have been taught to add, but still manage to come up with the wrong number? They must have taught you a different rule in primary school, Junya. The IRS works with *actual* addition." Junya wakes up in a pool of sweat.

Most of us will have had similar experiences involving tax inspectors, whether we meet them in nightmares or in office buildings. While conflicts with the IRS often take a more complex shape than the one in Junya's dream, it sometimes occurs that their calculations are different from ours. On some occasions, we feel that we have been wronged. In order to make that case, we attempt to show that our calculation is correct. The pressure is on us to provide a valid and decisive argument to that effect. Especially when large sums are at stake, some of us cannot rest until we have supplied one.

Junya's dream recurs again and again. Finally, he decides to sit down with a pen and paper in order to resolve the issue once and for all. His first impulse is to point to his childhood mastery of addition, but then Junya remembers that the inspector cast doubt on his very education. Besides, he may have performed admirably in the past, but since he has never done the 317+237 calculation before, how can he be certain of his performance in this case? 1+1=2, 2+2=4… Junya distinctly remembers grasping *something* about those examples. But is it really the same as "actual addition", which the tax inspector claimed for the IRS? It seems impossible to say, because on reflection, in order to grasp the concept of actual addition, Junya would have needed to grasp the corresponding rule of actual addition: but the examples from primary school are compatible with many different rules. Consider what happens if we consider only 1+1=2 and 2+2=4. Both are of the form $x+y$=z. If we do not know what '+' means, then the outcomes 2 and 4 are not particularly informative. "$x+y=z$" could be interpreted in any of the following ways:

– 2x = z
– x - (-2)-y = z
– x - y - (-2y) = z
– x/y * 2x = z

This is only a small sample, but it is already clear that these rules will yield very different answers as *x* and *y* take on different values. Who knows which rule Junya grasped in primary school? His insistence that 554, rather than 1000, is the correct answer suddenly seems arbitrary. Junya asks himself the same question as Kripke: "In what sense is my actual computation procedure (…) more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure (…)? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" (Kripke 18)

The tax inspector can be right and Junya wrong, but only if Junya is not following the rules corresponding to actual addition. Junya has then "misinterpreted his own previous usage" (Kripke 9): he never meant actual addition, but his own strange version of addition, jaddition. Let us suppose that the two procedures are identical, except for the fact that actual addition dictates that 317+237=1000 whereas jaddition comes up with the answer 554. There is nothing about Junya that could tell us which rule he was following all along. Recall little Junya in primary school: he would have responded to the examples presented to him with the same answers, earned the same praise of his teachers, and so on (by hypothesis, he never encountered 317+237 until the day he filled out the first tax forms for his new firm). Nor is the mental state of little Junya any different because of his first grasping and then following one rule rather than another. He has never applied his mind to 317+237 and is not determined in any way to answer 554 while he is learning about 1+1=2.

As Kripke points out, the problem is not about epistemology (Kripke 21, 37). It is not that we do not know enough about Junya's mental life. In a sense, it is about metaphysics: Junya's dream calls for a certain type of *fact* that can settle the dispute between Junya and the tax inspector. If there is no such fact, then it seems that either of their responses to 317+237 is arbitrary.

Indeed, any response would be arbitrary: we can think of Junya's accountant, his financial adviser and the lawyer he turns to all coming up with different answers because they all follow different rules. And Junya's troubles need not be confined to adding numbers. Imagine a different scenario and a different kind of dispute: this time Junya is accused of not having the concept of a table by an unnamed skeptic. Witness Junya's doubts as reported by Kripke:

> I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by 'table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is

> anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there? Did I think explicitly of the Eiffel Tower when I first 'grasped the concept of' a table, gave myself directions for what I meant by 'table'? And even if I did think of the Tower, cannot any directions I gave myself mentioning it be reinterpreted compatibly with the skeptic's hypothesis? (Kripke 19)

The problem raised by the skeptic's reasoning is that no behavior can be justified by reference to a rule. We have lost track of what the normative relation between meaning and intention to future action (Kripke 37) entails for any case that can be described in those terms. This does not only mean that Junya's current usage of 'addition' is inconsistent with his previous usage, but also that the rightness and wrongness of any intended application are up for grabs. Junya and the rest of us do not know which rule we are applying at any given moment: more specifically, there is no fact in virtue of which we are applying one rule as opposed to another.

Notice that this leaves us in a rather dire situation. The problem itself has become impossible to formulate: the stable meanings on which it depends collapse as soon as the outcome becomes apparent (which is what makes it a paradox). The whole structure of language comes crashing down. "There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do" (Kripke 55). The problem can also be applied to "predicates of sensations, visual impressions, and the like" (Kripke 20). In a single formula: for all putative instances of some rule, "finite past instances allow many mutually inconsistent extrapolations of them into the future, thereby underdetermining the rule" (Shogenji 504).

1.2 Implications for Private Language according to Kripke

A skeptical problem may be resolved in one of two ways. On the one hand, there are 'straight solutions', which refuse to grant the skeptic his point: there is, after all, a fact in virtue of which Junya means either 'actual addition' or some other way of manipulating numbers by way of '+'. On the other hand, there are 'skeptical solutions', which do not try to offer such a fact but still manage to solve the problem posed by the skeptic. Proponents of a skeptical solution concede that the skeptic is right that there is no 'fact of the matter' as to what kind of addition Junya means, but that his (or the tax inspector's) beliefs and assertions about 317+237 are still justified. Recall that the apparent lack of justification was what made the skeptical paradox seem so urgent. How, then, do we save meaning? According to Kripke, the solution to Junya's troubles is to jettison the notion that "facts or truth conditions are of the essence for meaningful assertion" (Kripke 77).

To put these alternative responses to the problem in more general terms: if we see that the skeptic endangers an ordinary practice or belief that we cannot give up, we may want to insist that the skeptic's problem is ill-posed and does not succeed in discrediting the practice or belief, which therefore remains justified. Kripke states that such a straight solution to the skeptical paradox is impossible (Kripke 77). The other option is to question the assumption underlying both the skeptical problem and its straight solution. To propose a skeptical solution is to say that the skeptic's target was never a candidate to justify the practice or belief in the first place. We may praise the skeptic for pointing out that the practice or belief need not, and in fact should not, be defended in a certain way (Kripke 67), but there is more to be said on the subject than the skeptic allows. Some answer to 317+237 is justified, albeit not in virtue of some fact.

What, then, is the skeptical solution favored by Kripke? It is important to notice that the skeptical paradox "holds no terror in our daily lives; no one actually hesitates when asked to produce an answer to an addition problem!" (Kripe 87). Kripke here invokes Wittgenstein's distinction between speaking 'without justification' [*ohne Rechtfertigung*] and speaking 'wrongfully' [*zu Unrecht*] (ibid). After all, as far as our daily lives are concerned, we do not frown upon those who respond to problems of addition without hesitation (in particular, without worrying about skeptics that will question their use of addition: unless they are filling out tax forms, perhaps). We do not feel that they are speaking 'wrongfully', though their answers may be 'without justification' in the skeptic's sense.

This is where private language comes in. What the skeptical paradox reveals, according to Kripke, is that Junya was wrong to consider himself as if he were "one person alone"; Junya has so far attempted to respond in terms of "his [own, JK] psychological states" (Kripke 88). But then "our ordinary practice [licenses] him to apply the rule in the way that it strikes him" (ibid).

As Kripke goes on to explain, this is not what we mean by following a rule. It is possible for Junya to *think* he is following a rule without this actually being the case. He may also act in accordance with a rule that violates his first intentions (Kripke 89, Shogenji 505). From this, Kripke infers the following:

> [I]f one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the conduct of the person who adopts it can have no substantive content. (…) As long as we regard him as following a rule 'privately', so that we pay attention to his justification conditions alone, all we can say is that he is licensed to follow the rule as it strikes him (ibid, emphases in the original).[5]

[5] Compare Wittgenstein §202, to which Kripke also refers: "To think one is obeying a rule is not [the same thing as obeying, JK] a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it."

The skeptical solution is thus to be sought in the wider community. The point is that agreement and verifiability are required. In the case of addition, we judge someone to be competent if his answers to particular problems agree with the answers we would be inclined to give, or at least stem from a common method. He is then 'allowed into the community' of adders.[6] There is no point in scrutinizing our past mental history in order to find out if we have grasped "some supersensible, infinite reality": such considerations have already proven to be of no help against the tax inspector (cf. Kripke 106). Instead, Junya should consult his community.

Kripke's skeptical solution, for all its counseled modesty, is quite difficult to grasp. In the spirit of Wittgenstein, we are asked to look instead of to think. We *actually* license people to use addition in cases they have not encountered before, and their confidence does not seem to be out of place. The skeptical paradox has taught us that this cannot be because of some matter of fact: so it must be because of the community. In one fell swoop, Kripke has reconstructed Wittgenstein's notorious 'private language argument':[7] not as a behaviorist premise, but as the destructive side of a skeptical solution. The conclusion seems to follow quite easily: since meaning is always a function of a community, there can be no private language.

But what do these categories ("community", "private") mean? In other words, what is the identity of the private linguist? Kripke helpfully considers an example (with a long history). Imagine Robinson Crusoe stranded on an island: but not as a result of a shipwreck. He has been there from birth and has never been exposed to a community. Should we deny that anything he does and says has meaning and insist that he cannot be a rule-follower?[8] Kripke begins by raising the straightforward distinction between physical isolation and an individual considered in isolation (Kripke 110). Immediately thereafter, he says that "*if* we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria of rule-following to him" (ibid.). Whether or not Crusoe, on his island, is following rules, thus, depends on our criteria. Simon Blackburn has been a prominent critic of this kind of reasoning.

> [According to Kripke] I have to consider whether Crusoe is a rule-follower by using the normal, community-wide way I make the judgement. But that would be true of any situation I seek to describe. And then, just as (contra Berkeley) I might conclude that an island considered in isolation has a tree on it, might I not conclude that Crusoe, considered in isolation, was following a rule? (...) We are apt to retort that Crusoe would have been a rule-follower in this situation whatever I or we or

[6] See Kripke 93 for a more extensive explanation.

[7] See Kripke 107f.

[8] There is empirical material on the question whether 'feral children' (children raised by animals) can acquire language: the consensus seems to be that they cannot. But this will not decide the question whether they cannot follow rules. For that reason, I will remain agnostic on the empirical question.

> any other community in the world had thought about it – just like the tree. And the reason is that all by himself he had a technique or practice (Blackburn 298).

It certainly seems true that it is possible for Crusoe to master a technique. Consider, for example, Michael Dummett's plot twist: Crusoe finds a washed-ashore Rubik's cube.[9] If it makes sense to claim that Crusoe has a technique of solving it, then he must be able to "[order] his expectations about the recurrence of sensations, with an aim at prediction, explanation, systematization" (Blackburn 299-300). And if Crusoe were to be engaged in such a project, "the attitude that whatever seems right is right is ridiculous. System soon enforces recognition of fallibility" (Blackburn 300). Crusoe seems to be more than capable of rule-following behavior. How can we reconcile the intuitive validity of these objections with Kripke's position, which he says is connected to the dictum that we should look, not think?

Recall that according to Kripke's own lights, we can only hope for a "descriptively adequate account of the *actual* assertion conditions for meaning-attributing sentences" (Boghossian 520). This insistence on 'actual justificatory practice' is not only problematic in the face of an intuitively plausible objection, such as the one raised by Blackburn. It also seems unclear how a descriptively adequate account could justify the nature of Kripke's rejection of private language, in particular, "one of the requisite modal force" (ibid). For Kripke has claimed that there *could be* no private language. While it is true that our actual assertion conditions advert to the dispositions of a community, "the most that would license saying is that *our* language is not solitary" (ibid: emphases in the original).

These are serious problems for Kripke's solution of the skeptical paradox. Let us therefore reconsider the connection between Kripke's 'communitarianism' about meaning and the private language argument.

§2 The Human Community and Private Language

2.1 A Repetition of Moves

We have already seen that the nature of a skeptical solution is to recognize part of the skeptic's negative point, but without granting that the practice or belief that was charged by the skeptic should be abandoned. Kripke's own skeptical solution entails that meaning cannot depend on any matter of fact, but it does not follow that there is no meaning. We do not have to stop using language. The skeptical solution, however, also has a destructive side: there can be no private language.

[9] Although this scenario is often ascribed to Dummett, he never published it.

This destructive side comes under fire once we realize that it is not evident that Crusoe's rule-following requires some sort of check by the community, as Blackburn points out. If Crusoe is able to devise a system for solving his Rubik's cube, there are right and wrong ways of applying it: he can apply it erroneously, of course, or swap systems: but the point is that it is *meaningful* to talk about erroneous application if he has defied his own rule. There is plenty of opportunity for self-verifying behavior: hence Crusoe, even when considered in isolation, can follow rules (see also Gauker 208 on self-checking). This also reinforces Boghossian's point: Kripke's 'modesty' does not allow him to say that there *could be* no private language.

My proposed way out is to re-apply the skeptical solution. Kripke seems to assume that the initial skeptical solution, and the 'communitarianism' it demands, precludes Crusoe-like figures from rule-following (if they have not passed the tests of our community). This parallels the original skeptic's insistence on matters of fact: his attack on meaning assumed that meaning was grounded in matters of fact. Equally, Kripke's treatment of Crusoe presupposes that a 'communitarian' analysis of meaning precludes the possibility that Crusoe, 'considered in isolation', follows rules. But could we not insist on the importance of community while simultaneously allowing that Crusoe follows rules? This would undercut Kripke's reasoning in the same way that Kripke undercut Junya's tax inspector.

Kripke, as we have seen, suggests that the private language argument affects putative rule-followers who are not part of a social community. Stephen Davies proposes, instead, that the relevant kind of community is 'the human community', comprised of all humans, with the inclusion of Crusoe. In light of the fact that not all rule-following is the product of consensual agreement, it does not seem far-fetched to say that "there seem to be tendencies common to all (mature) human beings" with respect to both the classification of a situation as belonging to a particular set and the subsequent application of a single technique to all members of the set (Davies 62, 66). This descriptive element – an actual propensity to agreement – is required, but there is also a normative component to the human community. Membership in it can be said to establish standards with respect to some practice. By referring to those standards, Crusoe can be said to invent and follow rules without contradicting the 'communitarian' solution to the skeptical paradox. Crusoe's membership is thus real enough (rather than imagined at best, as Kripke seems to suggest) (Davies 60-61). His is not a social community, but a human community in the sense of the total human population, where the members of that population define what counts as a rule. The central thought is as follows:

> (...) it may be appropriate to judge the individual's attempts to generate a regular pattern of behavior against standards set by the similar attempts, judgments and dispositions of other members of the community of human beings, despite possible social isolation of members of the community of human beings (ibid).

When seen in this light, the issues raised by Blackburn are no longer problematic. Crusoe is human, so no harm done: he can follow rules because he is part of the human community (no matter how 'physically isolated' he is).

The response to Boghossian is equally simple. We can address his point if we rephrase the argument against private language as a statement of *human* impossibility: this seems like a high enough standard to set. We should note that treating humanity as the relevant category is not only a skeptical solution to the problems stemming from Kripke's treatment of Crusoe. It is also a further widening of scope: having already shifted focus from the individual to a particular community, Davies urges us to consider the community of all humans in full. This allows for more intuitively plausible consequences, which is mandatory if we follow Kripke in taking actual assertion conditions as the cornerstone of any justification theory.

For the sake of clarity, the two 'analogous' skeptical solutions are as follows:

Skeptical Solution I

(1) The skeptical paradox: if Junya follows a rule, the skeptic says, he does so in virtue of matters of fact, but there is none: therefore, rule-following is impossible;
(2) But it seems clear that we *do* follow rules;
(3) Justification conditions (the 'normativity' of rules) stem from the community, so that rule-following is necessarily 'communitarian': there can be no private language in this sense;
(4) Therefore, Crusoe considered in isolation cannot be a rule-follower.

Skeptical Solution II

(5) Kripke's negative statement: rule-following presupposes a community, Kripke says, but Crusoe is not involved in any community: therefore, Crusoe cannot follow rules;
(6) But it seems clear that Crusoe *can* follow rules;
(7) Some justification conditions (the 'normativity' of rules) stem from the human community, so that meaning is necessarily 'human': there can be private language in this sense;
(8) Therefore, Crusoe considered in isolation can be a rule-follower.

In this way, we can have our cake and eat it too. In cases where all of humankind, including socially isolated humans, agrees on a particular rule, this agreement can be used to adjudicate rule-following controversies. But this victory seems to come at a price. If it is a valid response to Wittgenstein and Kripke, then what is left of the private language argument? It now appears that all that is needed to follow a rule is to be human: surely there is more to it than that.

2.2 What is Left of the Private Language Argument?

In §1, we were introduced to what seemed like a devastating problem – and then we applied what seemed like a satisfying solution. I have tried to argue against Kripke's skeptical solution on the grounds that it 'proves too much' by excluding Crusoe-like figures from the community of rule-followers: precisely because Crusoe, too, is part of a community, namely the community of human beings. But this second skeptical solution threatens to throw us back to the original problem. We should not want to say that following a rule privately is possible merely in virtue of being human; since not every instance of human behavior corresponds to a rule, the analysis has to be specified. Davies attempts to derive conditions for the possibility of private language, but is left with the conclusion that any prospective rule-follower must postulate the existence of an external world that is distinct from his experience of it, with the former being foundational rather than derivative (Davies 56). His argument also proves too much: it entails that only Crusoes that are metaphysical realists can be rule-followers. We stand in need of a new account of rule-following. Below I introduce three necessary conditions of my own design, which are jointly sufficient to explain what rule-following requires. Those conditions will hold the key to understanding what the private language argument, as developed by Kripke in order to answer the skeptical paradox, entails for private language.

The first condition was already implied by my discussion of Crusoe solving his Rubik's cube. If he tackles the cube systematically, Blackburn claimed, Crusoe has to be capable of "ordering expectations about the recurrence of sensations" with a view to explanation, prediction et cetera (Blackburn 299). Under what conditions is Crusoe able to do so? For one thing, we need to postulate the existence of regularities, that is to say stable patterns, which he can come to recognize. Stability is necessarily presupposed by any rule-follower: without stability, Crusoe would not be able to suppose an intimate connection between the rule he adopted while trying to solve the Rubik's cube and his success in manipulating said cube. In other words, he cannot start out by assuming that the cube has a will of its own and can take on any color at all, no matter what Crusoe does with it. Of course, it is possible for an unexpected color to come up, but then Crusoe will have to adapt his system so that it will be able to accommodate the unforeseen result. Even to attempt such accommodation presupposes that he can influence future outcomes by applying his rules.

My second condition is that Crusoe is capable of verifying or falsifying that he has followed a given rule. Each rule he follows sets a standard, for instance in terms of prediction. In particular, if Crusoe has mastered a certain rule, the rule itself excludes certain outcomes. Crusoe knows what the 'incorrect outcomes' are on the basis of earlier applications of the same rule. Let us say that the rules he uses to solve a Rubik's cube include 'solving the top', known to cube enthusiasts around the world. Whenever Crusoe follows the rules for 'solving the top', the squares at the top of the cube are all the same color. If the top features a stray blue square in the midst of eight red ones, then Crusoe knows that he has not followed the rule for 'solving the top'. If he believed that he had been following it, then his belief is now falsified. Verification works similarly: if the standards set by earlier applications of the rule are met, then it can justifiably be said that the rule has been followed. This leaves open the possibility that actual outcomes are compatible with many different rules, which does not *seem* to be a problem in all cases. For instance, if Junya calculates that 2+2=4, then it can justifiably be said that he follows the rule of addition. But even that is a matter of community membership.

For, thirdly and finally, acceptability by a community is the only standard by which we may speak of rule-following and meaning. Kripke claims that a substantive restriction is placed on individuals within a community by the justification conditions that prevail within it (Kripke 90). Formulating and upholding those conditions is itself a process that goes on within the community, so that it appears that I can never be justified in asserting something whenever the community around me thinks differently. Kripke explicitly states that "doing as others do" cannot be sufficient for meaning anything (Gauker 122, Kripke 112). But at first sight it appears difficult for Kripke to avoid this uncomfortably conformist result.

Simon Blackburn is once again among Kripke's critics. He objects that a community of rule-followers is not like an orchestra. In other words, mutual support is not sufficient as a standard of correctness, as it would be if we think about musical performance. Imagine, with Blackburn, that for individual instruments, there is no standard or instruction on how the piece ought to be played, so that "all melodies are equally acceptable" (Blackburn 293). There might then still be "standards of harmony across instruments" (ibid). But Junya is correct in saying that 317+237=554, no matter what the rest of the world says, we should want to say. How can Kripke resolve this problem?

Addition plays a certain role in our lives and the rule of 'addition' acquires its meaning as a result. Kripke phrases this relation in terms of "utility" (Kripke 73). Someone who uses 'addition' in a certain way is able to perform well in various interactions, for instance, those between the grocer and his costumer (Kripke 93) or between Junya and the tax inspector. As we continue to perform well, we become reliable rule-followers in the eyes of our community. Davies would be quick to call a society in which the tax inspector's rules of addition were upheld (in particular the dogma that 317+237=1000) "inhuman", in the sense that it would be astonishing to discover a Crusoe that "went in for mathematics at all" without ending up with something that is at least compatible with our rule of addition (Davies 64). But this dramatic turn of phrase cannot solve every problematic case. Could we not imagine a conflict within a given society about which rule is to be applied, with the authority falling predominantly on the side that is wrong? Think about the deductive rules invoked in proofs for the existence of God, for instance. It does not seem very helpful to resort to a charge of inhumanity if we disagree about such cases. Still, it seems that we do need some sort of standard to decide when (if ever) individuals justifiably disagree with their communities.

Since we are considering the human community, cases that are problematic in terms of justification would need to encompass all of humanity. Assuming Kripke's sense of utility, such cases would have to facilitate human interaction across the board without being justified. It may well be that if we phrase the problem in these terms, cooperation between all humans is indeed the ideal limit; not necessarily for every human enterprise, but certainly with regard to rule-following. For instance, if all humans agree on the rules of addition, so that life on earth becomes supremely coordinated (at least more so than it would be if we disagreed on addition), then this is itself ample justification. Note that this does not require that all humans agree on all instances of rule-following, if only because the human community is not the only kind of community. The relationship between communities and their members can be of a layered kind: Crusoe and Junya are both members of the human community, but Junya is a member of a particular social community, that of taxpayers in the United States of America, while Crusoe is not. We can think of such social communities as 'subcommunities' of the human community.

One may object that talk of 'layered membership' hides an underlying difference that separates the human community from any social one. Consider another disagreement between Junya and the tax inspector: this time they are quarrelling whether Junya's gifts to charity are legally deductible. Such conflicts can be resolved by appealing to concrete others who have the requisite authority to decide the issue (for instance, a judge specialized in fiscal matters). There is no such external point of reference for Crusoe, the objection continues: Crusoe cannot *ask* any other member of the human community to check whether he is following any rule.

We can reply by adapting an idea from Simon Blackburn, who writes: "The members of a [social, JK] community stand to each other as the momentary time-slices of individuals do" (Blackburn 294). Crusoe, as we have already seen, is able to predict future outcomes of applying a given rule on the basis of previous ones (past and future Crusoe being different 'time-slices' of the same individual). Consider the rules for 'solving the top'. Crusoe does not have to resort to introspection in order to find out whether he has followed those rules; nor does he need others to check the outcomes. He simply asks: are all the squares on the top the same color? More generally, Crusoe knows what the outcome of applying the rule is and is in a position to check whether or not the outcome has been realized, even though he is by himself.

But this explanation cannot suffice. After all, there is no matter of fact in virtue of which Crusoe has followed any rule: he may have unwittingly applied a different rule, which coincidentally results in the expected outcome. Only at this point does it matter that Crusoe is a member of the human community.

Of course, the point of his membership is not that he can count on the support of concrete others (he cannot), but rather that human beings form a community that accepts some putative instances of rule-following and rejects others. The questions whether or not 'born Crusoes' follow a rule in particular cases can be answered by referring to the attempts of others (for instance, the calculations they performed). It does not matter that those earlier attempts took place across the ocean and without Crusoe's knowledge: they have set standards that apply to his own attempt here and now. Again, this is conditional on the existence of propensities to agreement with respect to the rule, which is an empirical matter. Further examples about which the required kind of agreement exists include logical rules of inference, such as *Modus ponens* and simplification (also known as conjunctive elimination).

The question of justification is answered by appealing to either acceptance by a social community, as in the case of legal deductibility, or acceptability within the human community, as in the case of addition.[10] We have seen that there are different layers of membership: membership in the human community is more fundamental than membership in subcommunities (the latter requires the former). Correspondingly, acceptability is more fundamental than acceptance. A human being follows a given rule if and only if the relevant (social or human) community does *or would* accept that he is doing so.

There are, as Kripke said, no "supersensible, infinite realities" (Kripke 106) to be grasped that are somehow independent of any community. But we need not, and in fact should not, conclude that Crusoe cannot be a rule-follower. We can have our cake and eat it too: rule-following is determined by community membership *and* Crusoe can be a rule-follower. I have provided three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. To sum up, rule-following requires stable patterns we can come to recognize, so that it is possible to verify or falsify that we have followed a given rule. Thinking in terms of cooperation among all humankind ('the orchestra of humanity', to extend Blackburn's metaphor) is an important step, because mutual support on such a scale is a plausible standard of justification. The third and final condition is that acceptability within the human community is necessary for following a rule.

If I have been treating the issue fairly, the private language argument affects only putative instances of rule-following that do not jointly satisfy the three conditions outlined above. There are many implications outside of the debate about Kripke's skeptical paradox. To give one example, due to Stephen Law: imagine a solitary prisoner, who secretly records the days on which he sees rats in his cell by writing an exclamation mark in his diary. Law thinks that the prisoner's way of responding to rats cannot count as fol-

[10] Of course, it is possible that a Crusoe-like figure does not *know* whether he is following a rule that is acceptable from the point of view of the human community. But this is an epistemological question. Crusoe's ignorance of whether the criterion applies in individual cases does not take away from the fact that he is either following a rule or not in virtue of that criterion.

lowing a rule because of the private language argument (Law 165): but that conclusion seems impossible to justify. Why would the prisoner be unable to perform this simple technique? And indeed, the prisoner fulfils all three conditions (he can rest assured).

On the other hand, if the same prisoner were to write an 'A' into his diary every time he experienced the *Angst* of post-industrial man under late capitalism, then he would not be following a rule. For in that case, the portion of the world that he experiences (which is part of his inner mental life rather than the external world) is impossible to verify or falsify. Many cases and examples can be added: as in so many other matters, Wittgenstein's writings remain a valuable source.

Conclusion

The private language argument presents a challenge to any philosopher of language, whether he is interested in Wittgenstein's original intentions or not. Kripke has provided a very interesting version of the argument, but seems to go overboard when he considers the implications for a private language. I applied a second skeptical solution (in the spirit of Kripke's initial one) to Kripke's own position, in order to salvage the intuition that individuals considered in isolation can follow rules. The private language argument, understood as an argument against solitary rule-following, does not apply to Crusoe-like figures. It only applies to putative instances of rule-following, *R*, that do not jointly satisfy the three following conditions:

(1) *R* assumes regularities, stable patterns, that we can come to recognize;
(2) *R* assumes the possibility of verifying/falsifying whether a given rule has been followed;
(3) *R* is acceptable as an instance of language or a rule within the human community.

If interpreted in this way, the private language argument can be thought of as a counter to (a) implicit and explicit forms of 'communitarian solipsism' and (b) the truly objective kind of analysis embraced by some authors. Rules refer to the community in which they are formulated, but not every rule is 'merely' a function of social communities. We have to occupy the middle ground between the 'solipsist' and the 'objectivist' if we are to make sense of the all-important practice of rule-following.

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Is it Forbidden to Kill Someone?
Relevance Theory's Contribution to Deontic Logic

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Abstract

In this paper I would like to show how the Relevance Theory in general and the analysis of imperative mood in it can help us in one of the fundamental tasks of deontic logic. If we would like to use deontic logic for norm semantics, we—or the software we use—just need to find the deontic words before the regulated actions to use the proper operator in the deontic logical formula. But sometimes we cannot find such words in legal texts, thus we have to retrieve information on deontic status from the textual context: Relevance Theory can be of assistance in this process.

Keywords: Relevance Theory, deontic logic, norm semantics, interpretation of legal rules, legal texts

Deontic logic: the problem

Deontic[1] logic is the logic of norms and normative systems. The main issue it addresses is well illustrated in what is called Jørgensen's dilemma. Jørgen Jørgensen was wondering in his famous article *Imperatives and Logic* (1937) how inferences can play a role in the judicial application of laws: logical inferences can work only on claims which are descriptions, but a law and a judgement are not descriptions but prescriptions. What kind of inferences are we talking about? Here is a simple example:

> If you undertake *p* in a contract, do *p*.
> You undertook *p*.
> (Therefore) Do *p*.

This inference is like a modus ponens: we have two premises and a conclusion. And actually this is how judicial application works. There is an act (or some other kind of rule of law), there is a state of affairs, and in virtue of these, the judge returns a ver-

[1] Greek deon - δέον (gen.: δέοντος) – it means "that which is binding, that which is ought to be done".

dict. The process does not seem problematic, but it is from a logical point of view: our first "premise" and our "conclusion" are not really descriptions but prescriptions. How can the inference still work on them?

Deontic logic: the solution

The answer can be given by a system in which the prescriptions are translated into descriptions and the latter are simply handled by classical logic or by some version of it. This system was fully elaborated for first time by Georg von Wright in 1951 in his famous article *Deontic Logic*. He said the existential form of norms is their validity (being a legal norm means being legally valid), hence we can assign a *true deontic claim* to every valid norm, and a false one to every invalid norm also. The notion of (formal) *legal validity* — which is the base of von Wright's starting point —is about whether the norm (the act) was created by the authorized power and whether this power did it in the prescribed way (Szabó 35). The norms' and prescriptions' typical linguistic form is imperative mood (at least this is our first intuition): "Shut the door!", "Open the window!", "Keep off the grass!". After our "translation" (the operation by which we assign a deontic claim to our norms), our deontic claims will have special modality: deontic modality. It is not so easy to define what a linguistic modality is, but there are some features which can help us to describe and to recognize it: a modality is usually defined by means by which it can be expressed. Modality can be expressed by a variety of means: auxiliary verbs, adverbs, grammatical mood. Deontic modality is the peculiar property of superior/subordinate relationships' utterances (Kiefer 12). There are some typical means that are used in these kind of sentences which exhibit deontic modality – in English we call these words deontic auxiliary verbs. These are 'ought to', 'must', 'have to' (which express obligation) 'forbidden', 'must not' (which express prohibition), 'may', 'can' (which in these kinds of sentences express permission). So what we get from our prescriptions above are (true) deontic claims like: "Shutting the door is obligatory", "We ought to open the window," and "Walking on grass is forbidden" respectively. The deontic auxiliary verbs describe the content of the norms, the former somehow refer to the latter. The adjectives like 'obligatory', 'forbidden' and 'permitted' show the deontic status of the actions in the described norms. In formal deontic logic we use these states as operators—*O* as obligatory, *F* as forbidden and *P* as permitted—and this is the basis for generating formulas. For example if A is 'shutting the door' the first deontic claim is *O*A as a formula. With these kinds of formulas we can "perform" logically valid implications – so we solved Jørgensen's dilemma.[2]

[2] Of course deontic logic is not so simple and we did not by a long solve all the raising problems, but in this paper we focus only on one of them.

Deontic logic in norm semantics

And what about legal norms? We do not really find a legal norm in the imperative mood. Linguistically speaking, they are already formed as our deontic claims using adjectives we used above in our translations: "Unfair commercial practices are prohibited".[3] Or at least these norms contain a deontic auxiliary verb which enables us using–or enables us programming our software to use–the right deontic operator in creating a formula: "Any person who provides a health care service for the purposes of the NHS must hold a licence under this Chapter".[4] It means we don't have to trouble ourselves with assigning deontic force to a claim: we get it readily. The legal norm describes itself. By the looks of things it is not quite a job to formalize them: we look up the deontic word and we know which operator to use: for 'prohibited' we use *F*, for 'must' we use *O*. And this can be the basis for using a software to analyze legal norms' texts: if the software finds a deontic word before the word which refers to an action, it formalizes the rule using the right operator assigned to a given deontic word.[5] But sometimes the task at hand–not only from a deontic logical point of view but in natural language processing as well (e.g. a well-functioning parser)–is not so simple: what if the software does not find any deontic word before the action, but we still think–what is more, we are really convinced–that, obviously, it is a regulated one?

Deontic logic in norm semantics: a problematic case

Let's see section 160 of the Hungarian Criminal Code: "Any person who kills another human being is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between five to fifteen years".[6] This is the official[7] translation, but it is not entirely faithful to the original, which goes as follows: "Aki mást megöl, bűntett miatt öt évtől tizenöt évig terjedő szabadságvesztéssel büntetendő." A more verbatim translation would go this way: "Any person who kills another human being should be punished with five to fifteen years of imprisonment due to having committed a felony." The difference is important, because

[3] Act XLVII of 2008 on Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices (of Hungary).

[4] Health and Social Care Act 2012 (2012 c. 7) of United Kingdom 81 (1).

[5] Of course it is only the first step on a very long route: automated formalizing needs an amount of other conditions and problems to be solved. Not just the proper norm semantics is required; in most languages it is absolutely not plausible how a parser could be created which is able to manage tasks like the ones that will be sketched in this chapter. But in this article I do not want to go into details regarding NLP, I only want to indicate that the considerations described above are also relevant for programming.

[6] Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (of Hungary).

[7] 'Official' here does not mean it has been published by the State: this translation is made by the publisher (Wolters Kluwer) who is the legal database supplier of Hungarian courts and public prosecutor's offices.

it does matter whether the judge has the *option* to punish the perpetrator (as the former version suggests it with "punishable"), or whether he *must* do that. The original Hungarian text of the Criminal Code contains an obligation for the judge.[8] This is all we can find there; however, there is no explicit textual obligation for any other agents. What about the murder? There is no prohibition of homicide in the Hungarian Criminal Code. Is it not forbidden to kill someone in Hungary? The relevant article says only that the person who kills another commits a felony. But there is no explicit prohibition of committing a felony. So is it permitted? And the same goes for all felonies as well, since there is a long list of them in the Code: there is no explicit prohibition. In the Canadian Criminal Code, for example, there is a list of felonies presented in a very similar way as in the Hungarian Criminal Code, but there is a title above the list: "Prohibited Acts".[9] Is Hungary unlike Canada in the sense that committing a felony is permitted? This conclusion would be most bizarre, but how do we infer the opposite (as we obviously do), if there is no clear sign of a prohibition on committing a felony?

Relevance Theory's contribution I – general level

Relevance Theory can help us in two different ways in answering the preceding question. In this first way—with Relevance Theory as a general frame of describing communication and cognition—we can understand how this labelling of committing a felony can be so obvious in human interpretation; specifically, what is the process of interpretation that allows us to extract deontic statements from legal texts.

Relevance Theory is a theory of communication, philosophy of language and cognitive science, which explains every process of communication in virtue of relevance. This theory fits the Gricean tradition but exceeds that: the relevance as a notion has already been a part of the Gricean communication theory. According to Grice there is a common principle of communication, which tacitly governs every conversation: the principle of cooperation. Subsumed under the principle are four maxims as the maxim of quality (be truthful), the maxim of quantity (make your contribution as informative as it is required), the maxim of relation (be relevant) and the maxim of manner (be clear).[10] But the core of Grice's third maxim, relevance, plays a central role in the theory of Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber. This theory regards communication as an ostensive-inferential process which means inferences have a huge role in it; we do not only code and decode

[8] Of course there is a real possibility for the judge: she can choose—considering the circumstances—the length of the imprisonment. But about the fact of the penalty she cannot ponder.

[9] Consolidation Criminal Code Chapter C-46 Current to October 6, 2010. Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca.

[10] Here I consider the Gricean theory more or less known—for details see "Logic and Conversation" in *Studies in the Way of Words*.

in language use, instead, we make inferences in order to discern what is the speaker's meaning behind the literal meaning of the sentences our conversational partner utters. Finding the speaker's meaning relevant is our "beacon". Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance (this is the communicative principle of relevance); and relevance attends as a cognitive factor as well. Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (this is the cognitive principle of relevance) (Sperber and Wilson 65). That is we hear an utterance, we understand the literal meaning of the words in it but to grasp the speaker's full meaning, we make inferences. In these inferences our background information is input as well. And we have quite a lot background information, which helps us to infer what is intended meaning of the Criminal Code's paragraphs, especially due to one of Relevance Theory's principles above: every utterance has a promise about its relevance and the hearer has an expectation about this. This expectation, assumption and promise, and the background information enable us to infer what the speaker means by her utterance. What kind of background information do we have in the case of a criminal code? We know a lot about the tasks of the State maintaining public order, protecting citizens' safety. All of us have a conception of the values of society including the protection of life. Everybody has some knowledge about the system of rules, the role of legislation. And most importantly we have background information about the institution of penalty. What is penalized is not desirable. And if the State pronounces something undesirable (by the implementation of law in a legal norm) and contacts a (bad) consequence, a sanction to doing it, this disposition has to be understood as a prohibition. As a matter of fact this is what we call prohibition—when someone who has authorization, in our case the State, pronounces an action undesirable and threats with a bad consequence in case of doing it. And with this act the State actually says: "do not do that". To convince the reader of the correctness of this last assignment (pronouncing something undesirable to prohibition as an imperative act) as a step in our inference, we find another, specifically linguistic supporting point in Relevance Theory.

Relevance Theory's contribution II – on a more specific level

Relevance Theory provides an analysis of imperative mood that can help us in mapping what kind of *linguistic* considerations (or at least linguistic intuitions behind considerations) we might use in interpreting this kind of utterances. These considerations are probably based on the knowledge on how deontic statements are expressed by tools of natural language, sometimes without using overt deontic words. This explanation can give us insights we can use in programming: what kind of literal linguistic signs can be given as ones to be sought by our software to choose the right deontic operator in formalizing.[11]

[11] See footnote 5.

In the 10th chapter of *Meaning and Relevance* Sperber and Wilson examine mood to analyze nondeclarative sentences. They dissect interrogative and imperative mood as well; for us the latter will be of interest. They present some interpretations of imperative mood, notably Searle's one, which seems to be the most common: we use imperative mood to make someone do something. But Sperber and Wilson highlight examples for which the definition does not work: in which on the surface, on the syntactical level we use imperative mood, but our utterances don't have imperative force. For example, when someone asks directions, we usually say things like "Go ahead", "Turn right", "Take bus 3", etc., but we do not really mind if the hearer follows our instructions. In other words, we do not *want to make* him do that. Also, if someone asks permission to go away and in our answer to give the permission we say "Go, then", we would not describe our utterance as a command making him do something. Sperber and Wilson give a new account for imperative mood, which can explain these cases above as well. In this account the imperative mood concerns two crucial notions: desirability and achievability. The action in question has to be desirable for someone, and that someone doesn't have to be the speaker. It can be the hearer or someone else as well. Moreover, the action in question has to be achievable, potential, performable. For example, the tourist wants to go to Deák square, so for him going (arriving) there is a desirable action or state of affairs. When I say to him standing on Andrássy avenue "Go ahead," it doesn't matter whether the result (that he arrives to the square) is desirable for me, it's enough that it is desirable for him. But it does matter whether the action proposed by me is achievable: I do not say "Fly there" or "Tap your heels three times" because in the real world—at least due to the present state of science—it does not really work, so arriving to Deák square would not be achievable by this action. But going ahead is achievable, so what I used actually was imperative mood. How does this help us in interpreting the Criminal Code? Section 160 does not use a *syntactical* imperative mood but does use a *semantic* one. It pronounces an action (the murder) undesirable and with that it pronounces an achievable action (forbearing homicide) desirable. Whether desirable for society, or for the State, generally everybody would agree that forbearance of homicide is desirable; one of the basics of universal human rights is the inherent right to life. We make an assumption and expectation about the utterance's—I mean the Code's—relevance, we have some background information; we know that one of the State's tasks is to regulate human actions and we know the State does this by legal norms. So if we find an action pronounced desirable or undesirable in a legal norm, it has to be understood as a regulation of our action due to the relating norm. We understand that, in case when a textual command or prohibition is missing, by virtue of the norm's content: the qualification of the action. We know that if the State did not want to make us forbear an action, it would not pronounce that action undesirable with punishing performing it. So—with all of these—we *infer* and *understand* the aim, the meaning of it as a prohibition of homicide.

Conclusion

If we know the real meaning (the "speaker's meaning") of this norm we can form a true deontic claim: we already know we have to use the *F* operator relating to homicide when we put it down to formulas in spite of the fact that we did not find any deontic word implying prohibition. So we can make the Hungarian Criminal Code's content manageable by logic and our inferences based on it can be valid, and what is more important, the judge's inferences can likewise be valid. In this way Relevance Theory's principles and imperative mood's explanation help us in the starting point task of deontic logic: supporting in interpretation (from a deontic point of view) textually defective legal norms with saying to us which deontic operator shall be used to create a correct formula with which we will have valid inferences.

After having provided this nice conclusion the following question may arise: if desirability (and achievability) of the regulated action are such typical features of legal norms, maybe it could be the notion on the basis of which we make our claims of them in deontic logic in place of legal validity. After all, as we saw above, we had a legally valid norm but this validity was not enough to enable us to make surely correct deontic formulas in our deontic logic. In this new account with desirability (and achievability) a deontic claim would be true if (and only if) the norm which would be described by it would be about an achievable and desirable action (or state of affairs). On the one hand, these properties about actions have already been present in law as tacit requirements—a legal norm which obligates us to do something impossible would be in contrast to common sense. On the other hand, desirability is a subjective category, i.e., nobody feels an overpowering desire to pay his due, but we know (at least it is somehow commonly known—or it should be) that from a social point of view tax is a necessary (so desirable) institution of a society. Of course we can try to formulate the notion of public welfare, but it will never be unquestionable.

There is another argument against the change of legal validity to desirability. Desirability and achievability are not exclusive properties of legal norms. We can speak of them as requirements in the context of moral norms as well. For example, the norm "Be honest" is not a legal one despite bearing by the action in it achievability and desirability. The unique point of legal norms is, on the one hand, the institution of (declared, legal) sanction (which expresses the qualification of the related action and by which we could grasp the speaker meaning above),[12] while on the other hand, the power behind them which make them absolutely distinguishable from other norms. This latter parameter can be described much better with the notion of legal validity

[12] Issues of sanction and its role in deontic logic are worth much consideration, but they are not in our investigation scope now.

than anything else. Thus desirability and achievability remain at the base of law-interpretation, but there they are really useful notions.

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Интерпретативни модуси во културната антропологија: Исчекор кон нови креативни рефлексии за човештвото

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Abstract

The central aim of this text is to reflect upon the contemporary state of affairs in social sciences, with a focus on cultural anthropology and the dominant shift towards interpretive rethinking of human society, which took place by the end of last century. To this end, the text gives an overview of the premises of interpretive anthropology, which marks its zenith in the 60ties of the twentieth century. Interpretive anthropology and the interpretive modes of reflecting humanity in general, have powerfully entered the realm of social sciences at the end of the twentieth century. As such, they brought about the potency to resist and break the positivists, formal ways of knowing the world. This text is, hence, an attempt at criticizing the dominant view according to which human society can best be understood through positivist and often sterile scientific methods, and that everything else which does not belong to that realm, comes down to subjective, relativist speculations. Instead, through a dialogical analysis of several interpretive anthropological works (Geertz, Weiner, Rabinow, Taussig), this text brings forth both the complexities of the interpretive turn, but at the same time the motivation to regain faith in both cultural anthropology and the interpretive, hermeneutic approaches to studying human society.

Keywords: interpretive anthropology, hermeneutics, constructivism, subjectivity, relativism, hermeneutic ontology

Антрополошките трансформации и раѓањето на интерпретативната антропологија

Антропологијата во XX-от век исклучително многу се разликува од сите други антрополошки позиции доминантни во претходното столетие. Таа тогаш беше цврсто поврзана со своите помошни дисциплини (археологија, биолошка антропологија, социокултурна антропологија), а стремежот беше фокусиран кон пронаоѓање на еден генерален клуч за човештвото по пат на споредување на податоците добиени од истражувањето на разликите кај луѓето во минатото и во сегашноста.

Несомнено, меѓу главните претходници на современата антрополошка мисла, кои се обидуваа да ја следат линијата во еволуцијата на институциите, обредите и мисловните модуси од „примитивни“ кон модерни, секако беа Тајлор (Tylor), Фрејзер (Frazer), Диркем (Durkheim) и Морган (Morgan).

Радикалната промена што ѝ се случи на антропологијата на почетокот од XX-от век се состоеше во новиот фокус кој го добија општествената и културната антропологија. Тој фокус беше директно насочен кон една од најспецифичните антрополошки методи – етнографијата. Во XX-от век, етнографијата помогна во поврзувањето на она што инаку претходно, во XIX-от век, беа неколку издвоени процеси. Со други зборови, антропологијата во XIX-от век беше сублимат од неколку изолирани целини, меѓу кои беа собирањето податоци од прединдустриските или не-западни општества изведувано претежно од страна на аматери и теоретизирањето за нив во академските тврдини на антрополозите. Бронислав Малиновски (Bronisław Malinowski) со првото поглавје на неговото дело *Argonauts of the West Pacific* се издвои како доминантна фигура во етаблирањето на етнографската метода како во британската, така и во американската антропологија. Впрочем, Малиновски е честопати референцијата за големата промена во теоретската парадигма во британската антрополошка традиција заедно со Редклиф-Браун (Radcliffe-Brown) кој истата 1922 година го објавува своето дело *The Andaman Islanders.* Таа промена подразбираше напуштање на потрагата по некакво дадено потекло на нештата, односно по некаква инхерентна супстанција што би послужила во историското објаснување на нештата. Наместо тоа, се постави една нова цел, која подразбираше анализата на етнографските податоци да се прави низ призмата на нурнување на антропологот во секој детаљ од животот на народот што го изучува, или со други зборови, антропологот требаше да го бара значењето на нештата *внатре* самиот објект на истражување (Barth et al. 22).

Малиновски со својот фукционалистички пристап воочи дека сите делови на една локална култура имаат некаква улога во функционирањето на сите други делови и дека, според тоа, секоја култура сочинува една интегрирана, комплексна целина во рамките на која човекот се адаптирал на физичките надворешни и колективни услови. Веќе во овој пристап се согледува потрагата по значења *внатре* самиот субјект на истражување, односно сознанието дека она што на почетокот можеби се чини арбитрарно и безначајно, всушност игра голема улога кај луѓето, односно, претставува дел од генералниот механизам за опстанок.

Сличен беше и зафатот на Редклиф-Браун, кој во концептот на функционализмот изнајде начин да го преиначи антрополошкиот пристап од потрага по некакво потекло или есенција на нештата, кон потрага по некаква структура и меѓусебна поврзаност на елементите во целината. Тој ги направи своите истражувања на Андаманските Острови далеку пред Малиновски да ги истражува Тробријандите (имено од 1906-1908 година). Изборот на Андаманските Острови беше заснован врз претпоставката дека станува збор за најпримитивна и најелементарна форма на живот на собирачко-ловечка заедница. За разлика од Малиновски, кој концептот на функцијата повеќе го врзуваше за конкретните човечки потреби, Редклиф-Браун повеќе се фокусираше на функцијата што институциите во една заедница ја имаат во одржувањето на таа заедница воопшто. Со други зборови, тој го дешифрираше значењето на секој обичај низ призмата на релацијата на тој конкретен обичај со останатите обичаи, односно со генералниот систем на идеи и чувства во заедницата. Со тоа, Редклиф-Браун очигледно разви далеку поапстрактно ниво на анализа на заедниците од онаа карактеристична за Малиновски.

Главната трансформација на антропологијата во XX-от век, гледано според овие случувања, се состоеше всушност во самиот етнографско-истражувачки процес определен со два клучни елемента. Првиот се однесува на регистрирање на културните разлики претежно помеѓу не-западните народи, а вториот беше културна критика на културата на самиот антрополог, односно истражувач (Marcus & Fischer 36, 37). Самиот премин и реорганизација на антропологијата од наука за Човекот, кон етнографијата како клучен елемент на оваа дисциплина, во практична смисла значеше крај за генерализациите и „гранд теориите“. Како што ќе забележат Маркус и Фишер, холизмот во антропологијата го помести своето тежиште со тоа што антрополозите своето тежнеење кон некакви универзални тврдења го заменија со тежнеење за што поцелосно и попрецизно прикажување на определен начин на живот. Конечно и во самата етнографија се случија бројни промени, така што од оној горенаведен холистички фокус и голема доза на реализам во 60-те години од минатиот век, теоретизирањето се помести кон менталната култура, односно обидот да се сфати гледиштето, искуството и односот кон животот на оној кого го изучуваме. Токму во оваа инстанција се изродија и првите никулци на интерпретативната антропологија.

Пресек на интерпретативната антропологија

Интерпретацијата стекна голема репутација и престиж во филозофските кругови, но и во сферата на општествените науки во последните декади од XX-от век. Свртувањето кон интерпретацијата се состоеше и во отпорот кон линеарните, стерилни, позитивистички модуси на спознавање на светот и фрли зрак светлина врз можноста за инаков начин на обмислување на човештвото. Таа дистинкција помеѓу доменот и прецизноста на докажувањето на хипотезите на она што го истражуваат природните науки и позитивистичките методи наспроти науките што се занимаваат со човекот и светот на едно поинакво ниво, Кант (Kant) мошне прецизно ја доловува во *Критика на чистиот ум*. Моќта на природните науки за некакво логичко докажување на нештата следува од фактот што тие се засноваат врз логичен субјект чии активности можат да се генерализираат и да се сметаат за независни од контекстот. За спознавањето на човекот, пак, Кант ја воочува нужноста од постоење на една

„практична антропологија" која ќе се фокусира на субјект кој себеси се спознава преку рефлектирање за сопствените постапки како субјект кој не е само искуствен, туку е и субјект што во себе има содржина за интенционално дејствување. Во таа смисла Рабинов и Саливан (Rabinow и Sullivan) предупредуваат дека иако интерпретативниот пристап во општествените науки не е сам по себе кантовски, сепак се заснова врз претпоставката дека практичното спознавање на нештата во даден контекст не може да се сведе на систем од категории дефинирани според нивната релација едни со други. (Rabinow & Sullivan 4)

Интерпретативниот пристап значеше и рефокусирање врз конкретните облици на културно значење во сета нивна партикуларност и комплексна текстура, при тоа не запаѓајќи во стапиците на историзмот и културниот релативизам (Rabinow & Sullivan 6). Рабинов и Саливан ќе забележат дека интерпретативниот пристап ја негира опозицијата помеѓу субјективноста и објективноста. Овој пристап, имено, го одбива тврдењето дека комплексната стварност на значења (сигнификации) може да се сведе на производ на самосвеста во традиционална филозофска смисла. Наместо тоа, интерпретацијата поаѓа од постулатот дека мрежата од значења го конституира човечкото искуство до таа мера што тоа никогаш не може да се сведе на некакви претходни дидактички релации или други однапред дефинирани елементи. Во таа смисла, овие автори сметаат дека интерпретативната општествена наука всушност може да се нарече враќање кон објективниот свет, како комплексен систем од значења во кој постојано се наоѓаме.

Интерпретативната (симболичката) антропологија својот подем го бележи во втората половина од XX-от век или поточно од 1960-та година. Терминот се користи за да го означи специфичниот пристап како кон антрополошката пракса така и кон поимањето на културата. Пред сè, дојде до оддалечување од материјалистичките теории и функционалистичките интерпретации, според кои културата е средство за приспособување на човекот на природата. Истовремено, наместо да се толкува културата како нешто независно од поединецот, акцентот почна да се става на улогата на поединецот во обликувањето на културата (Moore 280). Најексклузивниот маркер на оваа антрополошка струја беше фокусот врз симболите и симболичкиот карактер на културата, а со тоа и врз *значењето* како неизбежен сопатник на симболите. Уште повеќе, доколку се земат предвид повеќеслојните значења на симболите, културата може да се разбере само низ интерпретација со чија помош антропологот продира и ја расплетува мрежата на значења креирана од членовите на определената заедница. Во овој сегмент и со своите длабоки интереси за симболичките темели на културата, секако најдоминантен беше Герц (Geertz). Со оглед на тоа што симболите поседуваат определена динамика и повеќеслојни значења, интерпретативната антропологија не остава простор за генерализациите специфични за претходните антрополошки парадигми според кои се даваат квалификации дека одредена култура е ваква или онаква [Бенедикт (Benedict), Мид (Mead), на пример]. Наместо тоа, како што прецизира и Мур,

„објаснувањето подразбира сместување на некој настан во мрежата од посебни културни мотиви, вредности и намери на учесниците. Така, улогата на антропологот не е толкување на културното случување внатре сеопфатната, универзална рамка, туку негово толкување внатре посебниот код на значење" (Moore 281).

Во обликувањето на оваа антрополошка парадигма значајна улога одиграа и филозофските и интелектуалните трендови како што се феноменологијата, структурализмот, семиотиката, франкфуртската школа на критичка теорија и херменевтиката (Marcus & Fischer 41). Оваа антропологија во голема мера се разликуваше од другите антрополошки струи во размислата и преиспитувањето на валидноста на етнографската интерпретација, односно анализата на самиот процес на истражување. Ова луцидно го дефинираат Маркус и Фишер велејќи дека „интерпретативната антропологија дејствува во исто време на две нивоа: собира информации за другите светови одвнатре и ги промислува епистемолошките темели на тие информации" (41).

Она што е пресвртувачко во интерпретативното обмислување во рамките на општествените науки е укажувањето на круцијалната грешка во научните кругови што се состои во обидот хируршки да се отсече истражувањето од неговиот историски и практичен контекст, како и во убедувањето дека валидноста и вистината за светот или за општеството може да се изолира од концептите на моралност и од механизмите на моќ. Дополнителна инспирација и поткрепа на оваа критика извира и од Гадамер (Gadamer) кој смета дека човечкото постоење може да се разбере само како инхерентно историско и длабоко нурнато во традицијата. Традицијата не е само збир од линеарно минато на обичаи и светогледи, туку, напротив, таа е борба за значење, можност и нужност од постојана реапропријација на историјата (Rabinow & Sulliwan 23). Токму во таа смисла, општествениот живот е постојана конверзација за стварноста, а со тоа и процес на континуирана интерпретација наместо повторување на некакви трајни, засекогаш дадени вистини или традиции. И токму во тоа лежи моќта на интерпретативниот пресврт во општествените науки.

Дијалошки ракурс со неколку интерпретативни антрополошки студии

Она што следува е дијалошка презентација на неколку антрополошки текстови кои проблеснуваат со интерпретативна интонација. Целта е да се укаже на исклучителната разновидност во интерпретативните пристапи, а со тоа и на нивната моќ и свежина да создадат едно поадекватно спознавање на светот. Клифорд Герц (Clifford Geertz) се вбројува во најеминентните антрополози на денешното време, особено на изминатите триесеттина години и секако е еден од основоположниците на интерпретативната антропологија. Меѓу другото, тој сметаше дека не ни е потребна нова криптографија, туку нова дијагностика, односно наука што ќе може да го одреди значењето на нештата, за животот што се ткае околу овие значења. Герц се обиде да најде одговор на човечката посебност, не заобиколувајќи го фактот дека секогаш и секаде постојат и одредени универзалности. Имајќи го тоа предвид, тој се обиде да ја согледа деликатноста на балансирањето на овие две сили. Тој истовремено е и еден од стожерите на, како што вели Ортнер (Ortner), реконфигурирањето на границата меѓу општествените и хуманистичките науки. Еден од клучните концепти за какво било разбирање на културите за Герц е токму *херменевтиката*, која ја гледа како средство со помош на кое тој ги изучува симболите и симболичките системи со цел да го долови начинот на кој луѓето го разбираат општествениот, религискиот и економскиот контекст и дејствуваат во него. Идејата за херменевтиката како единствен вистински начин на доближување и осознавање на карактеристиките на една култура, односно на начините на кои луѓето му даваат смисла на светот, Герц секако ја црпи од неговите претходници како што се Рикерт (Rickert), Дилтај (Dilthey), Хајдегер (Heidegger), Рикер (Ricoeur), Шуц (Schutz), Витгенштајн (Wittgenstein). Всушност, Герцовиот пристап кон интерпретацијата, во голема мера ја црпи својата инспирација токму од Дилтај и неговиот *Geisteswissenschaften* (духовни науки) во онаа смисла во која и духовните науки на Дилтај се стремат кон *разбирање* на дејствијата наспроти чистата *дескрипција* или *експликација*. Ваквиот пристап јасно го води Герц кон една крајно партикуларистичка и релативистичка димензија во антропологијата со која тој се доближува до класичните мислители како што се Боас (Boas) и Бенедикт. Антрополошката интерпретација, според Герц, „ги конструира толкувањата на она што се случува“ (Geertz 29). Доколку се одвои од мигот, од она што во дадениот момент го говорат и прават луѓето, за Герц, антропологијата ќе ја загуби својата примена и ќе стане празна. Иако најпознат по својот епски есеј за борбата на петли на Бали, овде Герц и неговиот интерпретативен допир ќе го разгледаме низ неговите прекршувања со структурализмот и тоа токму на оној етаблиран од Клод Леви-Строс (Claude Lévi-Strauss).

Леви-Строс не се занимава со општествената структура разбрана како матрица на односи што се воспоставуваат меѓу луѓето индивидуално или групно, туку се занимава со структурата на човечкиот ум. Тој се стреми да покаже дека структурата на човечкиот ум е таква, што тој несвесно ги уредува и преуредува идеите, темите, симболите и објектите во определени шеми, така создавајќи ја културата. Нашиот ум, смета тој, функционира според моделот на „бинарни опозиции“, односно правење на контрасти. Токму тука е и првата реакција на интерпретативната антропологија што се спротивставува на идејата дека значењата се воспоставуваат по пат на контраст помеѓу различни аспекти на културата, а не од формите на симболите кои доминираат во една култура. Истовремено, како што истакнува Ортнер (Ortner 136), додека структуралистите се фокусираат на анализа на дејствијата изолирано од актерите-учесници во тие дејствија, интерпретативната антропологија смета дека актерот е во центарот на секое дејствие. Структуралната антропологија исто така го анализира симболот само во рамките на неговото место во *системот*, а не како интегрален дел и предуслов за да се разбере системот. Овој јаз помеѓу идеалистичкиот пристап на интерпретативната антропологија од една, и материјализмот карактеристичен за структуралната антропологија од друга страна, доминира во 60-тите и 70-тите години од XX-от век.

Герц особено интензивно се спротивстави на некои од видувањата на Леви-Строс во неговиот есеј *The Cerebral Savage: On the Work of Claude Levi-Strauss* објавен во збирката есеи *The Interpretation of Cultures* во која длабински ги преиспитува ставовите кои Леви-Строс ги изнесе во неговото дело *Tristes Tropiques.* Уште на самиот почеток на овој есеј, Герц ја изнесува изјавата на Леви-Строс дека дури и ден-денес му се наметнува прашањето дали кон антропологијата, сосема несвесно го привлекла структуралната блискост помеѓу цивилизациите што се нејзин предмет на истражување и неговиот сопствен процес на мислење. „Мојата свест е неолитска", ќе изјави Леви-Строс во *Tristes Tropiques.* Навистина, верува Герц, личниот однос на антропологот кон предметот на проучување е веројатно попроблематичен од односот на кој било друг научник кон својот предмет на изучување. Антропологот, проучувајќи ги другите култури, веројатно никогаш нема да најде точен одговор на прашањето дали се можеби тие други, далечни народи (конкретно дивјаци, оти по нив трагаше Леви-Строс во *Tristes Tropiqes)* благородни, сурови, ограничени, слободни, втонати во лудачки мистицизам или слични на нас, итн... Во оваа согледба, Герц зрачи со препораката за авторефлексивност што секој антрополог мора да ја поседува и што, самата по себе, е одгатка на она како тој/таа ќе ги интерпретира другите култури. Така, тој вели дека доколку знаете што антропологот мисли за дивјаците, ќе го имате клучот на неговото дело. Истовремено, доколку знаете што антропологот мисли за самиот себеси, генерално ќе знаете што ќе каже за кое било племе што е предмет на неговото изучување. Ова го води Герц кон заклучокот дека, „целата етнографија е делумно филозофија, а добар дел од она што не е филозофија е исповед" (Geertz 128).

За Леви-Строс, како што ќе забележи Герц, етнографијата се обидува, отаде емпириската разновидност на заедниците, да дојде токму до она што е непроменливо. Затоа за него етнографијата го отвора патот за сите оние што се потпираат врз природните науки. Токму во фактот што кај Леви-Строс двете лица на антропологијата, имено, како начин на активно пристапување кон светот и како метод за откривање на одредени законитости, не се свртени едно наспроти друго, лежи силата и привлечноста на неговото дело, верува Герц. За Герц, *Tristes Tropiques* е веројатно најубавата книга која некогаш ја напишал некој антрополог. Во неа провејува епската димензија на Херојот, кој трага низ волшебното царство полно со изненадувања, искушенија и откровенија, за потоа да се врати кон обичниот живот на резигниран и исцрпен патник. Но, за жал, Леви-Строс стаса како задоцнет Колумбо за да заклучи дека „Тропите не се толку егзотични колку што се старомодни". Секако, како што забележува Герц, во 1918 година, навистина две третини од Бразил се третираа како неистражена територија, но кога Леви-Строс заминува таму во 1935-та година во потрага по луѓе сведени на основен израз, не наоѓа ниту еден домородец. На неколку километри постоеше резерват со домородци во него, но тоа Леви-Строс секако не го бараше. Така, тој разочарано ќе забележи дека она со што се соочил се „поранешни дивјаци“, односно оние на кои цивилизацијата одеднаш им се наметнала, а штом престанале да бидат опасност за општеството, цивилизацијата престанала да се интересира за нив.

Герц согледува дека она што му се случи на Леви-Строс на крајот од неговата потрага беше загатка. Леви-Строс секако сознава дека антропологот веројатно може да ги разбере другите само затоа што неговата сопствена култура веќе извршила влијание врз нив и ги прекрила со својот слој, или, пак, талка меѓу вистинските дивјаци, кои се многу ретки, но истовремено и толку различни што неговиот живот станува потполно одвоен од нивниот, а тие потполно неразбирливи, неинтерпретативни за него. Тој така ќе заклучи, „јас сум жртва на двојна немоќ: она што го гледам ми нанесува болка; она што не го гледам, срам“ (Geertz 134). Но токму од тагата и разочарувањето во *Tristes Tropique* ќе изникне задлабоченоста во структуралната лингвистика и инересот за неа, теоријата на комуникацијата и кибернетиката во неговата *La Pensée Sauvage* (1962). Тука Леви-Строс се свртува кон уверувањето дека луѓето едноставно избираат комбинации од репертоарот на идеи што им се првобитно дадени на располагање. Антропологијата е, според тоа, проучување на мислењето далеку повеќе отколку што е проучување на обичаите, верувањата и институциите.

Главната идеја на *La Pensée Sauvage,* како што ќе забележи Герц, е дека светот на поимни инструменти е ограничен кај дивјакот. Така тој гради модел за стварноста, светот, природата и за самиот себеси, но не како што тоа го прават модерните научници кои ги обединуваат апстрактните ставови во рамките на формалната теорија, туку ги уредуваат забележаните подробности во непосредно поимливи целини (Geertz 136).[1] Според ова, мислењето се состои во играње со елементите од поимниот свет што се претходно дадени. Ваквата анализа на *дивата мисла* Герц го води кон заклучокот дека Леви-Строс конструирал пеколна машина. Таа, вели тој, „ја поништува историјата, чувствата ги сведува на сенки на интелектот, а поединечните умови на поединечните дивјаци во поединечните џунгли, ги заменува со Дивиот ум својствен за сите нас“ (Geertz 141). Ова беше, смета Герц, начин за Леви-Строс да излезе од ќорсокакот во кој го однесе бразилската експедиција – физичката блискост и интелектуалната оддалеченост што подразбираше непремостливост меѓу светот на домородците и светот на Леви-Строс. Во оваа инстанца Герц смета дека станува збор за една основна структура што провејува кај Леви-Строс – универзалниот рационализам на францускoто просветителство. Уште повеќе, Герц е убеден дека вистинскиот *гуру* за Леви-Строс не беше никој друг туку Русо (Rousseau). За Русо, единствената солуција

[1] Конкретно, Герц укажува на тоа дека за Леви-Строс науката за конкретното ги уредува директно запазените реалности – разликите меѓу кенгурот и остригите, движењето на Сонцето и Месечевата мена, сезонскиот пораст и опаѓање на нивото на водата. Ова се структурални модели кои го претставуваат поредокот кој лежи во основата на реалноста (Geertz 136).

на парадоксот на задоцнетиот патник-антрополог, кој стасува предоцна или прерано за да ги најде вистинските дивјаци, е да развие способност да продре во *дивиот ум* користејќи го она што се нарекува епистемолошка емпатија (Geertz 143). Мислата на дивјакот нема да ја разбереме ниту со интроспекција, ниту со набљудување, туку во обидот да мислиме онака како што тие мислат. Потребна ни е, имено, неолитска интелигенција. Дивиот, нескротен начин на мислење е примарен за човечкиот менталитет. За човекот, според Русо, тогаш би било подобро да се придржува до средината помеѓу тромоста на примитивната состојба и трагичката активност на која нè наведува нашиот *amour propre*. Герц не е задоволен со ваквата поставеност на нештата и остро реагира прашувајќи се зарем е можно, после сè што се случи во 1762-та година, сè уште да се има верба во апсолутната превласт на разумот. Унификацијата на вистините и структурата на умот и нивната непроменливост, која ја заговараше Леви-Строс, претставува сериозен проблем за Герц, кој со сите сили се обидуваше да укаже на разновидноста на културите и неповторливоста на луѓето. Па така, тој ќе заклучи:

> Дури и да нема доволно „вистински дивјаци“, има доволно упадливи необични човечки единки што секоја доктрина за човекот која на него гледа како на носител на непроменливи вистини на разумот – „оригинална логика“ што произлегува од „структурата на умот“ – изгледа како чиста пикантерија, академски куриозитет. (Geertz 146)

За разлика од оваа интерпретативна леќа на Герц, Таусиг (Taussig) нуди една инаква перспектива низ својот длабински интерпретативен зафат на извештајот на Касмент (Casement) за насилието што компанијата на браќата Арана го правела врз Путумајо Индијанците од Јужна Америка во процесот на нивната работа на плантажите за екстрахирање на гума од шумите на Амазон. Ирационалниот, *дивјакот* е токму начинот на кој колонизаторот ги перципира Индијанците и токму од таквото видување на нештата извираат суровоста и непочитта кон тие луѓе. Начинот на кој овие Индијанци биле третирани, според извештајот на Касмент, покажува огромна доза на суровост и крвопролевање, што го тера Таусиг да ги турне границите отаде рационалните или економски мотиви за да го објасни насилието. Физичкото исцрпување, насилие и изгладнување на Индијанците секако на едно рационално ниво не може да се објасни, бидејќи ваквите постапки воделе кон губиток на работната сила. Па така, Таусиг во ова ја гледа деструкцијата на *дивјакот* по кој толку очајно трагаше Леви-Строс. Дивјакот е конструирана слика за Индијанецот онаков каков што го гледаат колонијалистите и како таков е негација на колонијалниот јаз. Единствениот начин да се уништи тој дивјак е да се третира со уште подивјачко насилие. Оттука, Таусиг влече маестрална констатација за тоа дека со постапките на една култура кај која насилието се спроведува систематски и е дел на една општествена структура, телото на Индијанецот во процесот во кој е освоено и измачувано е зоната во која идеологијата, моќта и знаењето стануваат едно со теророт (Taussig 29). Со острина на меч, Таусиг низ својата интерпретативна призма укажува на проблематичноста на редот и систематичноста што во случајот со Путумајо продуцираа дискурс на терор и стремеж кон елиминација на замислениот *дивјак*.

Конечно Вајнер (Weiner) низ деликатна анализа на народот Фои од Папуа Нова Гвинеја, прави одлично истапување во однос на создавање на нешто што тој го нарекува хајдегеровска антропологија. Вајнер го тангираат два клучни проблема. Едниот се однесува на преголемата естетизација на општествените науки, а другиот на западните етнографски методи во репрезентацијата на културите. Во потрага по некаква трансконтекстуална универзалност што тлее зад митот, ритуалот, општествените релации и сето она што е предмет на антрополошко истражување, Вајнер детектира една наивност во конструктивистичкото инсистирање на субјективност и е длабоко инспириран од Хајдегеровата критика на технологијата. Така, тој заговара хајдегеровска антропологија, која ќе извира од методолошкото и личното ангажирање со светот на стварите, луѓето и нивната отелотворена рационалност (Weiner 11). Така, Вајнер интервенира во современиот антрополошки занес да се врати субјективноста и „гласот“ на испитаниците кој честопати не го зема предвид фактот дека јазикот и другите начини на претставување го сокриваат исто онолку колку што го разоткриваат светот.

Интерпретацијата и кризата на репрезентацијата

Горенаведените видувања и интерпретативни антрополошки ангажмани се особено битни наспроти рецентната криза во антропологијата, попозната како криза на репрезентацијата. Оваа криза произлезе од сомнежот во веродостојноста на она што се опишува по пат на клучните методи во овие дисциплини, пред сè, етнографијата. Политичко-методолошката криза на доверба во примарната метода што се користи во антрополошкото производство на знаење, етнографијата, најсилно се манифестираше во 80-те години од минатиот век. Оваа криза ја доби својата манифестација во трудовите на Клифорд и Маркус, *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus 1986), како и во серијата статии меѓу кои особено се издвојуваат, *Ethnographies as Texts* (Marcus and Cushman 1982) и *On Ethnographic Surrealism* (Clifford 1981). За оваа дебата низ која се доведе во прашање целесообразноста на етнографијата како есенцијален метод во антропологијата, честопати во она што следуваше, се говореше како за постмодерна или современа антропологија. Меѓу клучните имиња што на овој или оној начин се сметаат одговорни за пресвртот во начинот на кој се пишуваше антропологијата во последните години од XX-от век се Џорџ Маркус (George Marcus), Мајкл Фишер (Michael Fischer), Ренато Розалдо (Renato Rosaldo), Џејмс Клифорд (James Clifford), Винсент Крапанзано (Vincent Crapanzano) итн. Иако тие самите никогаш навистина не прифатија да бидат етикетирани како претставници на постмодерната антропологија, тие сепак се несомнено главните основачи на теоријата на етнографијата што генерално се занимава со проблемот на *пишување на културата (writing culture).* Овие антрополози, инаку длабоко инспирирани од интердисциплинарноста која тогаш беше инвазивна на академската сцена во Америка, пласираа неколку проблеми во однос на дотогашните антрополошки парадигми и пред сè на етнографијата како метод. Нивната премиса беше етичката неприфатливост на раздвојувањето на теоријата и праксата, односно, евиденцијата. Оттука, тие се стремеа да ги уверат читателите во етички проблематичната позиција што извира особено од користењето на етнографијата и теренската работа. Имено, станува зборот за фактот дека опишувањето на светот секаде и секогаш подразбира некаква теорија, како и дека пишувањето за другите е пишување за „Другиот“.

Во воведниот текст *Introduction*: *Partial Truths,* кој говори за колекцијата есеи во книгата *Writing Culture,* Клифорд потенцира дека низ сите тие есеи провејува доминантната позиција дека културата е составена од комплексни кодови и репрезентации, дека поетиката и политиката се нераздвојни, како и дека науката е внатре, а не надвор или над историските и лингвистичките процеси (Clifford 2). Уште повеќе, продолжува тој, есеите го доведуваат во центарот на вниманието предикаментот на етнографијата, како и фактот дека таа е секогаш вплеткана во мрежата на инвенцијата, а не на репрезентацијата на културите. Според Клифорд, етнографските вистини се инхерентно *парцијални,* односно непотполни.

И покрај сите овие сериозни проблеми и остри критики со кои се соочи антропологијата кон крајот на минатиот век, горенаведените интерпретативни антрополошки ракурси укажуваат на еден сè уште силен пулсирачки потенцијал на оваа дисциплина, кој не смее да згасне во морето од критики за некоја нејзина божемна неоснованост, празнотија и импровизорна природа. Ваквите критики беа и инспирација за еден поинаков, интердисциплинарен пристап од кој, меѓу другото изникнаа и современите, сериозно ангажирани теми во антропологијата. Имено, станува збор за палета современи теми што ги преиспитуваат и интерпретираат културните граници, културните дијаспори, миграциите, насилството, флуктуацијата на капиталот, политичката фрагментација, режимите на општествена и морална контрола, неолибералните реформи, новите модуси на фармацевтската индустрија, информативната технологија, и ред други теми што антрополозите кои се занимаваат со најновите развојни текови на антропологијата, како на пример Онг (Ong) и Колиер (Collier), ги сублимираат во три целини кога говорат за технологијата, политиката и етиката како современи антрополошки проблеми.[2] Слично и Рабинов во последните години го

[2] Оваа забелешка се однесува на заедничкото издание на Ong и Collier, кое претставува колекција текстови од врвни антрополози во кои се третираат развојните текови на антропологијата во современиот свет. За подетален увид во проблематиките обработувани во овие текстови, види *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethnics as Anthropological Problems* (2005).

сврте својот фокус од класичните парадигми и студии на Мароко врз молекуларната биологија и геномика филтрирани низ призмата на биополитика (Agamben, Foucault). Ваквата промена извира од неговата согледба дека денес, повеќе од кога и да е, антропологијата треба да е пракса на изучување на формата што заемно поврзаните аспекти на познание, мислење и грижа ја стекнуваат низ континуирано променливите релации на моќ. Па така во *Midst Anthropology's Problems* Рабинов влегува во длабока анализа на теориите на Фуко (Foucault), Делез (Deleuze), Дјуи (Dewey) и се обидува да ги истражи формите на денешниот *антропос*. Истовремено, не изостава да забележи дека денес се соочуваме со непостоењето на *логос*, рационалност, онтологија, начин на спознавање и разбирање на денешниот *антропос*, кој е силно видоизменет во формите на живеење низ новите технологии. Во ваквите анализи и интерпретации на *антропосот*, антропологијата ја покажува повторно својата моќ за длабинска анализа и детектирање на состојбите во светот и заедниците.

Конечно, токму таа горенаведена криза на репрезентација, себескрутинизација и долга авторефлексија веројатно ги научи антрополозите денес повеќе за улогата на науката во културата и културата во науката отколку претходните генерации. Антропологијата веќе подолго време самата врз себе ги тестираше концептите на ирационалност, објективност, неутралност, а со тоа, измина долг пат на автотерапија. Токму поради тоа и поради човечката интонација што проби во неколкуте горенаведени интерпретативни анализи на културите, антропологијата треба да продолжи да ги анализира и интерпретира различните општествени феномени, процеси, состојби во светот.

Заклучок

Овој текст направи преглед врз современите случувања во општествените науки, со акцент врз културната антропологија и значителниот премин кон интерпретативно промислување на светот, културите и човекот кој се случи кон крајот од минатиот век. Во тој правец, се даде преглед на премисите на интерпретативната антропологија што го бележи својот зенит во 60-те години од минатиот век. Интерпретативната антропологија и воопшто, интерпретативниот модус на обмислување на нештата што силно продре во општествените науки кон крајот на XX-от век, ги придвижи нештата во однос на отпор и кршење на позитивистичките и формални начини на спознавање на светот. Преку анализа на неколку инспиративни интерпретативни текстови на Герц, Таусиг и Вајнер, овој текст се обиде да даде критика на сѐ уште доминантното гледиште дека човештвото може најпрецизно да се разбере низ позитивистички, формални и стерилни научни методи, а дека сѐ останато се сведува на субјективно, релативистичко нагаѓање. Истовремено, заклучоците одат во правец на желбата за враќање на довербата не само во антропологијата како наука која претрпе децении автотерапија и себерефлексија, туку и во нејзините интерпретативни, херменевтички пристапи кон изучувањето на човекот, кои помагаат во пронаоѓањето смисла на сообраќајот од релации помеѓу луѓето во светот.

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Accidentality and Knowledge After Gettier

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Abstract

Fifty years on since the publication of Gettier's famous article and there is still no widespread agreement among philosophers on some set of conditions that block Gettier cases and the like. In fact, there is much pessimism about some such project. The aim of this paper is to show that this pessimism is misplaced. I argue that an account that posits a reflective endorsement of the knowledge-yielding procedures that can be met at the social level can capture, what I here call, the *non-accidentality desideratum*. The lesson we can draw is that the project of adding some accidentality-blocker to true belief to have knowledge is not doomed if we give up the individualistic approach of much mainstream epistemology.

Keywords: knowledge, epistemic luck, Edmund Gettier, reflective endorsement, global reliabilism

Epistemology has experienced a bit of a renaissance within the last few decades and much of this can be traced back to Edmund Gettier's famous paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". Suddenly there was a puzzle that became the centre of attention; namely, the nature of knowledge, and there has been no shortage of proposals attempting to identify what has to be added to true belief in order to get knowledge. Different proposals put forward different "no accident" clauses that eliminate the knowledge-threatening epistemic luck that problematic cases, such as Gettier's own, exploit.

Fifty years on since the publication of Gettier's article and there is still no widespread agreement on some set of conditions that block these problematic cases. In fact, there is much pessimism about such project since the proposals have their own counter-examples with no sign of developing a successful one (e.g., Millar; Williamson). Moreover, the proposals are anyway likely to be quite complex and gerrymandered (and the more successful they are at dealing with counter-examples, the more complex and gerrymandered they are likely to be), making it hard to understand why we would have a concept that referred to such a thing (Hyman), let alone care about it (Kvanvig, *The Value*).

The aim of this paper is to show that this pessimism is misplaced. The project of adding some accidentality-blocker to true belief to be in a position to have knowledge is not doomed if we give up the individualistic approach of much mainstream epistemology. The social approach here put forward, I suggest, allows us to successfully address the *non-accidentality desideratum*, as I shall call it. Thus, I claim that there is an important lesson to be drawn from this. We can make progress understanding the nature of knowledge by not neglecting the realities of social interaction.

The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I introduce the non-accidentality desideratum. In §2, I present the Gettier cases and the type of knowledge-threatening epistemic luck that we should rule out. In §3, I put forward an account of knowledge that exploits social elements. In §4, I show how the proposed account meets the non-accidentality desideratum by showing how it deals with distinct sorts of cases. In §5, I offer some brief concluding remarks.

1 Non-Accidentality

Knowledge is ordinarily thought to be non-accidental, i.e., when we know, we don't have an accidental grasp of the truth. Crudely put, knowledge is incompatible with luck or chance, such as being the result of some lucky process.[1]

Most philosophers would accept this as a *desideratum*. Indeed, some have even provided analyses of knowledge that exploit this feature, such as: S knows that *p* iff it isn't at all accidental that S is right that *p* (Unger 158). But unfortunately no such account will do. The problem is that, even if they are accurate, they are neither theoretically illuminating nor practically useful (Zagzebski, "What is Knowledge?"). So, as Bernard Williams says, we "offer the "no accident" clause not as part of an analysis but [...] as a label for a class of conditions, the general requirements on which need to be spelled out with greater precision" (7). This is exactly what needs to be done—provide an anti-luck account of knowledge and elucidate the vague and not illuminating "non-accidental."

Nevertheless, although we commonsensically think that the end-result isn't knowledge if there is a fortuitous connection to the truth, we take some forms of luck to be benign, as when one is lucky to come across evidence that *p* (Unger). Still, our account should be in the business of dealing with Gettier-type cases since they seem to involve knowledge-threatening luck: in a sense the Gettiered subject gets things right by accident.

2 Veritic Luck

Gettier offers a couple of cases where one can have a justified true belief but intuitively one doesn't seem to know (122-3). Here is one of Gettier's cases: Smith is justified in

[1] I shall use 'accidentality' and 'luck' interchangeably.

believing that Jones will get the job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith then forms the justified belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. But Jones doesn't get it, Smith does, who happens to have ten coins in his pocket. So Smith has a justified true belief but, significantly, he doesn't seem to know.

His cases, Gettier claims, refute the Justified True Belief analysis, since justification, belief and truth aren't sufficient for knowledge. Now, Gettier's cases exhibit two general features: fallibility and accidentality. The first feature allows a belief to have positive epistemic status even though not all error-possibilities have been eliminated and so allows for the possibility that one can reach a false belief by exploiting a legitimate procedure (Gettier 121). The second feature allows a belief to be true by luck.[2] So, in Gettier's cases, one seems to achieve knowledge-constituting status about a belief that only by accident happens to be true.

Gettier cases then share both these features. When I form the belief that a sheep is in the field, I do so on the basis of, say, a reliable visual procedure that is meant to confer the relevant epistemic status but, unbeknownst to me, what I am actually looking at is a dog that resembles a sheep. Luckily, however, there is a sheep in the field, and so my belief is true and possesses the epistemic status to be knowledge but importantly it seems that it isn't an item of knowledge (Chisholm). Therefore, we can also see why some characterize Gettier cases as double-luck cases (Zagzebski, "The Inescapability", *Virtues*): where some bad luck (this time the non-perfectly reliable procedure didn't deliver the goods, although it normally does) is cancelled by some good luck (it just happens to be the case that there is a sheep in the field).

Now it seems that if we want our theory to be Gettier-proof, then we would do well in eliminating either of those features.[3] However, it isn't attractive for most of us to eliminate fallibilism (cf. Sturgeon). Scepticism is as unwelcomed as accidentality (if not more). So, by far, the most attractive option to deal with Gettier cases seems to be to eliminate accidentality. Of course this can be and has been attempted in different ways. Here I propose an account that can handle accidentality that I have developed elsewhere. But before I introduce the account, some distinctions with regard to the different types of luck that might be in play are called for. This is important because not all kinds are knowledge-undermining (Unger).

Following Duncan Pritchard (*Epistemic Luck* 133ff.), we can differentiate at least four *benign* varieties of epistemic luck: 1) *content luck* (when "it is lucky that the proposition is true," i.e., that a certain fact occurs), 2) *capacity luck* (when "it is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge," i.e., that she exists or has the pertinent abilities), 3) *evidential luck* (when "it is lucky that the agent acquires the evidence that she has

[2] See e.g. Dancy; Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck*; Unger; Zagzebski, "The Inescapability."

[3] Zagzebski ("The Inescapability", *Virtues*; cf. *On Epistemology*) seems to suggest that only infallibilist accounts can avoid these counterexamples; but see Howard-Snyder, Howard-Snyder, Feit.

in favour of her belief," i.e., that certain evidence becomes available) and 4) *doxastic luck* (when "it is lucky that the agent believes the proposition," i.e., that she forms the belief). Luck in these cases doesn't seem to threaten knowledge. But there is at least one type of epistemic luck that is knowledge-threatening: namely, *veritic luck*, which is "a matter of luck that the agent's belief is true."[4]

This is the knowledge-undermining luck that seems at play in Gettier cases (as the above "double-luck" description of the cases suggests), although, as we shall see below, there are different sub-types that seem incompatible with knowledge. Anyway, this is the kind of luck that we would need to eliminate if the account isn't to be subject to that sort of Gettier cases. So, given these cases which exploit veritic luck, we need to consider whether the account here proposed, and to be introduced next, can escape this kind of knowledge-threatening accidentality: whether knowers, according to our account, can't be veritically lucky believers.

3 Knowledge and Reflective Endorsement

It is often thought that a satisfactory account of knowledge should combine objective and subjective standards of appropriateness for a true belief to be knowledge (e.g., Fogelin; Russell). Normally this is understood in terms of a combination of *de facto* reliability and epistemic responsibility (e.g. Greco, *Putting Skeptics*; Zagzebski, *Virtues*). This combination seems desirable because, on the one hand, views that take into account only the subjective (or perspectival) aspect seem to fail to be appropriately normative. If Sid responsibly decides to use Tea-Leaf-Reading practices to find out the truth, those unreliable procedures do not seem to provide the knowledge-relevant normative status (Goldman, *Epistemology*; Greco, *Achieving*). On the other hand, views that take into account only the objective aspect are vulnerable to cases in which irresponsibility seems to rule out knowledge regardless of the reliability of one's belief-forming procedure (Zagzebski, *Virtues*). The well-known cases concerning reliable but epistemically naïve subjects, such as Norman (a reliable but naïve clairvoyant) and Mr. Truetemp (a reliable but naïve temperature-teller), suggest that reliability's positive epistemic status is swamped by irresponsibility due to their naivety with regard to the reliability of the procedures exploited (BonJour; Lehrer).

But this "standard way of looking at things" (Grimm 90) quickly gets us into trouble. Cases the pure reliabilist is quite fond of suggest this. For example, proprioception is a reliable faculty that many know nothing about it (not even about its existence), but we are nonetheless willing to attribute knowledge to those subjects when exploiting it. However, given reliability is necessary but not sufficient for the knowledge-relevant

[4] As Pritchard says: luck that "'intervenes' between the agent and the fact" ("Knowledge and Understanding" 36).

normative status of a true belief to be knowledge and that cases of reliable but epistemically naïve subjects motivate a responsibilist condition, we still seem to need some sort of admixture of reliability and responsibility. The problem, however, is to find a satisfactory combination of reliability and responsibility (M. Williams). But such combination is to be found by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time (De Brasi, "Reliability").

We cannot, as BonJour does, understand epistemic responsibility as demanding *the knower herself* to reasonably take the procedure exploited to be reliable, at the expense of over-intellectualizing knowledge.[5] After all, most ordinary subjects would often fail to satisfy this condition (even if allowed to satisfy it tacitly—BonJour 50). It seems that clear knowledge needn't be a reflective success of the subject: "Knowledge is a matter of responsiveness to the way the world is" (Roush 122), but not necessarily to reasons of the subject.[6] Having said that, we needn't give up BonJour's idea that we require some reflective endorsement of the knowledge-yielding procedures.

Although the personal reflective endorsement of procedures is implausibly demanding, its social analogue isn't. The proposed account then suggests that such reflective endorsement needn´t be performed by every knower of the epistemic community. Instead we can all exploit, as we often do, different procedures rooted in the epistemic community, for which we lack positive reasons, as long as the reflective endorsement is met at the social level. That is, although the knower needn't possess the positive grounds for the endorsement of the procedures that she and other members of the community rely on, some member of the community does. These procedures are, I shall say, *socially endorsed*: in the sense that some subject or, more likely, a group of subjects of the knower's epistemic community have undertaken through time the positive epistemic work to reasonably take the community's established procedures to be reliable.

The clearest example of subjects who appreciate the rationale behind our belief-forming procedures and who would also promote their revision through time if regarded necessary, is that of regulative or ameliorative epistemologists, whose job is to actively engage in the project to remedy the deficiencies of our epistemic practices (to increase their truth-conduciveness). In particular, the social endorsement is sometimes the product of some sort of epistemic policing that prompts the correction or perfection of inadequate procedures. And this social endorsement means that one, as a member of the community, is permitted to exploit any of its rooted knowledge-yielding procedures even in the absence of personal positive reasons for their endorsement.

[5] "Part of one's epistemic duty is to reflect critically upon one's beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing things to which one has, to one's knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic access" (BonJour 42). In particular, the knower should at least reasonably judge the belief-forming procedures to be reliable from within her system of beliefs (BonJour 50, 123).

[6] See e.g. Ayer; Goldman, *Epistemology*; Lewis; Millar.

This anti-individualist approach to knowledge-relevant responsibility yields the following account: (as a first approximation and ignoring defeaters and factivity) S knows that *p* iff (i) S's belief that *p* was formed by a reliable procedure, AND EITHER (ii.a) the procedure is reflectively endorsed by some member(s) of S's community and (ii.b) reliance on the procedure is a standard or established practice of the community, OR (iii) S herself reflectively endorses the procedure.

This account exploits a division of epistemic labour where some members of the community responsibly endorse the procedures for others and so corrects some unfortunate individualistic simplifications of much current mainstream epistemology that are inapt for theorizing about knowers who are members of social communities. Significantly, given we are to satisfy some perspectival dimension on knowledge, allowing the endorsement condition to be met at the social level makes the burden of epistemic responsibility less hard to endure, and so we end up with a plausible account that can accommodate the relevant intuitions regarding knowing and non-knowing epistemically naïve subjects, such as those who exploit proprioception and clairvoyance, respectively (De Brasi, "Reliability"). Moreover, the account can be independently motivated (De Brasi, "Testimony") and importantly for our purposes it can, as we shall see below, handle accidentality. The details of the account aren't relevant here, since all we need to capture the non-accidentality of knowledge is an account that posits belief-forming procedures that are endorsed to fulfil a certain job.

4 Gettier Cases

So, what can this account say about Gettier cases? In order to answer the question we need to note that the knowledge-yielding procedures are endorsed to connect us to the fact that makes the target proposition true. This is because the procedures are meant to be truth-discriminating—that is, they discriminate truths from falsehoods.[7] This notion of discrimination is central to reliability (Goldman, "Discrimination," *Epistemology*). As Alvin Goldman says, "To be reliable, a cognitive mechanism must enable a person to discriminate or differentiate between incompatible states of affairs" ("Discrimination" 771). So this should be seen as a refinement on our understanding of knowledge-yielding procedures: a procedure for *p* can discriminate *p* from other state of affairs where *p* is false.[8]

[7] Indeed, if this capacity were lacking, one would be achieving the truth accidentally and not have knowledge (McGinn).

[8] Consequently, a "knowledge attribution imputes to someone the discrimination of a given state of affairs from possible alternatives" (Goldman, "Discrimination" 772).

Indeed, as mentioned, knowledge requires responsiveness to the world and discrimination is the natural option that allows us to achieve such responsiveness.[9] Knowledge requires a proper connection to the fact that makes the target proposition true, where a "proper connection" is a connection that allows us to discriminate such proposition from other state of affairs where it is false. So knowledge-yielding procedures provide us with the capacity to distinguish competing state of affairs and it is with this constraint in mind that the procedures are endorsed.

But Gettier cases are *ex-hypothesi* cases, in which no such connection occurs because they are cases of "double-luck." In other words, in these cases, the procedure fails to connect us to the fact (say, the sheep in the field) that makes the target proposition true. Now, given fallibilism, Gettier cases don't give us a reason for not endorsing the procedures we happen to exploit in those cases unless these cases represent (given our worldview) significant error-possibilities. And I take it they don't, so these procedures needn't be given up.

Having said that, in these cases, the procedures do fail to connect us to the relevant facts and so they don't work as they should. Just like an artefact can fail, in certain cases, to work in accordance with the way it was designed, so can the procedures. And Gettier cases are cases in which this is so. The Gettiered subject doesn't know since the procedure employed fails to work as it was conceived to do by not connecting her to the fact that makes the target proposition true. That is, in cases of double-luck, the subjects employ procedures that are endorsed to fulfil a certain function but fail to do so. In these cases, we can say that the procedures fail to work as conceived when endorsed.

4.1 Goldman-Ginet Cases

But there are other cases, which one might at first think are Gettier-*like*, that don't seem in fact to have the same structure as Gettier cases. One such case is the fake-barn case, where although one believes that it is a barn after seeing the only real barn among many fake ones, one doesn't seem to know (Goldman, "Discrimination").[10] So, unlike the above sheep case where the subject isn't looking at a sheep but the belief she forms ends up anyway being true, in the fake-barn case the subject does see the real barn about which she forms her belief. And the problem in the latter case seems to rest with the nature of the environment in which one comes to believe that it is a barn. Indeed, it is important

[9] Sensitivity, which roughly requires that if *p* were false, S wouldn't believe that *p*, is another way of being responsive to the world. But, Roush argues, safety, which roughly requires that if S believed that *p*, then p would be true, fails to be so since "it gets the direction of fit wrong for what knowledge is" (121). Regardless of this, neither of them seems the natural (or right) option; see below.

[10] These aren't cases where the subject lacks knowledge because of some defeater. The subject is unaware of the situation and we can stipulate that there is no reason why she should be. If this weren't so, the case would be explained by such defeater.

to distinguish at least two different types of problematic cases.[11] Firstly, those cases in which what seems to be exploited is some kind of *veritic double-luck*—a luck that "'intervenes' between the agent and the fact." Gettier's own cases and Chisholm's sheep case are of this kind, so we can continue to call them Gettier cases. Secondly, those cases in which what seems to be exploited is some kind of *environmental veritic luck*—a luck that concerns the environment in which the procedure generates the success. The paradigmatic example being the fake-barn case, so we can call them *Goldman-Ginet cases* (given Carl Ginet's involvement in Goldman's fake-barn case).

Consequently, what can our account say about Goldman-Ginet cases? Again, in order to answer the question we need to note that the knowledge-yielding procedures are responsibly endorsed to promote the truth given our worldview. Now this endorsement of procedures presupposes that certain background conditions are in place (say, that it isn't habitual for countrymen to build fake-barns) and, given these conditions, the procedures are reasonably taken to be truth-conducive. Indeed, these are the conditions that one naturally presupposes, given our shared worldview, to obtain when employing a procedure. And it is these background conditions presupposed by the procedures, i.e., the conditions for which the procedure was endorsed, that allow us to handle the denials of knowledge in Goldman-Ginet cases. After all, in these cases it seems the procedures would be exploited in situations that they weren't endorsed for, and so we can explain why knowledge isn't to be possessed.

The procedures are endorsed to be exploited *in certain environmental conditions* in which they are reasonably taken to be truth-conducive (hence allowing them to be legitimate[12]), but in Goldman-Ginet cases those environmental conditions are different if the subject is at the time exploiting a procedure that for *her* community (given their worldview and environment) is legitimate.[13] The subject then doesn't know since there is a mismatch of environmental conditions—a mismatch between the conditions for which the procedure was endorsed (say, a fake-barn free environment) and the conditions in which it is used (say, an environment that is replete with fakes). So the procedure to determine from a distance whether something is a barn is endorsed, given our worldview, with a certain type of environment in mind, which isn't, as the case states, one where there is an abundance of fake-barns (after all, attempting to individuate barns in such a fake-barn infected environment wouldn't be reasonably regarded as truth-conducive), and so we don't know in the fake-barn case.

[11] See e.g. Greco, *Achieving*; Pritchard, *Knowledge*, "Apt Performance," "Knowledge and Understanding."

[12] Of course, as mentioned above, in order to be legitimate procedures, they also need to be, as a matter of fact, truth-conducive.

[13] If the subject weren't exploiting a *legitimate* procedure of her community in this sort of case, then we could easily explain her lack of knowledge in the fake-barn case since merely looking at a barn from a distance wouldn't put us on a position to know that there is a barn.

So the account can also capture our intuitions concerning the Goldman-Ginet cases. But one might think that ours is a pseudo-solution since it still can't deal with the real problem—that even if we aren't in an epistemically inhospitable environment, we *could have been* in some such unfortunate environment (Pritchard, "Knowledge and Understanding"). It is just a matter of luck that we aren't, and this luck is meant to eliminate knowledge. Now, if this were so, our account would be in trouble. After all, if the procedure is being applied in the environment for which it was endorsed, and even if it is just a matter of luck that we happen to be in such an environment (and barring defeaters), then such application of the procedure won't eliminate knowledge. Fortunately, our intuitions don't seem to clearly follow that pattern.

Let us adapt the fake-barn case so that the subject is in Real-Barn County, where there are no fake-barns, and sees a real barn but she would, unbeknownst to her, instead be in Fake-Barn County if she had turned left at the junction 10 miles ago (as she could have easily done, since she is just driving around). My intuition is that she knows. And, although I don't expect everyone to share it, I do expect many to do so, since this just seems to be a case of benign luck: particularly, a case of capacity luck, when it is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge by having the pertinent abilities.[14] Our strong intuitions about the subject in the original fake-barn case lacking knowledge are the result of *actually* exploiting the ability or procedure in the wrong environment. And this then is a case of "environmental luck" because, although the environment in which the procedure is being applied isn't the one for which it was endorsed, the procedure stills delivers in this instance the truth. Such environmental luck is knowledge-precluding and our account can do justice to this.

4.2 Harman Cases

However, Goldman-Ginet cases aren't alike another kind of cases, which we might call, *Harman cases*, such as the political assassination case, Donald's letters case, and Tom

[14] Cf. Sosa, *A Virtue*. In his account of (animal) knowledge as apt true belief, a belief is apt if it is accurate because it is competent or "adroit." What matters is the ability of the epistemic agent and that this cognitive ability is responsible for the cognitive success. A belief isn't apt if it isn't successful "sufficiently" because of the subject's adroitness (Sosa, *A Virtue* 79). It seems this account won't fully capture our intuitions about Goldman-Ginet cases, since environmental luck doesn't seem to interfere with the aptness of a performance (Pritchard, "Apt Performance"). In those cases, "the act fails to be *safely* successful, since it might too easily have failed, through lack of the required competence or conditions. It might still be apt, nevertheless, indeed attributably, creditably apt" (Sosa, *A Virtue* 81). So, Sosa's account give us the right results when considering the *adapted* fake-barn cases because it ignores safety, but the wrong ones when considering the *original* case because its aptness condition is satisfied (cf. Greco, *Achieving*). After all, in the original case, the subject isn't using the right "tool" for those conditions, although she happens to get the truth. Nevertheless, the fact that she could have very easily used some other tool, without being epistemically irresponsible, when she actually used the right one doesn't undermine the actual success.

Grabit case (Harman 142-4), which are sometimes (misleadingly) thought to exploit the "social aspect" of knowledge (Meeker). In these cases, it seems, according to Gilbert Harman, that the subject doesn't have knowledge and this seems to be the result of there being evidence that can easily be accessed by the subject, which isn't anyway acting irresponsibly (i.e. being negligent with regard to the evidence) and which, if so accessed, it would count as a psychological defeater. For example, in the assassination case, one has gained a true belief about the death of the dictator by testimony (say, some newspaper), but when one is isolated from media reports in one's hotel room, false denials of the dictator's death are being aired. But I am not sure most people would share Harman's intuitions (I, for one, don't) and indeed some claim that many don't (Lycan 121).

Moreover, according to our account, the subject does know in these cases. This is because the knowledge-yielding procedures are silent about this possibility of luckily, but not irresponsibly, lacking some misleading evidence that is easily accessible and that would undermine knowledge, so no condition is being violated in these cases. And this seems to be as it should, given the resemblance of this case to cases of benign evidential luck—when it is lucky that the agent acquires the evidence that she has in favour of her belief. Although in these cases the luck doesn't concern the evidence that becomes available but the evidence that doesn't, still we are lucky, but not irresponsible, with regard to the total evidence acquired. And this kind of luck doesn't seem knowledge-precluding.

In any case, given the controversial nature of the intuitions behind Harman cases, they seem to lack the counter-exemplary force that Gettier cases and Goldman-Ginet cases enjoy (Lycan 125). Because of this, Harman cases are unlikely to trump theories. Nevertheless, if we are right about these cases instantiating a sort of benign evidential luck, we can understand why many would be wary of the denial of knowledge in these cases.

4.3 Local and Global Reliabilism

Finally, note that the account proposed, as a form of *global reliabilism*, can eliminate cases of what we might call *procedural veritic luck*. This is the kind of knowledge-undermining luck that sensitivity and safety theories suffer from, because of their shared *local reliabilism*, where the method employed need only be reliable with regard to the targeted proposition (Goldman, *Epistemology*; McGinn). Let me explain.

A local reliabilist theory of knowledge, as Colin McGinn says, "localizes the conditions for knowledge into a relation between the knower and a unique proposition [whereas a global reliabilist theory] speaks of the person's propensity to believe the truth with respect to a range of distinct 'relevant' propositions" (116-7). So, the main difference between a local and a global reliability theory concerns the range of propositions taken into account or, as Goldman says, "uses for which the process is reliable"

(*Epistemology* 44-5). Indeed, "Global reliability is reliability for all (or many) uses of the process, not just its use in forming the belief in question" (*Epistemology* 45). Roughly put, the difference between these theories lies in the emphasis on the reliability of either type processes (global reliabilism) or particular propositions (local reliabilism). More precisely, we need to distinguish between the reliability of a process in general and the reliability of a process with respect to a given proposition.

The relevance of this distinction is that a local account, such as the sensitivity or safety theories, is then susceptible to counterexamples that exploit their locality. But before making this clear, let me briefly introduce these local theories. A sensitivity theory states that knowledge is sensitive true belief, where this sensitivity is understood as the satisfaction of the following subjunctive: not-p→not-B(p); which in a crude but intuitive reading states that "if *p* were false, S wouldn't believe that *p*" and in evaluating this condition we consider only close possible worlds (Nozick).[15] A safety theory, on the other hand, states that following subjunctive: B(p)→p; which again in a crude, but intuitive reading, states that "if S believed that *p*, then *p* would be true" and, again, only close possible worlds are relevant to its evaluation (Sosa, "How to Defeat").

Now, needless to say, both principles have been criticized for a variety of reasons.[16] But regardless of the success of these criticisms, safety theories can't rule out cases involving procedural luck. That is, even if these theories might naturally be seen as arising out of the need to be able to eliminate cases of malign luck (Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck*, "Knowledge, Luck"), because of their local nature, they can't rule out the sort of luck that global theories can. After all, globally unreliable procedures that safely or sensitively deliver the truth, say by some quirk of nature, for the targeted propositions seem possible. Intuitively, it seems that the subject doesn't know in these cases, precisely because the procedure employed isn't globally reliable – it is in a sense lucky that the belief is true and safe, since the procedure isn't globally reliable. The local reliability of a procedure shouldn't be happenstance and the above sort of scenario hasn't gone unnoticed. For example, Pritchard (*Knowledge*, "Knowledge and Understanding") introduces a case where one can safely acquire the truth because some person makes sure that one does so with regard to the targeted proposition (by arranging the world accordingly) in most nearby (and in all very close nearby) possible worlds (hence locally reliable), but the procedure employed isn't truth-conducive across a range of relevant propositions.[17]

[15] Strictly speaking Nozick holds a stronger theory which requires a fourth ("adherence") condition: p→B(p). So his "tracking" theory requires subjunctive sensitivity to both truth and falsehood; while "sensitivity theories" require only subjunctive sensitivity to falsehood.

[16] See e.g. Comesaña; Greco "Worries;" Hiller and Neta; Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck*; Sosa, "How to Defeat," "Skepticism."

[17] But, couldn't we use this helper-scenario to create counter-examples to global accounts, including the one here proposed? Notice that, although a range of our beliefs would in this case be true (the helper

So in response to this deficiency of local reliabilism one might attempt to combine local and global reliabilism, as anti-luck virtue epistemologists do (Pritchard, "Knowledge and Understanding"). In this case, one would give up the pure safety or sensitivity account for a hybrid account that exploits both local and global features—say, safety and virtue-reliabilist conditions, respectively. There is indeed no problem in mixing these two approaches since they aren't mutually exclusive (Goldman, *Epistemology* 47).[18] And in fact this sort of hybrid approach is already attempted by Goldman (*Epistemology*), who endorses both local and global reliability (cf. McGinn). But if what I say above is correct, no such hybrid is required. Our version of global reliabilism can preclude the sort of veritic double-luck involved in Gettier cases and the environmental luck involved in Goldman-Ginet cases, as well as the above procedural luck. No supplementation from local principles, such as safety and sensitivity, is required. Having said that, the pure local alternative to understanding reliability is unsatisfactory, if it is not supplemented by a global condition. That is, pure safety and sensitivity theories, where the subject's belief is "subjunctively connected to the fact" (Nozick 178), will not do, since they fail to rule out cases of procedural luck.

To sum up, there are different kinds of epistemic luck and not all are knowledge-undermining. But veritic double-luck, environmental-luck and procedural-luck are epistemically deleterious. Now pure local reliabilist accounts can't do justice to procedural luck, since a procedure can be locally reliable by accident, hence suggesting the adoption of hybrid theories that combine local and global reliabilism. But this isn't required since the global reliabilist account here proposed can do justice to the different sorts of knowledge-threatening veritic luck; hence satisfying, I suggest, the non-accidentality desideratum.

Of course I anyway anticipate costs to this account. Even if our account can handle Gettier cases and the like, and so capture the non-accidentality desideratum, it might fail to capture some other desideratum, in which case we would have to weight the costs and benefits of the competing theories to adjudicate between them. But regardless of that, this account seems to possess the means to capture a desideratum that others don't.

5 Conclusion

Fifty years on since Gettier's article, there is I think one lesson to be learned: one can make progress in epistemology if one does not ignore the social dimensions of our prac-

makes sure they are), the procedure itself doesn't connect us to the facts that make the targeted propositions true (that is indeed what the helper is doing for us); hence depriving us of knowledge.

[18] Although one might worry the move is *ad hoc*. Pritchard ("Knowledge and Understanding" 59-62) attempts to address this.

tices. Indeed, as Jonathan Kvanvig says, "we should never begin to think that the deepest epistemological questions concern the isolated intellect" (*The Intellectual Virtues* 177). The account here proposed, by positing a reflective endorsement of the knowledge-yielding procedures that can be met at the social level, grants a fuller engagement with the sort of social issues to which traditional epistemology is often blind given its strongly individualist orientation. This social approach corrects the unfortunate individualistic simplifications of much current mainstream epistemology which are inapt for theorizing about knowers who are members of social communities and which won't allow us to capture the perspectival dimension on knowledge. This correction, I have argued, allows us to capture the non-accidentality desideratum, showing that the pessimism displayed by some against the project of adding some accidentality-blocker to true belief to have knowledge is misplaced.

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Pre-Socratic Understanding of Justice by Željko Kaluđerović

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In the last few decades, philosophical literature features a renewed interest in the concept of justice. Authors reflect upon different understandings of justice, both from a methodological and from a substantial point of view. While some are trying to conceive a distributive theory of justice that will be universally acceptable for all societies, others believe that it is not possible to construct a theory of justice outside the historical and cultural context, i.e. beyond the meaning and significance of social goods to which the principles of justice apply. There is a fraction of thinkers who speak of a universal normative formula for justice, which would be useful for the evaluation of all societies; and a fraction of those who argue that a valid theory of justice is just one elaborate form of an already existing understanding of justice, which is based on social conventions, and therefore varies from one case to another.

In the context of layered and dispersive considerations of justice, most of the philosophers search for the foothold for their points of view in the work of the great thinkers from the recent or the distant past. The introductory parts of many books, as well as the corresponding vocabularies, superficially base the sketching ideas about justice on some of the most important forerunners who dealt with these issues; or they linger on one or many predecessors, chosen by the writer's will. The situation becomes more glaring as it goes deeper into the past, retiring not only temporally but also spiritually from the modern era, and approaching the *arche* of science itself. Such an approach cannot fully meet the basic intentions of a stringing research, because for a fundamental and profound understanding of the idea of justice in its varied manifestations through its 2600 years long history, a systematic approach to the earliest manifestations of this idea is required; only then it can be adequately received in its multiple dimensions.

The book *Pre-Socratic Understanding of Justice* by Željko Kaluđerović is a valuable contribution to the introduction of the ideas of justice developed by ancient Greeks in Serbia and in the region. The book comes as a result of many years of research of justice, and was initiated in the work on Kaluđerović's doctoral dissertation. It would be difficult to list all the changes, especially those of content and stylistic nature, which the author put in the edited version of the book which is in front of the readers. Changes were made because of occasional digressions and necessary refinement prompted by his subsequent insights; because of the further corrected translation solutions of the essential philosophical terms and concepts available; as well as due to the need for a more synoptic and fluent presentation. Although, in a temporal sense, it comes after the book *Hellenic Conception of Justice* (Zoran Stojanović Publishing Bookstore, Sremski Karlovci/Novi Sad 2010), this work called *Pre-Socratic Understanding of Justice* logically precedes it. Specifically, the contents of the two books complement each other and overlap in their intention. With the appropriate selection of thinkers and the appropriate synthesis of relevant material, taking into account its unique background, they represent a coherent whole in terms of presentation, understanding and perception of justice from Homer to Aristotle.

In his book *Pre-Socratic Understanding of Justice* Željko Kaluđerović opted for an integrated interpretation of the process of establishing the ancient Hellenic notions of justice and for the clarification of the historical flow of thought, in which these notions transformed into a philosophical understanding of justice. Such an integrity of research interest dictated the need, in presenting the complex Hellenic perception of justice, to take into account the nonphilosophical and pre-philosophical Hellenic opinions, as well as the reflected philosophical experience of opinions. While depicting the process of representation of justice, Kaluđerović establishes a relationship between the consideration of the rudimentary meanings of justice and the determinaton of its existential characteristics, equivalences and correlations. These features included rationing merit and rights that members of the tribal aristocracy were considered to have in the community, with a constant reminder that the „*dike*" commonly referred to the two parties that were in dispute. The author found that the early Greek concept of justice, by the range of its distribution, without specific doctrinal difficulties, extends beyond the boundaries of what is now called the practical-political sphere. Justice, besides being a legitimate basis for the entire human *praxis*, was also an overall cosmic principle of metaphysical proportions. In addition, the mention of justice in ancient times had a religious connotation - a context that the first „physicists" inherited from their own mythopoetic past.

By developing the main thesis of his book, Kaluđerović showed that in the initial modalities of the concept of justice there was a dimension of justice that would allow its use in the relations between polises. Then, the book follows the shaping of the idea of justice in „a poem about justice", a contribution to its establishing by the Athenian legislators and one of the seven sages, Solon, through the regularity and rhythm of the evolution of justice in the works of the famous tragedians, with a special emphasis on

Ashley's *Oresteia*, from cosmic to legal justice, and until the indication of individual rightness. Then, the first philosophical text in which the notion of justice is used, along with its understanding as *isakis isos* and *antipeponthos*, is analyzed. After seeing justice as an established order of things, the chapter *Dike-Ananke* classifies justice as a universal cosmic force, and justice in terms of adherence to the *ethos* and *nomos*, according to the author, has the center of its reflective abstraction strongly shifted towards the practical sphere. Kaluđerović conducts the key interpretive and researching move in a systematic survey of understanding of the justice in Callicles and Protagoras. Sophistic consciousness, represented primarily in Protagoras, seeked a measure of justice in itself, and no longer only in the world's experience. Callicles, praising the intemperance, licentiousness and freedom as virtue and happiness, destroyed the understanding of arithmetic and geometric equality, as well as the foundation on which the presentation and understanding of justice rested - the relation of equivalence. With such attitudes of Callicles, the author concludes, the sophistic view brought about radical consequences, and the understanding of individual justice was taken to the extreme.

Finally, in his book *Pre-Socratic Understanding of Justice*, Željko Kaluđerović, through an enviable research and reflective meticulousness, was able to conduct a comprehensive interpretation of the representation and understanding of justice, and to show at the same time why, with the later conception of justice, it became the very basis of the practical experience of Western civilization with all its subsequent institutional and consciously reflected forms.

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